Chapter 3:
Divine Sovereignty
With respect to the
question of divine power, as we saw in the last chapter, classical
theism came to accept the model of efficient causation. This model can
make good sense of many of the biblical traditions, but not of all:
God’s particular involvement in human history, his apparent lack of
knowledge concerning the future in some of the earlier narratives, his
suffering, his willingness on occasion to change his mind. These
traditions could be comfortably suppressed as crude anthropomorph-isms
as long as confidence in the model of divine efficient causation
remained strong, but that model has become vulnerable in recent
centuries because it cannot do justice to the problem of evil or account
adequately for creative freedom. An alternative, now emerging in
theism, is the model of divine persuasion.
Given these two
philosophical perspectives, the coercive and the persuasive, the
biblical witness to divine power seems inconsistent. Each can explain
what the other cannot. Between them they can account for all the texts,
broadly speaking, but they seem mutually incompatible. From another
perspective, however, this mixture of persuasive and coercive elements
becomes readily intelligible. One of the basic biblical images,
particularly with respect to the symbolization of divine power, is the
figure of the king. A king does not rule by being the efficient cause
or maker of anything. His rule is largely persuasive; it is effective
insofar as his subjects are obedient to the royal commands. That rule,
however, is not purely persuasive, for the king has access to
coercive measures to apply to those who refuse to comply.
In a discussion of
power and obedience in the primeval history, George W. Coats has
recently outlined the logic of this position.1 He emphasizes
the element of persuasion involved in the divine commands given to the
man and the woman in the garden. This element of persuasion respects
their freedom and integrity. “So, as long as the human creature can be
persuaded to obey the limitations placed on him by his creator, creation
will be in its proper order. Yet, what happens when the human creature
remains unpersuaded?”2 “God kicked man out of the garden to
his death, away from the tree of life. And he made it impossible for
man to get back in. There is no divine persuasion here. There is only
divine coercion, a divine sentence of death for the disobedient
creature.”3 Later on, he concludes:
Thus, the God who
persuades and the God who judges the unpersuaded stand in tension. This
tension is an integral part of creation theology. Moreover, the
grandiose, prideful, vain, and egotistical man lives in tension with the
call to obedience and its corresponding limitations on power. If he
goes too far in obedience, he may lose his freedom, his maturity, his
necessary grandiosity. If he goes too far in his freedom, he loses his
source of power, indeed, his life. The mature son celebrates those
tensions before God as a responsible king who rules God’s creation. And
in the celebration he receives both his life and his power.4
Persuasion and
coercion stand in tension, but the same God can apply both if he is
primarily conceived of as a king exercising his royal authority. In the
Priestly creation story, persuasion was sufficient. The cosmic ruler
commanded, and the world faithfully executed those commands. Because of
this faithful obedience, the created order could meet with God’s full
approval: “behold, it was very good” (Gen. 1:31). But as Coats points
out, problems arise with disobedience, particularly when man oversteps
the limits of his power. God may be patient and long-suffering, but
sooner or later he must intervene to vindicate his rule. As king God is
judge, the one charged with maintaining justice by overthrowing the
oppressor and rescuing the oppressed.
There is no question
but that this image of God as king poses serious difficulties for
process theism, for it not only highlights elements of divine coercion
but offers a coherent account of their presence. In moving back from
philosophical to biblical concepts, however, we find ourselves in a
domain of shifting and fluid patterns, and the image of God as king is
no exception. Generally speaking, this poses no problem as long as both
the persuasive and the coercive elements are balanced against one
another, and the only issue concerns the relative importance of each.
But the inner dynamic of Israel’s experience of God’s sovereignty over history leads inexorably to the
view that he exercises absolute control over the future. In that moment
there is no longer any divine persuasion remaining, nor logically any
creaturely freedom. At this juncture, however, just when it appears
that there is no room at all for any affirmation of divine persuasion,
Jesus’ proclamation of the kingdom of God introduces a radically new way
of experiencing God’s sovereignty as the power of the future. As the
power of the future, God’s activity is not only purely persuasive but
does not need coercive measures to achieve its purposes. Thus while
process theism can only do partial justice to many of the images of
divine kingship in the Bible, and none to some, it may be the model most
appropriate to the final image emerging from this tradition.
