Chapter 6:
Reconciliation
through the Cross
God was in Christ as
the divine address for man actualized in the life, death, and
resurrection of Jesus. He was also in Christ inasmuch as Jesus’
personal existence revealed the divine perspective upon mankind, for he
encountered and experienced our predicament with all the patience, the
care, and the longing for our well-being that God bestows upon us. In
the last chapter we saw how in Christ’s resurrection we can be raised to
newness of life, exchanging our separate, self-justifying individual
existences for corporate participation in the body of Christ, whose
manifold cells are coordinated and directed by the living purposes of
its transhuman psyche, the risen Christ. Now we need to consider how
this resurrection was prepared for by the suffering and death of Jesus.
It not only made the original event possible, but it continues to make
our own incorporation within this body possible by the reconciling work
of God effected in Christ.
In the final
high-priestly prayer, John records these words for Jesus: “I glorified
thee on earth, having accomplished the work which thou gayest me to do;
and now, Father, glorify thou me in thine own presence with the glory
which I had with thee before the world was made” (John 17:4-5). These
words are spoken in anticipation of the cross, when all would be
accomplished, and express John’s assumption of a subjective preexistence
of Christ, for his exalted state in resurrection is understood as a
restoration of his former glory. Our attention is drawn to the twofold
act of glorification depicted here: God glorifies Christ in
resurrection, while he glorifies God in crucifixion. Exaltation to the
right hand of power is certainly glorification. The crucifixion is no
less glorification, if it is understood primarily in terms of
revelation. The Old Testament spoke of the Shekhinah, the
glorious visible manifestation of the invisible God, for no
manifestation of God’s presence among us could be less than glorious.
The shocking reversal of the gospel, underscored by John, is that God is
most decisively glorified to us in this execution of a criminal and
blasphemer.
John Courtney Murray
has said that while the Old Testament speaks to us of God, only the New
Testament reveals this same God to be the God and Father of our Lord
Jesus Christ.’ In his teaching and healing ministry Jesus certainly
acted out an intimacy with his heavenly Father that startled
contemporary Jewish piety, but his deepest revelation of God’s profound
empathy for us was reserved for the agony of the cross. This dimension
of God’s being, however, though hinted at in tentative probings in the
Old Testament literature,2 was indignantly suppressed in
classical theism by Greek ideals of perfection, which dictated absolute
impassability to God. To safeguard this divine impassability, it even
decreed two natures in Christ, one divine and one human, holding that in
his crucifixion he suffered as man, but not as God. Our teaching is
precisely the opposite: in no event did Jesus more fully demonstrate the
love of God than in his passion! In this God was truly glorified.
Classical theism,
despite its insistence upon the divinity of Christ, wishes to make the
crucifixion into a purely human act. But this would have no saving
significance for us. The resurrection is the presupposition of the
cross, as Jürgen Moltmann has recently reminded us.3 Without
the resurrection, Jesus’ execution is no different from the crucifixion
of countless Christian martyrs after him, or the stoning of the prophets
before him. He would have died as one of the heroes of the faith, along
with the saints and martyrs, inspiring us by his fearless example and
profound teaching, but not saving us from our sins and reconciling us to
God.. Who can forgive us for our sins, save God alone? If God works
through Jesus to reconcile us to himself, this must embrace the
suffering this entails. If this is the cross of the Risen One, then the
vindication of Jesus as the supreme revelation of God certainly includes
the depths of this suffering.
Whitehead’s original
conception of God as the principle of limitation in Science and the
Modern World, like classical theism, had no room for divine
passivity. Subsequently he enlarged this with an appreciation of God’s
consequent or receptive nature. With Whitehead we can make a formal
distinction between two natures or aspects of God’s actuality: his
primordial nature as the locus of all pure possibilities, which God
draws upon in order to provide the initial aims for each emerging event,
and his consequent nature as the ultimate recipient of all actuality,
which is perfectly experienced and treasured within God. Naturally
these two aspects of God reciprocally influence each other: God’s
provision of initial aims is particularized and made relevant to the
world in terms of his consequent experience, and the way God treasures
this experience draws heavily upon the infinite resources of his
primordial imagination. While a full account of the divine dynamics
must perforce dwell on these interactions, we may briefly consider these
distinct natures by an abstraction of reason.
