From The
American
Academy of Political and Social Science,
175,
September 1934, 11-18. In 1934 Barnes views the “Hitler movement in
Germany” as “a menace to European peace,” but insists that it “could not
conceivably have arisen to power except upon the wave of resentment in
the minds of the German people against the war-guilt charge and the
punitive measures which have grown out of it.”
Appended to this prophetic interbellum
article is this author description: “Harry Elmer Barnes, Ph.D., has been
editorial writer for Scripps-Howard newspapers since 1929, and is a
lecturer and debater in this country and abroad. He has been on the
faculty, in the departments of history and sociology, of
Syracuse University, Columbia University, Clark University, New School
for Social Research,
Smith
College, and Amherst College. In three books: The Genesis of the
World War, In Quest of Truth and Justice, and World Politics in
Modern Civilization, and in many articles, he has devoted his
attention specifically to the problem of war guilt and its bearing on
current world politics.”
The Public Significance of the War Guilt Question
Harry
Elmer Barnes
There are many sane,
sensible, and informed people who believe that we should discourage
discussion of the war-guilt question on the general ground that it is
better to let sleeping dogs lie in peace. They hold that to bring up
the question of war responsibility only revives war hatreds and
postpones the desirable healing process which must precede any permanent
peace. They claim that it is best to forget the war propaganda and
Versailles
and to put our trust in the League,
Locarno,
and the Kellogg Pact.
Most reasonable
persons will agree that world peace is a larger and more important issue
than settling the question of who started the World War. If it could be
shown that silence upon the question of war guilt would hasten and
assure world peace we might remain silent, however great the moral
injustice to the Central Powers.
It appears to the
writer, however, that the position of those now opposed to a discussion
of the causes of the war is illogical and untenable. There can be no
hope of establishing peace in Europe until the moral and material
injustices of the Treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain, and Trianon are
undone and Europe is reconstructed in harmony with justice and decency. The
plant of
Locarno cannot flourish in the pot of Versailles. The facts and the
principles underlying these two settlements are irreconcilably opposed.
One can scarcely look
for peace in a Europe with no adequate international organization, when
thirty national states threaten peace instead of the eighteen which
existed in 1914. A settled state of affairs could hardly be expected to
develop when Germany and her allies were disarmed and compelled to pay
crushing indemnities on the ground of their sole responsibility for the
great conflict, while the Entente Powers, armed to the teeth, endeavored
to reduce or evade altogether their pecuniary obligations to the United
States on the assumption that they saved us from perpetual slavery under
the heavy hand of the Hun.
The crying injustices
of Transylvania, the Tirol, Bessarabia, Macedonia, the Polish Corridor,
the Saar, and Silesia, to mention but a few of the more atrocious fruits
of Versailles, must be rectified before Europe can aspire to permanent
peace. Otherwise, the oppressed nations will but await a more favorable
alignment of European powers to renew the vain attempt to secure justice
by deceit and force.
The Story of the Allies
The full import and
significance of the war-guilt controversy cannot be apparent unless we
are completely aware of the revolution in historical interpretation
which has taken place in the last decade and a half with respect to this
question.
The Entente epic of
1914-18 ran essentially as follows: For years prior to 1914, France,
Russia, England, and their associates had been working steadily for the
peace of Europe and a concert of nations. But they had been blocked at
every turn by German bluff, aggression, and ill will. Germany was
impatiently awaiting the arrival of Der Tag, when she would
overrun all Europe as she had France in 1870-71. She had built up a
colossal and unmatched military machine, having become nothing less than
a great military octopus threatening the peace of the world.
Der Tag
came when the
Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was
assassinated at Sarajevo on June 28, 1914. It was even asserted by some
Entente writers that this assassination was plotted by militarists in
Germany and Austria who could tolerate no further delay.
Immediately the
Allied states tried to hold the situation in check by diplomatic
measures, but Germany spurned them all. When her ally, Austria, seemed
likely to listen to reason,
Germany
threw everything to the winds and plunged
Europe into blood and ruin through a premature and utterly
unprovoked declaration of war on
Russia. Turning
westward, she declared war on France and invaded the defenseless little
neutral state of Belgium, thus transforming the solemn obligations of
nations into scraps of paper.