The shift from a
prophecy to apocalypticism gave an important stimulus toward views of
divine determinism. As long as God is conceived as operating by
persuasion, he must effect his purposes indirectly, through the agency
of historical forces. For persuasion depends upon obedience, whether
that obedience is freely given, or unwittingly exacted as in the case of
Nebuchadnezzar and Cyrus. For this reason divine persuasion must work
with existing historical realities to shape them toward desired ends.
Once, however, God is conceived as exerting his power directly, or by
means of heavenly creatures wholly subservient to his will, the actual
deployment of historical forces becomes irrelevant to the realization of
divine purposes. Thus the imagination of the apocalyptic seer is freed
from the constraints imposed upon the prophet. He is freed to dream of
God’s decisive, unambiguous act to eradicate all evil, as the
ambiguities of divine action in the historical process recede into the
background. History becomes simply an interval of waiting, negatively
contrasted to this coming, glorious day. But it is fully known and
measured, else why should it endure so long? Since God is fully in
control, he should vindicate himself right early. The apocalypticist’s
task is only to explain the delay and indicate signs of its coming.5
The seeds of this
transition from prophecy to apocalyptic may be found in part in the
trial speeches in Second Isaiah.6 In these scenes the gods of
the nations are brought before the ultimate judge, the Lord of Israel:
Set forth your case, says the Lord;
ring your proofs, says the King of Jacob.
Let them bring them, and tell us what is to happen.
Tell us the former things, what they are,
that we may consider them,
that we may know their outcome;
or declare to us the things to come.
Tell us what is to come hereafter,
that we may know that you are gods;
do good, or do harm,
that we may be dismayed and terrified.
Behold, you are nothing, and your work is nought;
an abomination is he who chooses you. (Isa. 41:21- 24)
At stake here is the
reliability of divine promise and threat. The Lord declared to Israel ‘‘the things to come” in his threats to destroy
Israel and Judah for their sins, and he made good on those threats. Now he is about to
fulfill his promises and bring the captives back to
Jerusalem.
The Lord has the power to bring about the aims he envisages; he
accomplishes his purpose. These other gods may declare what they are
going to do through their prophets, but nothing ever happens. They
don’t come through on their promises.
So interpreted,
Second Isaiah’s message remains wholly within the prophetic framework.
We can rest content in the reliability of God’s promise, while also
looking about to discover what will be the instrumentality for achieving
this purpose. God can bring about his goals by one means or another as
he seeks to exercise his persuasive powers.
But the passage can
also be interpreted another way. The gods of the nations cannot declare
the future because they do not know it, and it is this lack of knowledge
which proves that they are not gods. Moreover, God knows the future
because he has the power to control it, and the future must conform to
that control. God’s declaration of what is to come is them a prediction
based on certain knowledge, not a promise he intends to fulfill.
Omnipotence here becomes the foundation for omniscience, and the
groundwork has been set for a thoroughgoing determinism. This never
occurs in apocalypticism, however, for in that vision God only controls
the major events of history. He does not interfere with the freedom of
those addressed, who are urgently summoned to repentance and obedience.
The very human
yearning for vindication in the midst of ambiguous circumstances thus
generates an inexorable pressure upon the logic of divine sovereignty.
We seek to be sure of God’s actions, and not to rest content with his
promises. This pressure undermines the unstable balance that existed
between persuasion and coercion, leading ultimately to the elimination
of human freedom, at least theoretically, in the face of a completely
determined future. And yet, paradoxically, the apocalyptic contains
within itself the seeds of human freedom, which achieved their decisive
breakthrough in the proclamation of Jesus. For the apocalyptic
transposed the decisive locus of divine sovereignty from the present to
the future. As we shall see, this understanding of God as future, or
more precisely, as the power of the future effective in the present,
permits a renewed appropriation of divine persuasion and human freedom.7
Apocalyptic Judaism
acknowledged God’s lasting, ever-present sovereignty in his lordship
over Israel, but in a rather perfunctory way. This sovereignty at best was a
limited and hidden one, for
Israel was in slavery to the Gentile nations who reject the reign of God.
God’s reign and the reign of the Gentiles over
Israel form an intolerable contradiction. So all hope and concern was
directed toward God’s future reign, when
Israel would be freed, and the whole world would see and acknowledge God as
king.
