Chapter 1:
Whitehead’s
Pilgrimage to Process Theism
In this book we shall
be considering how the particular conceptuality of process theism can
illuminate our understanding of biblical and Christian traditions. By
process theism we largely mean the particular conception of God which
the mathemati-cian Alfred North Whitehead fashioned in later life. The
understanding of God that he came to is sharply critical of many of our
inherited notions, particularly concerning divine omniscience,
omnipotence, and immutability. Whitehead’s thought suggests ways we
might free ourselves from the problems and difficulties that have
burdened theology for centuries, and even allows us some dimensions of
the biblical message which we have neglected and have not really
appreciated.
Before we embark on a
theological appropriation of process theism, however, it will be
instructive to see how Whitehead himself came to espouse it. He once
wrote: ‘‘Aristotle found it necessary to complete his metaphysics by the
introduction of a Prime Mover—God . . . . in his consideration of this
metaphysical question he was entirely dispassionate; and he is the last
European metaphysician of first-rate importance for whom this claim can
be made. After Aristotle, ethical and religious interests began to
influence metaphysical conclusions.”1 This same claim can be
made in Whitehead’s case: he came to incorporate the existence of God
within his system largely by philosophical reflections on the problem.
William Ernest Hocking, one of Whitehead’s Harvard colleagues, reports
that, concerning the idea of God, Whitehead told him, ‘‘I should never
have included it, if it had not been strictly required for descriptive
completeness. You must set all your essentials into the foundation.
It’s no use putting up a set of terms, and then remarking, ‘Oh, by the
by, I believe there’s a God.’ “2
Whitehead was born in
1861, two years after Darwin’s Origin of the Species was
published, on the Isle of Thanet, the easternmost tip of southern
England. His father was an Anglican clergyman of the evangelical school.
Whitehead studied at Sherborne which, while he was a student there,
celebrated its thousandth anniversary. It had begun as a Benedictine
monastery and then later became, under Edward VI, one of the public
schools of
England. During his senior year he lived in what was thought to have been the
abbot’s cell, and became steeped in Anglican piety and tradition. Then
he went up to
Cambridge. Professionally, Whitehead studied and taught only mathematics at
Trinity
College,
Cambridge
during his years there, from 1880 to 1910. As an undergraduate he
talked openly and freely about his interest in religion, especially
about foreign missions. “We may not know precisely what many of Jesus’
sayings mean,” he is reported to have said, “but the commandment to go
into all the world and preach the gospel is very clear.” 3
Bertrand Russell
reports that at one point “as a young man, he was almost converted to
Roman Catholicism under the influence of Cardinal Newman.”4
However, these early convictions faded and Whitehead became doubtful and
uncertain. The cause for this may well have been the problem that
faced many Victorians, the problem of God’s omnipotence and the presence
of evil in the world. If God is all-powerful then he must be negligent
in doing anything about evil. So Whitehead decided to take up the
study of theology. Lucien Price records: “This study went on for
years, eight of them, I think he said. When he had finished with the
subject, for he had finished with it, he called in a
Cambridge
bookseller and asked him what he would give for the lot.”5
He gave up the subject, sold all the books, and gave up on theology.
The theologians failed to persuade him. Russell confirms this:
“Throughout the time that I knew him well—that is to say, roughly, from
1898 to 1912—he was very definitely and emphatically agnostic.” 6
During all these
years a revolution was occurring in physics. With the advent of
Einstein’s relativity theories, both special and general, the
foundations of physics to which Whitehead had grown accustomed were
completely shattered. He belonged to the generation that really was
convinced that physics was on a firm foundation, that practically
everything in the discipline had been discovered. Its principles were
set; they had been that way ever since the time of Newton—and would remain that way. Now the whole theory was up for grabs. He
said he was fooled once about the certainty of the foundation of physics
and he was sure he would not be fooled again. Thus Whitehead’s thinking
thereafter always had an element of tentativeness; he was painfully
aware of the difficulties in discovering the final foundations of
things.