We may equally well
designate the primordial aspect the nontemporal dimension of God’s
being, for it is God conceived of as divorced from time, wholly
independent of the world, timelessly envisioning the entire multiplicity
of pure possibilities. It is Aristotle’s God “thinking on thinking.”
Alternatively, it is the God of the Old Testament in his role as
creator, lawmaker, and judge. To be sure, Whitehead does not conceive
of God as the efficient maker of the universe, fashioning it out of
nothing. Rather, his God conforms to the image of the Priestly writers
in Genesis 1, who commands the world to be. This realm of pure
possibility forms the Word by which God commands and creates. This same
realm provides all the pure forms of value, in terms of which each
effort of the finite world is evoked, and in terms of which its final
achievement is judged. This lure of God entices the creative advance
onward, and simultaneously serves as the ideal standard by which its
results are measured.
The passive,
receptive aspect of God’s being is consequent upon the ongoing activity
of the temporal world. It is, we may say, God’s temporal nature. In
himself, God is independent of time, but temporal succession is a
fundamental reality of the world, the chief means whereby it can support
a vast multiplicity of finite, exclusive actualities. Three solutions
have been offered as to how a nontemporal God could be related to a
temporal world. (1) God and the world are radically distinct, at least
from the divine perspective, and so God is ignorant of this dull,
sublunary world (Aristotle). (2) God knows the world, but because his
knowledge is nontemporal yet penetrates to the reality of things, the
temporality of the world is finally merely apparent. This is the upshot
of classical theism, and the basic implication of God’s knowledge of
future contingents. There seems to be no way a purely nontemporal God
can know a temporal world without violating that world’s temporal
integrity. (3) God’s eternal nature is supplemented by a temporal
nature, itself directly dependent upon the world’s finite actualizations
for its concrete content of experience. In himself God knows only pure,
unbroken, nontemporal unity, but this knowledge is further enriched by
the temporal experience of the world’s plurality. This consequent
knowledge is cumulative and temporal, following the contours of the
world’s unfolding reality.
The thoroughgoing
coherence of Whitehead’s philosophy demands these two natures in God.
God is an actuality, even the chief exemplification of the category of
actual entities,4 and all actualities have both conceptual
and physical prehensions. Without these additional physical prehensions,
God would have no experience of the world, whose plurality and finitude
require temporality. On the other hand, the experiential evidence for
the divine consequent nature is very subtle and tenuous. For this
reason Whitehead postpones its introduction as long as possible in his
two major metaphysical works. In Process and Reality, the
consequent nature is considered only in the last eleven pages,5
while its counterpart, “an Adventure in the Universe as One,’’ is
mentioned only on the last two pages of Adventures of Ideas.6
The structure of both works is the same: for the most part
Whitehead is content to justify his doctrines by an appeal to average,
ordinary experience, although experience is understood more richly than
its analysis in classical empiricism would indicate. In this one
instance, however, he warns us that “any cogency of argument entirely
depends upon elucidation of somewhat exceptional elements in our
conscious experience – those elements which may roughly be classed
together as religious and moral intuitions.
These words should
not be misunderstood as a traditional appeal to revelation. At least
two factors militate against such an interpretation. In the first
place, Whitehead takes an evolutionary view of experience, reminding us
that our ordinary, waking consciousness was once highly extraordinary
among our primate ancestors. Thus it is quite conceivable that in the
future the extraordinary deliverances of religious and moral intuitions
will appear quite ordinary. Secondly, Whitehead is at all times
interested in discerning the generic, invariant structures of
experience, not their contingent contents. Insofar as revelation
diverges from reason, it does so in terms of such contingent content.
Revelation has sought to apprise us of the favored role of Israel or of
the divine significance of the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth,
contingencies which in the nature of things philosophic generalization
knows not of. If revelation has sought to teach us of the mysteries of
the Trinity transcending human reason, we must remember that its
reflection began in the effort to understand just how God and the person
of Jesus are to be related, and must make allowance for the partial or
total eclipse of specific revelational content by the overlay of
philosophical speculation. Inasmuch as Whitehead always seeks for
philosophically generic features, disregarding specific historical
particulars, we must suppose that the impress of the consequent nature
is a pervasive feature of all experience, yet unnoticed except in all
but the most sensitive religious experiences.