Jesus shared this
focus of concern toward God’s coming, future reign. Jeremias reports as
an assured result: “Nowhere in the message of Jesus does the basileia
(kingdom) denote the lasting reign of God over
Israel in this age.” 8 But unlike Jewish apocalypticists before
him, and Christian apocalypticists after him, he refused to speculate
concerning the signs of the end that must be fulfilled. He does not
seek to explain why God’s kingdom has been delayed so long, for he was
grasped by its immediacy. With John the Baptist (cf. Matt. 3:2),
Jesus proclaimed that ‘‘the
kingdom of
God is at
hand” (Mark 1:15 par.) “God is coming, he is standing at the door, indeed, he is
already there.” 9 He promises his disciples that some of them
will “see the kingdom of God come with power” in their lifetimes (Mark
9:1). The incident concerning the barren fig tree (Mark 11: 12-14) may
portray this expectation of an imminent end even more vividly, if
Jeremias is correct in suspecting an Aramaic imperfect with an
originally future significance behind the Greek text. Then Jesus, in
finding the tree merely in leaf, uttered not a curse but a prediction:
‘‘No one will eat fruit from you again” because the end-times will be
upon us even before those figs become ripe.10
The consummation of
the kingdom is a purely divine act. Only the Father knows and decides
when that will be. When it comes, it will come suddenly. We can do
nothing to hasten its day, nor avert its coming. Jesus scorns those who
would try to bring the kingdom about through their own efforts: “From
the days of John the Baptist until now the kingdom of heaven has
suffered violence, and men of violence take it by force” (Matt. 11:12). Nonetheless, the very imminence of this coming great event exerts
tremendous power over the present moment, endowing it with extreme
urgency. Elisha was allowed to say farewell to his family (1 Kings
19:20), but Jesus does not grant his disciples this permission (Luke
9:61-62). Nor can he permit a son to fulfill the elemental duty of
mourning his father the customary six days: “Leave the dead to bury
their own dead” (Luke 9:60). Those who fail to heed the call, who are
not galvanized into action by the presence of this errupting kingdom,
are simply dead, perpetuating the existence of this old age. Every hour
is precious, too precious to be taken up with mourning. The dead must
be called into the world of life before it is too late.11
When the crunch is on, we must act quickly, and decisively, taking
extraordinary measures. Even conniving old stewards about to be thrown
out of work know this (Luke 16:1-7). Jesus’ instructions when he sent
forth the disciples to preach the kingdom also express this urgency to
lose no time. “Salute no one on the road” (Luke 10:4): do not tarry in
exchanging greetings, or join caravans traveling the same direction.
This command was more offensive then than now, because of the deeper
significance of salutations then in communicating the peace of God.12
Likewise each town was given its chance, but if its inhabitants do
not respond, move on quickly. “When they persecute you in one town,
flee to the next; for truly, I say to you, you will not have gone
through all the towns of Israel, before the Son of man comes”
(Matt.10:23).
Something momentous
did happen shortly with the resurrection of the living Christ as the
dynamic, coordinating agency energizing a radically new communal
reality,13 but this was not the expected consummation of the
kingdom. Insofar as Jesus’ expectations are to be understood out of the
traditional apocalyptic which he undoubtedly shared, they went
unfulfilled. But Jesus also spoke of the present immediacy of this
future kingdom, for this future reality exerted its power upon present
actions. The
kingdom of
God in
Jesus’ preaching cannot be interpreted as either simply future or simply
present; recent New Testament scholarship has abundantly shown this. It
is in this peculiar tension between the future and the present that
Jesus introduces a novel element ultimately destructive of the
apocalyptic framework within which most of the New Testament is
articulated.
Jesus proclaimed:
“The kingdom of
God has
come near,”14 which means more than simply that it was
expected to arrive at some not too distant date in the future. Its
nearness is also a qualitative measure of its power in affecting the
present, a power which has already come to be felt. This future reality
exerts its own power, more or less felt in varying degrees of nearness
or distance. As this nearness was experienced in all of its power and
poignancy, it was natural to assume, given the apocalyptic expectations
of the day, that the long awaited kingdom of God was also
chronologically near as well. But the experienced nearness of the
kingdom may be independent of its chronological date, since it applies
directly only to the power which the future exerts in the
present.