He then undertook a
series of studies on the foundations of natural science: An Inquiry
into the Principles of Natural Knowledge (1919), The Concept of
Nature (1920), and The Principle of Relativity (1922). The
last book is a critique of Einstein’s theory of relativity, proposing a
comparable theory to put in its place. It has not received much of a
hearing principally because his objections to Einstein are primarily
philosophical. The book is written in three parts—a philosophical
introduction, a section on physics, and a section on mathematics,
requiring expertise in all three areas. I doubt if many readers have
really understood the work.
In the meantime,
after thirty years at Cambridge, Whitehead pulled up stakes and moved to
London.
Eventually he became Dean of the Faculty of Science at the Imperial College of Science and Technology, and was very heavily involved in
administration. As he was approaching retirement, after a lifetime of
teaching mathematics, with publications in mathematics, the philosophy
of nature, and logic, he was offered a chair in philosophy at Harvard.
It was in this country that his metaphysics, and with it his
philosophical theism, developed.
His first
metaphysical synthesis was presented in the Lowell Lectures of February 1925, later incorporated in Science and the
Modern World. These lectures are largely consonant with the
philosophy of events that Whitehead had already developed in his
philosophy of nature. These replaced the traditional elements of space,
time, and matter with spatiotemporal volumes (events) having certain
characteristics (objects). In this view we may conceive of anything
material as a series of events having persistent characteristics that
are constantly exemplified over a period of time. The material object
is simply an expression of the stability and persistence of these
characteristics exemplified in the events. Such events express the
static repetition of the past, whereas any dynamic activity constitutes
an ever-changing series of events.
These
Lowell
Lectures polemicize against the prevailing scientific materialism
inherited from the seventeenth century, and propose an alternative
“philosophy of organism” based upon events and objects ordered in terms
of organic mechanism. Although the lectures examine the interaction of
science and religion, they are quite neutral with respect to the
existence of God. Yet when he came to publish these lectures in June of
that same year, he included several additions, among which was a chapter
on “God,” arguing for God’s existence and describing his nature as
Whitehead then conceived it. We must scrutinize these additions very
closely for clues they might give to the development of his
philosophical theism.
In his earlier
philosophy of nature, and in the original
Lowell
Lectures, Whitehead conceived of actual events as being divisible into
smaller events ad infinitum. However, in a section appended to
his lecture on “Relativity,” Whitehead changed his mind.7 On
this atomic theory of events, there was a lowest threshold for actual
events, below which it cannot be subdivided into smaller actual events.
We are familiar with this in terms of atomic theories of matter in which
it is argued that elementary particles cannot be actually subdivided,
although they are extensive and hence mathematically (or potentially)
divisible. Whitehead applied this argument, not to material particles
but to events, atomic events which he henceforth called “actual
occasions.”
This has certain
implications, such as the denial of determinism. The way the past
persists into the present is the essence of efficient causation, and
observes the regularity of scientific law. Scientific explanation seeks
to account for the present event insofar as it can be understood in
terms of its causal antecedents. The ideal of complete explanation,
coupled with the assumption that only efficient causation is effective,
necessarily yields causal determinism, a methodological postulate
widespread among the more hardheaded practitioners of the social
sciences, though now less prevalent among natural scientists, especially
physicists. I find nothing to object to the ideal of complete
explanation, even though it is unrealizable in practice, but I do
question this exclusive attention to efficient causation.
Causal determinism
follows naturally enough, to be sure, from our ordinary notion that the
cause produces its effect. Here productive activity is vested in the
antecedent cause, and its effect is merely a passive outcome. But if
the event is atomic, it requires a lapse of time in order to become the
event which it is. It does not instantaneously arise out of its
antecedent causes. Yet, if these totally determine it, it should. This
may well be a possible anticipation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle, that the past conditions for any event only determine its
outcome within certain parameters. Below those parameters the physicist
sees only random action, that is, a determination not caused by the past
conditions.