The allied states,
thus suddenly surprised in an ambush attack by the German “gorilla,”
reluctantly but gallantly took up the sword in self-defense. England
came in solely to champion the cause of “poor little Belgium” after she
had exhausted every resource of diplomacy and persuasion. The war, thus
begun with clean hands on the part of the Entente, was carried on as a
noble and idealistic enterprise. There was no thought of territorial or
financial aggrandizement. The Allies fought for the sanctity of
international law, for the rights of small nations, for the end of
military dictatorship, for the freedom of the seas, for democracy, and
for world organization to prevent another season of carnage. There were
no secret agreements among them. All was aboveboard and exposed to the
clear noonday light of truth and sincerity. Never before had so many
states united to shed their blood in the cause of pure and limpid
idealism.
On the other hand,
Germany continued her brutality after the fashion of her brazen acts in
the summer of 1914. She reduced war to the lowest level of savagery,
not only crucifying captured soldiers, but even brutally and wantonly
assaulting, mutilating, and murdering non-combatants, many of them women
and children. German submarines transferred the barbarism from land to
the waters, turning their guns on the poor devils who were struggling to
keep afloat.
This pretty myth
might have been believed for generations had not revolutionary overturns
in Germany, Austria, and Russia permitted the publication of the secret
documents in foreign offices which told the real truth about 1914. They
also exposed the facts about the Allied agreements after the war broke
out—i.e., the notorious Secret Treaties.
The Reverse Side
We now have the
actual facts about 1914. They represent a complete reversal of the
Entente picture, though nobody of sense regards Germany as a snow-white
and guiltless lamb in the midst of a pack of howling and badly smeared
wolves.
In the decade before
the war, Germany had made vigorous efforts to arrive at an understanding
with Russia, France, and England, but had failed. This was partially
due to the French determination to obtain Alsace-Lorraine, to the
British jealousy of German naval, mercantile, and colonial power, and to
the Russian desire for the Straits. It was in part due to the maladroit
diplomacy of Chancellor von Bülow and his evil genius, Baron von
Holstein. From 1912 to 1914, Izvolski, Russian ambassador in Paris, and
President Poincaré of France carried through a diplomatic revolution
which placed France and Russia in readiness for any favorable diplomatic
crisis which would bring England in on their side and make possible the
recapture of Alsace-Lorraine and the seizure of the Straits.
This opportunity came
after the assassination of the Archduke. Germany accepted all the
important diplomatic proposals of 1914 save one. For this she
substituted one which England admitted was far superior. She tried to
hold Austria in check after July 27, but France and Russia refused to be
conciliatory. In the midst of promising diplomatic negotiations, Russia
arbitrarily ordered a general mobilization on the German frontier.
France had given her prior approval. This mobilization had long been
admitted to be tantamount to a declaration of war on Germany. After
vainly exhorting the Russians to cancel their mobilization, Germany
finally set her forces in action against the numerous Russian hordes.
France informed Russia that she had decided on war a day before
Germany
declared war on Russia and three days before Germany declared war on
France. England came in to check the growth of German naval, colonial,
and mercantile power. The Belgian gesture was a transparent subterfuge,
used by Grey to inflame the British populace. He has himself admitted
that he would have resigned if England had not entered the war, even
though Germany
had respected Belgian neutrality. The documents show us that Grey
refused even to discuss Belgian neutrality with Germany as a condition
of British neutrality. Belgium did not figure in the British cabinet
discussions when war was decided upon. Lord Morley’s Memorandum on
Resignation proves this.
War Aims of the Nations
In the light of the
well-established facts about 1914, it is now clear that, under existing
circumstances, Serbia, Russia, and France wished a European war in the
summer of 1914; that Austria-Hungary wished a local punitive war but not
a European war; and that Germany, Great Britain, and Italy would have
preferred no war at all, but were too dilatory, stupid, or involved to
act with sufficient expedition and decisiveness to avert the calamity.
In 1918 the
Bolsheviks of Russia published the notorious Secret Treaties of the
Allies. These proved that the idealistic Entente pretensions about the
aims of their war were no more valid than their mythological assertions
about the events of the summer of 1914. Russia was to get the Straits,
Constantinople, and adjacent districts. France was to get
Alsace-Lorraine and the left bank of the Rhine. Italy was to make the
Adriatic an Italian lake. Great Britain was to be rewarded by the
destruction of the German navy, merchant marine, and colonial empire.