This proclamation is
also coupled with a summons to repentance and faith. The power of this
nearness does not affect us indifferently, shunting us to and fro in the
manner of a physical force acting in terms of efficient causation. This
power addresses our freedom, eliciting a response of acceptance or
hostility. Its power lies precisely in its capacity to call forth our
freedom, for it stirs us to our very depths. The possibilities of
repentance and faith require the fullest exercise of freedom, as they
involve the transformation of our own selfhood.
For the purpose of a
fuller analysis, we introduce a threefold distinction between the power
of the past, the power of the present, and the power of the future.
These three powers interpenetrate; they require each other, as all
contribute to the actualization of each action or event. These are the
ways process philosophy sees the three modes of time to be ingredients
in causation. Whitehead conceives of the actuality as producing itself
out of the way in which it appropriates its antecedent causes. The
locus of productive activity thereby shifts from the past causes to the
present event, which is active in virtue of its own power. The past
causes determine the content of the present actuality, but only as this
content is appropriated and unified by the present activity. Causation
is here understood on analogy with perception: nothing is perceived
unless we actively engage our attention in perceiving, yet what we
perceive is dependent upon content derived from our environment. The
power of the present selects and unifies this past content, so that the
past is effective in the present only insofar as it is taken up into the
present by the power of the present. Not all past actuality can be
appropriated by the present because it contains conflicting and
incompatible tendencies. Our freedom lies in the power of the present
to select and to organize that which we inherit from the past.
In the absence of
direction, however, such freedom would merely effectuate random
combinations of the past. Freedom is responsibly exercised in the light
of future possibilities, which become lures insofar as they are valued.
Thus we may describe free actualization as the bringing of the past into
the present by the power of the present responding to the lure of the
future. The future is just as causally effective as the past, though
each in its own way. This would be denied on the ordinary assumption
that causes produce their effects, for all productive agency must be
vested in actualities, and there can be no future actualities. But in
Whitehead’s reversal of our ordinary assumption, productive agency is
vested in the actuality presently coming into being, so that its causes
are merely passive objects to be appropriated. Future possibilities are
just as objective as such past actualities, and hence are equally
capable of exerting causal power to the extent that they are taken up
into the present. The particular valued possibilities which shape our
actions come from many sources, but ultimately, Whitehead argues, they
derive from the creative activity of God. God is the ultimate power of
the future, rescuing the world from degeneration into chaos by the
relentless provision of ever-new creative possibilities for the world to
actualize.
The interacting roles
of these three powers may be seen in Paul’s contrast between flesh and
spirit (Gal.
5:16-24).
The flesh cannot simply mean the body, since the works of the flesh
include idolatry, enmity, jealousy, and the like—passions not obviously
rooted in our biological makeup. Yet the word “flesh” indicating our
biological heritage is enormously suggestive. It embraces all of our
habits and “natural” desires, and constitutes the power of the past as
effective in our lives. Spirit, in contrast, testifies to the power of
the future. Flesh and spirit are forever in tension with one another,
for in every decision we determine whether our figure goals will shape
our past inclinations, or vice versa, and to what extent. They require
each other, for without the past, there is nothing which can come into
being in the present, while without the future, there is nothing for the
present to become. Their constant struggle, moreover, indicates that
these two powers alone do not determine what is. There must also be the
power of the present, which is our inmost being, by which we respond to
the future by means of the past, and to the past by means of the future.
The power of the
future does not reside in some future actuality. This is a
contradiction in terms if, in our freedom, we face a genuinely open
future, such that nothing is actual until it has been actualized in the
present. Moreover, it is not as if this awaited actuality first exerts
power when it becomes actual in the present. For any power it exerted
then would be the power of the past or the present, not the power of the
future. To understand the power of God, then, we must focus our
attention on how the future can be effective in the present. It is
precisely on this point that Jesus’ teaching is liberating, for it
portrays this future kingdom as it impinges upon the present. Both
dimensions are crucial. If the kingdom is simply a present reality,
then it is just one more actuality among others in our present world,
mysteriously hidden from view. If the kingdom is simply future, then it
exerts no power to which the present must respond, but remains merely an
inert possibility we hope someday might be realized. It is the
energizing of possibilities by divine appetition that constitutes the
power of the future in the present, the nearness of God’s reign.