A second implication
involves a reversal of our ordinary understanding that causes produce
effects. The cause must precede its effect in time, yet it must be
presently existent in order to be active in producing its effect. If,
however, temporal atomicity requires a lapse of time in order to bring
the effect into being, its causes are already past and gone before the
effect arises. This generates a contradiction: the cause must precede
the effect in order to be its cause, yet if it precedes the effect by
any lapse of time, the cause can no longer be active or effective in
producing the effect. The usual theory managed to bridge this gap by
claiming that the cause is instantaneous with its effect, thus it is
present with the effect while at the same time it precedes the effect.
But if there is a lapse of time, then the cause is past and gone.
Whitehead challenged customary thinking by reasoning that it is the
event in the present that should be taken to be active. Instead of an
active cause producing a passive effect, he argues that there is a
present event producing itself out of its passive past causes.
We do have a model we
might adopt for this sort of causation, which is perception. In
perception the sensory impressions which we receive are objective causes
in that they determine the character of what it is that we are
perceiving. But the way in which we perceive things, the meaning we
attach to them, the way we integrate these sensory impressions into a
coherent whole involves, as Kant would say, the spontaneous activity of
the mind organizing its sensations. Whitehead suggests that this model
of perception can be generalized as our model for understanding all
causation. Therefore, he takes the word “apprehension,” a conscious
taking account of other things, and deletes the prefix “ap-” to give us
the word “prehension.” Prehension is the opposite of the way we
generally conceive causation. Therefore, if A causes B, B prehends A.
B is constituted by the way in which it prehends A and all its other
past causes.
The use of perception
to understand causation means that we are now able to bring into one
account both causation and perception. Thereby we can overcome the
usual dualism by which causation is regarded as a feature of the realm
of matter, while perception is conceived as belonging only to mind. It
also involves a transformation of our understanding of subjectivity and
objectivity. If all (efficient) causes are past, as past they are also
objective. They form the data of prehensions. They suggest that what
we mean by subjectivity is simply present immediacy. The shift from
object to subject is essentially one of temporal terms: that which is
objective is past, and what is subjective is what is immediately present
to us.
This means, among
other things, that subjectivity has nothing particularly to do with
human consciousness or mentality. The reason we regularly associate
subjectivity with human awareness and consciousness is that this is the
only subjectivity of which we are immediately aware. We only know
ourselves subjectively. We infer that other persons also enjoy
subjectivity, but this we do not know directly. Whitehead argues that
if subjectivity is really another way of talking about the felt sense of
present immediacy, as opposed to what is past to us, then this is a
feature of all events. All events without exception have their own
interiority, their own subjectivity. Therefore the language which we
should use to describe the coming into being or the emergence of
individual events should be subjectivistic language, purged of its
associations with human existence, with consciousness, and with
mentality. This is really the project that Whitehead undertakes in his
major work, Process and Reality (1929).
If one purges the
notions of mentality and physicality of their associations with subject
and object, one comes to a different understanding of them; at least
Whitehead did. He came to hold that what we mean by the physical is
simply the repetitive, the reiterated, the habitual. The character of
molecules reveals them to be most conservative. They can continue to
reiterate the same patterns of existence for billions of years.
Mentality, on the other hand, is coordination directed toward novel
intensity. Insofar as events differ meaningfully from their past, not
simply reiterating that which they have inherited, they display some
degree of mentality. As for consciousness, Whitehead is not suggesting
that there is any more consciousness in the world than we ordinarily
assume. This is basically an empirical matter to determine. But it is
not necessary for an entity to have either mentality or consciousness
for it to be subjective. All enjoy subjectivity in their present
immediacy, with varying degrees of physicality and mentality, depending
upon how they repeat, or revise, their inherited past. Only a few have
any degree of consciousness.
Now, if events
produce themselves out of their causes rather than causes produce events
as passive effects, then there is an element of self-production in every
event which may be understood in terms of spontaneity and freedom. For
there is no necessity that a given set of causes must be unified by the
event in exactly the same way in each case. Rather there is an influx
of a great many causal factors which the occasion in coming into being
uses to unify itself. It makes its own actuality out of these causal
factors. Whitehead speaks of decision as the mark of actuality, because
the occasion decides or cuts off the alternative possibilities of
integrating the past in order to become the one single actuality that it
is.