Altogether, they were to destroy the “economic power of
Germany.”
These treaties, of course, sent the Allied “Holy War” myth gurgling to
the bottom of the sea, spurlos versenkt. Wilson tried to block
their execution at
Versailles,
but with indifferent success. As William Allen White well expressed the
facts, Wilson
traded “the shadow of American ideals for the substance of European
demands.”
The courageous works
of Ponsonby, Avenarius, Grattan, Viereck, and others have likewise upset
the war-time myths about German atrocities. It is amply proved that
even the Bryce Report was consciously falsified and completely
unreliable. Even Admiral Sims admitted that there was but one German
submarine atrocity, and for this the German commander was punished.
This remarkable
reversal of historical opinion relative to responsibility for the World
War does not, of course, give Germany any ground for assuming a
holier-than-thou attitude. She did not wish war in 1914 because her
aspirations and policies were being remarkably well realized through
peaceful channels and activities. Her pacific attitude did not grow out
of her superior moral principles or a more sincere devotion to the cause
of peace. Had some of her basic goals and public policies been
realizable only through war, as was the case with France and Russia,
there is every probability that Germany would have been just as
bellicose in 1914 as were these other powers.
The Evidence
The reader may
legitimately raise the question as to how we know that this so-called
“revisionist” interpretation of war responsibility is any more sound or
assured than the views which passed current during the war period. The
answer is that we now have about all the relevant facts that will ever
be known with respect to war responsibility in 1914.
The situation is
wholly novel in human experience. As a result of the revolutions in
Russia, Austria, and Germany, new governments appeared on the scene
which had no reason for desiring to conceal the facts which might
possibly turn out to be discreditable to the preceding royal regimes.
Indeed, they hoped that the documents in the foreign offices would
actually show that the imperial governments had been responsible for
bringing on the Great War. They believed that such proof would help to
maintain the revolutionary governments in power. They counted on an
increased popular hatred of the older regimes from the knowledge that
the monarchical governments had been responsible for the suffering which
the World War had entailed.
Therefore, the
Austrian and German governments voluntarily published a full and
complete edition of the documents in their respective foreign offices
bearing on the crisis of 1914—the so-called Red Book and the
Kautsky Documents. The Germans subsequently published all the
important documents on the whole period from 1870 to 1914, the Grosse
Politik. These allowed the facts to speak for themselves as to
German foreign policy in the half-century before the war, and challenged
the other states to do likewise.
The Russian Bolshevik
government did not systematically publish its documents, but allowed
French and German scholars, such as Marchand and Stieve, to have access
to the archives and to make adequate selections. The Stieve collection,
known as Der diplomatische Schriftwechsel lswolskis, is the
standard edition, and its honesty and adequacy cannot be challenged. It
deals particularly with the work of Izvolski in carrying through the
great diplomatic revolution of 1912-14 in collaboration with President
Poincaré of France.
The Austrians were
long delayed in the publication of material on the period before 1914
because of the opposition of the Entente to the appearance of such
potentially damaging documents. Finally, in 1930, Austrian scholars
published an eight-volume collection of source material on
Austro-Serbian relations from 1908 to 1914. This has made necessary a
much more lenient judgment of Austria than was possible when Professor
Fay’s important work appeared in 1928.
The British
Government was the first nonrevolutionary government voluntarily to
publish its documents bearing on the outbreak of the World War. This it
began in the autumn of 1926, and ten other volumes are in process of
publication on the period from 1898 to 1914.
Finally shamed and
smoked out, the French began in 1928 to publish a collection of
diplomatic documents on the prewar period. The fact that the
supervisory authorities are mainly public functionaries rather than
impartial scholars makes it highly probable that the French documents
will not possess the completeness or the candor to be observed in the
earlier publications. But so much documentary material has now been
published by other states which enables us to check up on the French
documents that we may be certain that the colossal frauds and forgeries
which characterized the original French Yellow Book will not be
possible in this more extended collection of French documents.