In the controversy
concerning Beelzebul, Jesus declared: “But if it is by the finger of God
that I cast out demons, then the kingdom of God has come upon you” (Luke
11:20; cf. Matt. 12:28). This manifesta-tion of divine power signifies
the nearness of the kingdom, which in the apocalyptic expectation Jesus
shared might be imagined to be casting its shadows before it, if not
already breaking into their midst. Apart from the association of
experienced nearness with chronological nearness, however, this saying
takes on almost the character of an analytic truth: the exercise of
God’s power is the way in which he reigns among us. The
kingdom of
God is not
a political commonwealth but signifies rather God’s active ruling, which
must be present where the divine power is manifest. By using the term
“kingdom of God,” with its indelible future orientation, however, Jesus implies that
God’s power is this power of the future, for it is this future
reigning of God which is actualized in the present by means of this
ministry of exorcism.
If this future
reigning is already effective in our world, then we may anticipate the
conditions of the age to come here and now. The experienced nearness of
God’s reigning power justifies Jesus’ anticipatory actions: his
table-fellowship with the lost sheep of Israel looking forward to the
messianic banquet; the gift of God’s forgiveness, reserved for messianic
times (Mark 2:5); his preaching of a new, eschatological Torah designed
for this new coming age. This was a time for new wine, for new
garments, bursting through the limits of the old (Mark 2:21-22). While this power is near, this is not a time for fasting, but
for the feasting of the wedding (Mark
2:19).
The apocalyptic hope
powerfully expresses our very human longing for an unambiguous display
of God’s activity. Israel characteristically looked for a future Day of
the Lord, but Isaiah may have had the discernment to recognize that a
Day of the Lord may have occurred in the events surrounding
Sennacherib’s attempted invasion of Judah in 701 B.C.15 But
it is difficult to discern the decisive action of God in the
vicissitudes of this life. If our analysis of God’s reigning as the
power of the future is correct, it is not hard to see why this is so.
The power of the future is effective only insofar as it is responded to
by the power of the present, and that response is usually highly
fragmentary, since it is also colored by the power of the past. None of
these three powers actualizes anything independently of the others.
This means that God as the power of the future is necessarily effective
in all things, but it also means that nowhere is he the sole agent. If
so, the straightforward apocalyptic hope is an idle dream, resting upon
a misconception of how God acts.
There is also another
difficulty. If the
kingdom of
God were to
become a present reality, it would no longer be future. Thus the
reigning of God is forever future, never capable of surrendering its
futurity to present realization. This emphatically does not mean that
the kingdom is infinitely distant and therefore unrealizable. It means
rather that it is precisely as future that God’s reign exerts its power,
affording the opportunity for its realization here and now, however
fragmentarily. We can confess, however, that God’s sovereign majesty
did draw nigh unto man in the person of Jesus Christ. Through Jesus’
faithful response to the Father, his human activity became the vehicle
for divine activity, for Jesus’ own power of the present allowed the
divine power of the future to be fully effective.
It is our contention,
then, that Jesus’ response to the present power of the coming kingdom
implicitly undermined the apocalyptic expectation for an unambiguous
display of divine majesty in this world, although he continued to share
that hope. If so, what then happens to the consummation of the kingdom
and the last judgment? Are these simply mythological accompaniments of
this now unfounded apocalyptic hope?
The final judgment,
which Jesus conceived as preparatory to the consummation,16
cannot be lightly dismissed in our time. The possibility of major human
catastrophe, whether by nuclear holocaust or by irreversible ecological
disaster, is all too real. Seen in a wider perspective, the threat of
destruction has always been present in a world containing a vast
multiplicity of free centers of power potentially in conflict with one
another. These are all held together in loose harmony by the pervasive
influence of God as their coordinating agency. “If he should take back
his spirit to himself . . . . all flesh would perish together, and man
would return to dust” (Job 34:14-15). The entropic forces toward
increasing disorder would take over to reduce this cosmos into chaos.