This means that there
is a place for purpose and for value in the process of actualization.
For if one argues that past causes produce the effect, this purports to
be a total explanation. One simply has to exhibit what the past causes
are in order to explain the present event. If, on the other hand, the
present event creates itself by the way it decides how to unify its
past, then it is necessary also to introduce purpose to explain how
possibilities influence the process. There are real possibilities as to
what that particular event can become. These possibilities are valued
in that some are better than others with respect to actualization in
this event.
Now, it finally
developed in Whitehead’s thinking that God is the ultimate source of
these possibilities. He provides the possibilities for each event, the
values in terms of which it can become what it is. To put this argument
another way, we can say that God’s role is to provide the origin of the
occasion’s subjectivity. This is a question, I think, that has been
rarely faced by philosophy. Philosophers fail to explain how subjects
come into being. For example, in Kant’s philosophy there is a great
deal of discussion concerning the nature of subjectivity. Every
rational being uses certain capacities, the categories and the forms of
intuition, by which he experiences and orders the world. Very little is
said as to how these come into being. If we take a biological account,
somehow our subjectivity or consciousness emerges somewhere around the
ages of one and two. We cannot remember back in our subjectivity any
further than that. Where this subjectivity comes from is just an
inexplicable mystery.
Whitehead was faced
with this problem acutely because each event enjoys its own
subjectivity. How does it acquire this subjectivity? How does it have
the capacity to feel or prehend its various causal data and bring them
into unity? Whitehead proposes that it begins with an ideal of what it
can become, given its particular circumstances. This ideal is what it
receives from God, and it achieves its own actualization by the way in
which it fuses together all of its efficient causes by means of this
ideal of itself. The event is not determined by God because it is
capable of using the past causes it inherits to modify that aim. Nor is
it determined by its past because it can also use that aim to modify and
to influence the way in which it will appropriate the past. Thus both
can be played against one another to secure its own spontaneity or
freedom.
This theory is only
barely hinted at in Science and the Modern World, and receives
its first full expression in Process and Reality. At first God
was conceived merely as the principle of limitation or selection,
selecting among the infinity of possibilities which otherwise would
become available for each occasion. As such he was one of the formative
elements of the world, and not an actuality like the actual occasions
enjoying his own subjective immediacy. But, as Whitehead saw it, some
such principle of limitation was required.
While God’s existence
was first philosophically required in the revision of Whitehead’s first
metaphysical synthesis which he appended to his Lowell Lectures of 1925,
it would be presumptuous of us to claim that these reflections first
caused Whitehead to become a theist once again. Such personal shifts
are gradual, often imperceptible. It is unlikely that he remained the
emphatic agnostic that Russell knew after the war. In fact, Russell
thinks that the death of Whitehead’s younger son, Eric, in air combat in
1918, significantly shifted his views: ‘‘The pain of this loss had a
great deal to do with turning his thoughts, to philosophy and with
causing him to seek ways of escaping from belief in a merely mechanistic
universe.” 8 Some sense of this may be gleaned from the
dedication of The Principles of Natural Knowledge to Eric’s
memory: “Killed in action over the Forêt de Gobain giving himself that
the city of his vision may not perish. The music of his life was
without discord, perfect in its beauty.”