This documentary
material has been accompanied by special monographs, by biographies and
memoirs of leading figures in the diplomatic history of Europe from 1870
to 1914, and by able works which have sought to assemble, appraise, and
summarize the significance of the documentary evidence, the monographs,
the biographies, and the memoirs. The overwhelming majority of such
works, of which Professor Fay’s The Origins of the World War is
an outstanding representative, reverse our war-time judgments in the
manner which we have above described. Differences of opinion today
relate to details rather than to the general picture.1
Practical Bearings of
the War-Guilt Question
We may now consider
the public significance of the revolution in our conceptions of war
responsibility, and make it clear why the subject is one of high
importance in the movement to create a better and more pacific era of
international relations.
Punitive measures
In the first place,
the peace treaties of 1919—Versailles,
Saint-Germain, Trianon, and Neuilly—all rest upon the assumption of
either the unique or the primary guilt of the Central Powers. The
severely punitive measures embodied in these treaties are based in
considerable part upon this thesis of war guilt. Therefore they not
only are unjust, but provoke acute resentment on the part of the
vanquished states who suffer under the yoke of these treaties. There
can be no permanent peace in
Europe until the vindictive system set up under the peace
treaties is thoroughly modified. The Hitler movement in
Germany, very
generally and rightly regarded as a menace to European peace, could not
conceivably have arisen to power except upon the wave of resentment in
the minds of the German people against the war-guilt charge and the
punitive measures which have grown out of it.
But there will be
little prospect of any far-reaching revision of the Treaty of Versailles
and its associated documents unless the nations of the world recognize
and admit the falsity of the war-guilt verdict upon which so much of the
postwar settlement really rests.
War
debts and reparations
The war debt and
reparations issues also turn very directly and immediately about the
problem of war guilt. A major foundation of sentiment in debtor
countries favoring the reduction or cancellation of the debts due to the
United States is the popular belief in such states that during 1914-18
they were really fighting the battle of the United States in preserving
us from a German invasion. Hence, they cannot see why we should insist
upon being repaid for loans which the Entente was using to buy munitions
and other goods which they employed to repel the common enemy in Europe
and thus prevent the battle line from spreading to the United States.
So long as the fictitious and fanciful wartime theory of the causes and
the issues of the World War prevails, there is much logic in this
opposition to the payment of war debts.
Once the facts are
fully realized, however, a complete reversal of attitude becomes
necessary. It is now apparent that the debtor countries contracted
their loans from the United States under obviously false and fraudulent
pretenses. Instead of joining in a crusade in behalf of justice,
liberty, and fair dealing, the United States was enticed into a sordid
war of European self-interest through all manner of deceit and
misrepresentation.
Whatever the
practical difficulties in the way of collection, it is now entirely
clear that the United States has a perfect moral basis for the
collection of the war debts one hundred cents on the dollar. Likewise,
our cancellation of more than half of these debts between 1923 and 1926
appears an act of gratuitous international generosity without precedent
in human history. Later cancellation demands on the part of the Entente
take on the form of incredible effrontery.
Similarly with
reparations, the war-guilt issue plays a critical part in this field of
international controversy. German reparations were explicitly and
definitely based on the war-guilt clause (231) of the Treaty of
Versailles. President Wilson had publicly repudiated the imposition of
a punitive indemnity upon Germany. Therefore reparations were
represented as a moral penalty for the deliberate and willful guilt of
Germany in bringing on the World War.
Once the most
elementary facts about war responsibility are recognized and admitted,
the very foundations drop out of the whole reparations policy, unless
the Entente is frank and honest enough to admit the imposition of the
old-time indemnity. The question which should have been raised after
1919 was not how much Germany could pay on the reparations account. but
why she should be paying anything at all. The invasion of the Ruhr to
collect reparations appears in the new perspective as an utterly
unjustifiable act of military aggression. The Lausanne conference of
1932 ostensibly terminated German reparations, at least for the time
being and in any large amount, on the ground of Germany’s incapacity to
pay. The facts would have dictated such a discontinuance in keeping
with nothing more than elementary logic and justice.
Unfriendly attitudes
A thorough and public
threshing out of the war-guilt issue is also absolutely indispensable to
the creation of a realistic and friendly set of attitudes in European
international relations. So long as the Entente peoples are compelled
to labor under the delusion that they were attacked by Germany, they are
bound to maintain an attitude of fear, hostility, and resentment toward
Germany and her allies. This will obstruct the development of any
feeling of trust and friendship upon which some assurance of peace and
good will might rest.