If this coordinating activity is God’s universal function, then it is by
God’s power that our own catastrophe has been averted this long. Jesus
understood that God could both shorten (Mark 13:20) and lengthen the present time, as the parable of the barren
tree indicates (Luke 13:6-9). “All human existence, hourly threatened
by the catastrophe, lives in the interval of grace: ‘Let it alone this
year also, in case it perhaps bears fruit’ (Luke 13:8f).” 17
Catastrophe as such
is the result of destructive causal forces existent in the world; its
power derives from past actuality as it impinges upon us, and not
directly from God. Nevertheless, these destructive forces may on
occasion be acting in response to divine directives.18 They
express the wrath of God, insofar as God judges existing orders and
structures as worthy of destruction.19 Existing structures
may be obstructing the realization of new relevant values, and to that
extent be evil, deserving to be destroyed. The revolutionary fervor of
the oppressed may be inspired by a holy zeal. But the judgment of
destruction is always ambiguous; many values only possible in terms of
the old order will never be realized, even though the destruction of
that order permits other kinds of value to emerge. The destruction is
experienced as disaster by those who cling to the values of the old
order, but is welcomed as liberation and opportunity by those seeking
the new order. Because God’s judgment is always for the sake of some
further ideal, it can never be final in any absolute sense. His is
always the power of the future, and therefore cannot motivate any
absolute termination beyond which there is no future. Nevertheless,
divine judgment may be final with respect to this present age and the
ideals it seeks to exemplify.
God’s judgment takes
place through the instrumentalities of this world, but the consummation
of the kingdom we long for must be an unambiguously divine event. For
that very reason it cannot be a future event, as every event in this
temporal world requires the conjoint activity of both God and
creatures. Our irreducible freedom, moreover, means that we finally
determine, through our own present power, how effective God’s future
power will be. This is a paradoxical and intolerable result from the
standpoint which assumes that all power is measured in terms of the
capacity to produce results, and God’s supreme power is manifest in his
productive creation of this world ex nihilo. Denying God the
power to replace this world by another would be tantamount to reducing
him to impotence and inactivity. On the other hand, if productive
activity is vested in becoming, in our present power to produce
ourselves, then God’s supreme activity lies in his creation of himself,
not the world. Rather than seek the consummation in some future event
in which God affects the world, we should find it in the continuing way
in which the world affects God.
Apart from the world
God has neither past nor future, but is pure presence. Nontemporal, he
creates himself as the envisagement of the infinitude of all pure
possibilities.20 Just as the world acquires a future from
God, so God acquires a past from the world. Each individual creature
receives its past from the other creatures of the world, and its future
ultimately from God, and out of these creates a new present. God’s
presence is internal to himself, derived from his nontemporality, but
out of that and the past which he receives from the world he creates a
new future, as he transforms his pure possibilities into real
possibilities, that is, realizable possibilities under the conditions of
the world. Thus we do not say that God is a future reality which does
not yet exist. Most properly, he is a nontemporal actuality who
influences us by the future he now creates; by means of the real
possibilities he persuades the world to actualize.
To be sure, the
existence of nontemporal actuality is different from that of temporal
actuality, for temporal actualities influence us as past efficient
causes. That does not make him any less existent, but it does mean that
his presence is felt through an entirely different mode, the future.
Moreover, this
creation of the future provides God with a way of achieving the final
consummation. For it is by means of the conceptual richness of his
inexhaustible pure possibilities that God is able to absorb into himself
the multifariousness of the world, overcoming the evil of its
destructive conflicts through the higher harmonies this infinite
imagination provides. God experiences
every actuality for what it can be in such a perfected system—its
sufferings, its sorrows, its failures, its triumphs, its immediacies of
joy—woven by rightness of feeling into the harmony of the universal
feeling. . . . The revolts of destructive evil, purely self-regarding,
are dismissed into their triviality of merely individual facts; and yet
the good they did achieve in individual joy, in individual sorrow, in
the introduction of needed contrast, is yet saved by its relation to the
completed whole. The image—and it is but an image—the image under which
this operative growth of God’s nature is best conceived, is that of a
tender care that nothing be lost.21
This weaving together
of the actual and the ideal is the consummation of the world in God’s
experience,22 but it is also our future, since the Ideals
used to bring the actuality experienced by God into harmonious unity
thereby also become ideals and lures for actualization in the temporal
world. “For the perfected actuality passes back into the temporal
world, and qualifies this world so that each temporal actuality includes
it as an immediate fact of relevant experience. For the kingdom of
heaven is with us today. . . . It is the particular providence for
particular occasions.” 23 The kingdom of heaven, as
Whitehead understands it, is the perfected actuality of God as
incorporating within himself the ongoing process of the world. It also
provides the power of the future as operative in the present as the
source of those aims we seek to realize in faith.