Moreover, we must
remember that the flower of English manhood, including many whom
Whitehead taught at
Cambridge
and London,
also perished in this war. Apart from religion, Whitehead was to write,
“human life is a flash of occasional enjoyments lighting up a mass of
pain and misery, a bagatelle of transient experience.”9
“Religion and
Science,” originally delivered as an address in the Phillips Brooks
House at Harvard on Sunday, April 5, 1925, immediately before his discovery of temporal atomism, gives no hint
of the philosophical theism Whitehead came to espouse in his chapter on
“God.” Yet it shows a very high appreciation for religion,
defined as ‘‘the reaction of human nature to its search for God.”10
“It is the one element in human experience which persistently shows an
upward trend. It fades and then recurs. But when it renews its force,
it recurs with an added richness and purity of content. The fact of the
religious vision, and its history of persistent expansion, is our one
ground for optimism.’’11 Yet this is the search for
God, a search whose goal is most elusive. “Religion is the vision of
something which stands beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of
immediate things; something which is real, and yet waiting to be
realized; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest
of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes, and
yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good,
and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and
the hopeless quest.”12
At the same time,
Whitehead notes that ‘‘there has been a gradual decay of religious
influence in European civilization.”13 He predicts that
‘‘religion will not regain its own power until it can face change in the
same spirit as does science.”14 For science, “a clash of
doctrines is not a disaster—it is an oppor-tunity.”15
Conflicting theories, often buttressed by fresh evidence, provide the
opportunity for the expansion, revision, or qualification of existing
theories for their improvement. So likewise the expression of religious
principles requires continual development, so as to be hospitable to new
sensibilities nourished on this scientific advance. At the time,
Whitehead appears to have no such revision of our concept of God to
offer, although he was shortly to have one. He seems then to be most
sympathetic to the religious quest, perhaps himself participating in it,
but relegating it primarily to theological concerns. In any case it did
not have any place in philosophy, unless strictly required by its
fundamental principles.
The notion of God as
the principle of the limitation of possibility was the first version
that Whitehead developed as to the nature of God, but this concept was
considerably modified over the course of the next three or four years.
For example, by March 1926, in Religion in the Making, Whitehead
had come to the conclusion that God could be conceived either as a
principle or as a person. Conceived as a principle, God really is very
much like Plato’s Form of the Good, that is, the principle of order or
value in terms of which all the possibilities are organized.
Alternatively, one could conceive of God as a personal being who “thinks
on thinking,” to use the Aristotelian phrase. That is, Whitehead
conceived of God during this period in either Platonic or Aristotelian
terms. Ultimately, he argued, it did not make any difference.
Therefore, he proposed the questionable thesis that all civilized
religions really center around the same basic point, namely, that there
is a permanent rightness at the center of things. These religions
primarily differ as to whether this is to be described in personalistic
language as God, or an impersonal language as Brahman, Nirvana, or Tao.
Insofar as God is
conceived as personal, God is alone with himself, thinking his own
thoughts, apart from the world. In classical Christianity, Aristotle’s
ideas were taken over, but characteristically modified. In that
tradition, instead of thinking of God as a persuasive power who acts as
a kind of lure toward which things move, which was Aristotle’s
conception, Aquinas and others adopted the understanding that God
creates by being the ultimate efficient cause for the world. Thus God
knows the world by the way in which he creates it. God becomes the
ultimate efficient cause, the primary cause of things, separate from the
world with all of its secondary causal processes.
Whitehead, however,
remains true to the original Aristotelian conception that God acts in
terms of final causes, because God’s function is to provide the lures
for the individual occasions to actualize. Within two years, however,
Whitehead saw that the actuality of God also requires that he be
influenced and enriched by the world. One of the reasons he came to
this conclusion was his insistence that God ought to exemplify the same
principles that other actualities in the world have. As he writes in
Process and Reality, “God is not to be treated as an exception to
all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is
their chief exemplification.”16
A second reason stems
from Whitehead’s claim that every actual occasion has two different
kinds of prehensions. It possesses a set of physical prehensions, the
way by which it prehends other past actualities which causally influence
it. It also has conceptual prehensions which provide the way by which
it is influenced by values, ideals, possibilities, and concepts. It
needs the latter in order to be oriented toward the future, and the
former in order to be oriented toward the past. So every occasion is
seen as the fusion of these two types. Yet God was conceived as a being
which had an infinite number of prehensions of ideals, possibilities,
and values, but did not experience the world in any sense. Aristotle
was perfectly content with this. He argued that God couldn’t care less
about knowing the world, for the world was too mundane, too inferior.
It wasn’t worth knowing. Therefore, God simply contemplates his own
thoughts in solitary splendor.
