A prominent Catholic
intellectual and political theorist, Francis Canavan was born in New
York City in 1917, joined the Society of Jesus in 1939, and was
ordained in 1950. After receiving his doctorate from Duke University
in political science in 1957 (where he studied under John H.
Hallowell), Canavan taught at St. Peter’s College and served as
associate editor of America before joining the faculty of
Fordham University, where he taught from 1966 until his retirement
in 1988.
Best known as one of
the world’s preeminent Burke scholars, Canavan is the author of
three books exploring various aspects of Burke’s thought: The
Political Reason of Edmund Burke (1960), Edmund Burke:
Providence and Prescription (1987), and The Political
Economy of Edmund Burke (1995). In these volumes and his other
writings on Burke, Canavan has sought to restore Burke to his
rightful place among the pantheon of Christian natural law thinkers
by showing that Burke’s thought had a fundamentally Thomistic
character.
Canavan has also
written on the political theory of freedom of speech (Freedom of
Expression: Purpose as Limit, 1984), as well as on Catholicism
and American culture and contemporary America’s search for a public
philosophy. Some of his most important writings on the latter
subjects are collected in Pins in the Liberal Balloon
(1990) and The Pluralist Game: Pluralism, Liberalism, and the
Moral Conscience (1995). At the heart of these writings is a
far-ranging critique of the liberal individualist intellectual
tradition. Understanding liberal political theory to be shaped in
important ways by the liberal tradition’s philosophical commitments
(in particular, by its embrace of a nominalist metaphysics), Canavan
argued that the liberal model of man and society is flawed because
it is incompatible with the Christian understanding of the nature
and destiny of the human person and corrosive of the matrix of
institutions, convictions, and virtues on which a democratic society
depends for its vitality and ultimately its very viability. He
further argued that the claim of liberalism to be “neutral” on the
whole question of the human good is specious and turns politics into
“a shell game” in which, in the name of neutrality, social life is
reorganized in accordance with liberalism’s distinctive and highly
controversial vision of the human good.
—Kenneth Grasso
from
First Principles