This sense of the
kingdom of
God is
eloquently evoked in another passage from Whitehead’s writings. Its
explicit topic is religion per se, but perhaps it describes more
accurately the epitomization of religion that we find in Jesus’
proclamation of the kingdom:
Religion is the
vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within, the passing
flux of immediate things; something which is real, and yet waiting to be
realized; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest
of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes, and
yet eludes apprehension; some-thing whose possession is the final good,
and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and
the hopeless quest.24
Jesus’ proclamation
of the coming
kingdom of
God was
open-ended, although clothed in the specific apocalyptic imagery of the
day. In this particular form the kingdom has not come with power, at
least not as soon as the early Christians eagerly awaited it. Yet the
sovereignty of God was effectively manifest in those days. This Jesus,
who was killed, God raised up and made both Lord and Christ (Acts 2:32, 36). The resurrection of Jesus whereby he became the dynamic
directing agency of a new corporate reality, the body of Christ,
exhibits the creative power of God for man in a way never before
achieved. This was a new biological emergence, a vital breakthrough in
the evolutionary history of the world, made possible by the creative
order made available by God in that specific situation. In the
resurrection Jesus became the Christ as the incarnation or actualization
of the divine Word addressed to the human situation, thereby realizing
the kingdom or sovereignty of God in our midst.
This is our theme in
chapter five. It is also our Christology, specified in terms of the
resurrection. We understand by the Christ the realization of that
specific aim or future possibility appropriate to our human condition,
an aim which Christians confess was fully actualized in Jesus of
Nazareth.
Since this christological proposal emphasizes the contingent specificity
of the divine aim in Christ, it is not an aim given to everyman, nor is
it an aim which primarily reveals to us the character of God rather than
his specific address to man. On these counts it considerably diverges
from other proposals in process Christology. Thus we shall preface our
examination of the resurrection by a consideration of several other
Christologies formulated in a process vein, indicating the strengths and
difficulties of each. In this way we shall see more clearly the
criteria proposed for an adequate process Christology, and be in a
position to judge how well they apply to an interpretation of the
resurrection, the central event in the life of the church, both then and
now.
Our proposal also
entails a distinction between the Christ, that Word or creative
possibility specifically addressed to the human situation and
actualizable by a man, and the Logos, which is the totality of creative
possibilities inherent in the primordial or nontemporal nature of God,
actualizable by the diverse creatures appropriate to them, including
intelligent living beings on other worlds. In limiting their concerns
to man, the church fathers made all too quickly an identification
between the Christ and the second member of the Trinity. It is
difficult to persuade ourselves of the untenability of this
identification without a full exploration of the problem of
extraterrestrial life, so we shall undertake this as well in the next
chapter in preparation for our christological proposal. In this way,
too, we shall see the close correlation that exists between creation and
salvation.
Notes
1. George W. Coats, “The God of Death,” Interpretation 29/3
(July 1975), 227-39.
2. Ibid., pp. 230-31.
3. Ibid., p. 231.
4. Ibid., p. 238. For a vigorous defense of the claim that a
process model of divine power includes both coercive and persuasive
elements, see J. Gerald Janzen, “Modes of Power and the Divine
Relativity,” Encounter,’ 36/4 (Autumn 1975), 379-406.
Janzen’s essay originated as a response to an earlier version of this
chapter. Its exegetical insights, particularly concerning Job and
Romans 8, are daring and challenging. Although we differ on at least
one point in the interpretation of Whitehead’s philosophy (he holds the
system to require that God acts efficiently by mediating to present
events finite efficient causes derived from the past), I do not see how
his God acts coercively in any of the senses outlined in the previous
chapter. To act coercively God would have to restrict the range of real
possibility otherwise available to a given event. Since past events
already restrict this range, it is not further restricted by having
these events mediated to the present event through God. Other than
mediating the past, his God seems to act in a purely persuasive manner.