Whitehead became
convinced that in order to render his metaphysics coherent, conceiving
of God as one actual entity among other actual entities, God would also
have physical prehensions. If so, he also directly experiences the
world. Therefore, in this vision, God and the world form an ecosystem,
wherein both contribute to each other. God provides each event with its
aim or lure toward which it moves. The event actualizes itself,
influenced by the possibilities that God has provided, but also becoming
something in its self-production by appropriating elements out of its
past. This result is then experienced by God. In this way, the world
enriches God.17
In the classical
view, God is what he is quite apart from whether the world exists or
not. God’s perfections are complete whether or not there is a world.
If that is true, the world has no ultimate significance. For process
theism, the world ultimately has its significance because of the way in
which it enriches the divine experience. The classical view conceives
of God as immutable and unchanging. It is based on the Greek idea that
any change in a perfect being leads to corruption. Whitehead’s
argument, rather, is that the perfect is that which is capable of
indefinite enrichment, capable of being enriched by that which is
emerging.
We need also consider
the matter of omniscience. In the classical view, God knows the future
in detail. For him it is all mapped out. The problem always was to
ascertain in what sense then we are free. We may be free in the sense
that we are not compelled to act the way we do, but it remains an
illusion to think that we could really act in an alternative way if God
already knows the way we will act. There is only one way we can go.
Whitehead argues that God does know everything there is to know, but he
challenges the notion that the future can be known as if it were already
actual. To know the future in the concrete detail which it will become
is to know what is possible as if it were already actual. This is to
know a contradiction. So God is always in process of experiencing what
is new for him, namely, the course of the world as it fully actualizes
its possibilities.
Even more
drastically, process theism revises our understanding of divine power.
Classically, God’s power is seen in terms of omnipotence, and God is
creator as the sole primary efficient cause of the world. In process
theism God is primarily persuasive, creating more indirectly by
providing the lure for each occasion whereby it can create itself.
It might seem, at
first glance, that such modifications of God’s knowledge and power are
quite foreign to the biblical tradition. This may be, however, because
we have grown accustomed to interpreting its message exclusively in
classical categories. Process theism may provide a revised hermeneutic
enabling us to understand and appropriate that message in a new and
living way. As a philosopher, Whitehead was not overly concerned with
this task, but for our purpose in providing an application of his
thought to Christian theology, it is basic and central. Hence in the
next two chapters we shall sketch some of the ways in which our
understanding of the Bible can be enriched by the conceptuality of
process theism, starting with selected themes from the Old Testament.
Notes
1.
SMW, p. 249.
2.
Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy, ed. George L.
Kline (Englewood
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 16.
3.
See Victor Lowe, Understanding Whitehead (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1962), P. 231.
4.
Bertrand Russell, Portraits from Memory (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1956), p. 96.
5. Dialogues of
Alfred North Whitehead,
as recorded by Lucien
Price (Boston: Little, Brown, 1954), p. 151.
6.
Letter to Victor Lowe of September 26, 1959, as recorded in Understanding Whitehead, p. 232.
7.
For the nature of the original Lowell Lectures (1925) and Whitehead’s
appended material on the character of time see my study, “Whitehead’s
First Metaphysical Synthesis,” International Philosophical Quarterly
17/3, (September 1977), pp. 251-64.
8.
Russell, Portraits from Memory, p. 93. Frederic R. Crownfield
argues that Whitehead’s revised rationalism, based upon his own
reflections on Paul Sarpi’s History of the Council of Trent,
gradually led him out of his earlier agnosticism. “Whitehead: From
Agnostic to Rationalist,” The Journal of Religion 57/4 (October
1977), 376-85.
9.
SMW, p. 275.
10. Ibid., p. 274.
11. Ibid., p. 275.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 269.
14. Ibid., p. 270.
15.
Ibid., p. 266.
16. PR, p. 521.
17. Ibid., p.
532.
Posted June 13,
2007
Back to
Preface and Table of
Contents
Forward to
Chapter 2: Divine Persuasion in the Old Testament
Back to Ford Page