For example,
patriotic and revengeful French leaders nurse in France the illusion
that France has been three times attacked and invaded by Germany in
modern times—in 1813, 1870, and 1914. This creates in the French mind a
sentiment of fear and enmity which makes any real understanding with
Germany either difficult or impossible. If the French people could be
made to see that in the case of each of these invasions France was
actually the aggressor in the war, the French people would be likely to
fear Germany less and to demand a change of policy on the part of the
arrogant and bellicose French statesmen and diplomats.
Until Europe faces
realistically and factually the war-guilt issue, the latter is bound to
remain the breeding place of errors and misunderstandings which will
permanently block efforts to assure European peace.
A realization of the
facts with respect to the causes and the issues of the World War should
also do much to refute the dangerous illusion that peace and other noble
causes can be promoted by the savage and brutal methods of warfare. The
facts about the war and its results should help the cause of peace by
making clear how futile it is to hope that we can end war by more war.
The war spirit and methods create a psychological attitude on the part
of the participants in the struggle which makes constructive,
farsighted, and generous conduct at its conclusion well-nigh
impossible. Statesmanship does not emerge headlong on the heels of
savagery. If we desire peace it must be achieved in a period of peace,
and not hoped for as the aftermath of war. The greatest words of
President Wilson during the war were that there could be no permanent
peace which was not a “peace without victory.”
United
States needs caution
So far, we have
discussed the practical bearing of the war-guilt question upon the
healthy reconstruction of European international relations. But the
problem has its practical bearings for the people of the United States
as well. A dawning consciousness of how badly we were deceived about
the actual issues in the European situation from 1914 to 1918 may serve
to make us rather more cautious and hesitant about capitulating to
propaganda in the event of another European cataclysm. We may be led to
scrutinize evidence more closely and to a void being the victims of
skillful foreign press agents and silver-tongued orators.
It would be very
foolish to maintain that the Entente Powers of 1914-18 are the only ones
in Europe likely to try to deceive us. All sides to any great conflict
are bound to do their best to enlist our aid and sympathy. Sometime in
the future, England and Germany may be united against France and Italy.
If so, England’s command of the seas will give Germany that access to
our attention which she was denied in 1914-18. Under such circumstances
we may need to be as critical of German propaganda as we ought to have
been of French and British partisanship in the Great War.
It so happens,
however, that in the present instance we have to consider the manner in
which Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia deceived us as to the
facts relating to the outbreak of the World War and as to the issues at
stake in the struggle. An understanding of these facts certainly should
do much to make us less ready to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for
any European nation or coalition whatever, in the event of another world
conflagration.
Conclusions
Therefore it would
appear that the question of who brought on the World War is a problem of
the greatest moment and the utmost timeliness. It is such: (1) because
upon the lies of the war period were erected the detestable treaties
which followed its close; (2) because the chief sound moral basis for
revising these treaties is the truth about the causes of the World War;
(3) because European peace can be secured only as a result of the
revision of the treaties; (4) because a study of the facts about war
propaganda from 1914 to 1918 affords the best possible protection
against our being so rudely and completely deceived another time; and
(5) because the results of the conflict demonstrate for all time the
futility of expecting war to be ended by war, and show us that if we are
to secure peace it must be worked for in a time of pacific relations.
If, by setting forth
the facts about war guilt and the postwar treaties, we can arouse a
sufficient wave of moral revulsion and indignation to force a revision
of the treaties in harmony with facts and justice, more will have been
achieved than can be hoped for from any armed conflict of whatever
proportions.
1
The latest and, one may fairly say, the final desperate
effort to revive and vindicate the wartime conceptions of war guilt is
contained in Professor Bernadotte E. Schmitt’s The Coming of the War
1914 (1930). This has been devastatingly answered by M. H. Cochran
in his
Germany Not Guilty in 1914
(1931), probably the most severe criticism to which an
American historical work has ever been subjected. Even those who defend
Schmitt personally refute his work and conclusions by implication. For
example, Professor F. L. Schuman sweepingly defended Schmitt’s
scholarship and impartiality in reviewing Schmitt’s book in The
Nation. At the same time, Schuman’s own work, War and Diplomacy
in the French Republic, presents a revisionist interpretation wholly
at variance with Schmitt. The history of war-guilt scholarship is
recounted in my World Politics in Modern Civilization, Chaps.
XXI-XXIII.
Posted
March 9, 2008