5. The apocalypticist typically believes that God must come quickly
because he cannot any longer tolerate the evil of the world. As we
shall see, this was not Jesus’ reason for proclaiming the nearness of
the kingdom.
6. See Isa. 41:1-5, 21-29; 43:8-15; 44:6-8, 21-22; 45:20-25.
7. The phrase, ‘‘the power of the future effective in the present,” is
borrowed from the writings of Wolfhart Pannenberg, though perhaps I use
it in a different sense than he intends, As Pannenberg correctly notes,
Whitehead himself gives no constitutive role to the future in his
philosophy: see John Cobb’s Theology in Process,
ed. David Ray Griffin and Thomas J. J. Altizer (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1977), p. 136. Pannenberg convinces me that he
should, and I believe such an extension of Whitehead’s philosophy is not
inconsistent with its basic principles. See my proposal, “A
Whiteheadian Basis for Pannenberg’s Theology,” Encounter 38/4
(Autumn 1977), 307-17, and my conversation with Pannenberg, ‘‘A Dialogue
about Process Philosophy,’’ ibid., pp. 318-24.
8. Joachim Jeremias, New Testament Theology: The Proclamation of
Jesus (New York: Scribners, 1971), pp.101-2.
9. Ibid., p. 102.
10. Ibid., p. 132.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 133.
13. See Chapter 5.
14. Luke 10:11; cf. Luke 10:9; Mark 1:15; Matt. 3:2;
4:17;
10:7.
15. See Isa. 22:1-14, interpreting the perfect tense as past rather
than as “prophetic future.” See also A. Joseph Everson, “The Days of
Yahweh,” Journal of Biblical Literature 93 (1974), 329-37.
16. See Jeremias, New Testament Theology, pp. 122-41.
17. Ibid., p. 140.
18. God’s activity may be understood as indirectly coercive, but it is
directly persuasive, becoming coercive only insofar as his aims are
actualized in creaturely response. Here we diverge somewhat, perhaps,
from Daniel Day Williams, who writes; “Certainly it is true that God
does exercise coercive power. We cannot escape the fact when we look at
the way in which the structures of life coerce us, smash our plans,
seize us in the grip of their inevitabilities. God is not identical
with those structures but His wrath is in then, as they are related to
the ultimate structures of value which is His own being’’ (“Time,
Progress, and the Kingdom of God,” in Process Philosophy and
Christian Thought, ed. Delwin Brown, Ralph E. James, Jr., and Gene
Reeves [Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971]; p. 461.
Williams’s qualification, that God is not identical with those
structures, indicates that the coercion itself ultimately comes from
that which is not God, though perhaps mediated by him. It is true,
however, that these structures themselves may in turn be derived from
the actualization (at least in part) of values provided by God.
19. “Wrath” here is most appropriate, for as our minds feel and
transmit the anger (and other passions) of our bodily feelings, so God
internalizes those destructive intentions which conform with his solemn
sense of justice. Otherwise his judgments would be cold and unfeeling,
not drawing upon a rich undercurrent of passion ultimately derived from
the world itself. On this point, see my essay on ‘‘Our Prayers as God’s
Passions,’’ pp. 429-38 in Religious Experience and Process Theology,
ed. Harry James Cargas and Bernard Lee (New York: Paulist Press,
1976). Yet as
I. Gerald
Janzen has masterfully shown in a careful exegesis of God’s speech in
Hos. 11:8, which he translates as “My heart transforms itself upon
me/My change of mind grows fervent,” God’s love can overwhelm and
transform such wrath, although preserving and including it within a
greater integration: “Metaphor and Reality in Hosea 11,” Society of
Biblical Literature 1976 Seminar Papers, ed. George MacRae
(Missoula: Scholars Press, 1976), pp. 413-45.
20. See chapter 7 outlining a process trinitarianism, note 5. The
nontemporal act whereby the Father begets the Son ‘‘before all worlds’’
can also be conceived as the act whereby God creates himself.
21. PR, p. 525.
22. 1 have explored this theme more fully in “Divine Persuasion and the
Triumph of Good,” pp. 287-304 in Process Philosophy and Christian
Thought, especially in the final section.
23. PR, p. 532.
24. SMW, pp.
267-68.
Posted June 13,
2007
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