The initial aim
guiding each act of becoming to fruition is a pervasive feature of all
actuality, yet only humankind, to our knowledge, is consciously aware of
it. Our perception of the initial aims provided by God is a measure of
our moral sensitivity. Frequently, however, these moral norms are taken
to be absolute and invariant, regardless of circumstance. No
flexibility or sensitivity to changing situations is permitted. This
would be the case if the initial aims provided by the primordial nature
were not tempered and modulated in any way by God’s consequent
experience. In that case, however, moral norms would either be too
general to be relevant and useful, or so specific as to be unduly
restrictive.
If this were the only
side of his character, the primordial nature of a personal God could
easily become the impersonal standard of values such as Plato’s Form of
the Good. With the consequent nature, however, God is unmistakably
personal. We do not directly apprehend his consequent nature, but
become aware of its presence by the subtle, dynamic shifts in the divine
aims directly accessible to us as God responds to our actions. This is
the meaning of a very enigmatic statement that appears on the very last
page of Process and Reality: “Throughout the perishing occasions
in the life of each temporal Creature, the inward source of distaste or
of refreshment, the judge arising out of the very nature of things,
redeemer or goddess of mischief, is the transformation of Itself,
everlasting in the Being of God.”8 This inward source of
distaste or of refreshment is the series of initial aims received from
God, which both judge our previous achievements, and give us courage to
strive anew. If the best be bad, it appears under the guise of the
goddess of mischief, providing only the best possibility for that
impasse.9 Yet it can also redeem. The individual, momentary
occasions of our life, with their particular, limited accomplishments,
pass away, yet not before they are caught up and transformed in the
divine life, informing and qualifying those initial aims which God then
supplies our successive occasions. These new aims are not impervious to
our past, but express God’s living response and encouragement to our
faltering actions.
In the biblical
imperative “You must be born anew” (John 3:3), the same Greek
word anothen may also mean: “from above.” Both meanings of this
rich ambiguity are relevant to our argument. In terms of the perishing
occasions of our temporal life, we are being born anew and from above as
we receive novel initial aims from God originating our subjectivity from
moment to moment. It is possible for us to be blind to this inward
source, insisting upon the solid, substantial endurance of our old
selfhood, but the experience of reconciliation in nearness to God calls
forth the newness of life that this interior dialogue evokes. It is
God’s consequent experience of our lives which calls forth his dynamic
provision of new aims for our lives, by which we have redemption.
Ancient
Israel was never tempted to replace the lawgiver with the law, following
Plato’s example. It had a lively sense of God’s personal involvement in
the history of his people. To that extent its teachings clearly
anticipate what Whitehead designates as the temporal or consequent
nature of God. Yet combined with the image of God as the righteous
judge, this divine responsiveness quickly issued into the threat of
rejection in the face of
Israel’s sinfulness. The New Testament proclaims that no matter how evil the
sin, God stands ready to receive the sinner and to forgive the sin, He
stands ready to receive into his own being all the evil of the world to
bring about its transformation, and this experience of evil is the
divine suffering epitomized by the crucifixion. This is the most
profound manifestation of the presence of the consequent nature in our
experience.
Yet the dynamics of
divine reconciliation is subtle, and it is all too easy for some
commentators to emphasize the consequent character of God’s activity at
the expense of his primordial character. This appears to be the case
with the most extensive reflection to date upon the work of Christ
within a process context, Don S. Browning’s Atonement and
Psychotherapy.10 As the title indicates, Browning
proposes to understand the atonement in terms of an analogy drawn from
Carl Rogers’s theory of psychotherapeutic healing. According to this
view, the neurotic person cannot rely spontaneously upon his total
experiencing process because some of his feelings are inadmissible to
his own awareness.11 He has placed conditions of worth upon
himself, conditions by which he can accept his actions, and these same
conditions, largely appropriated from his own social matrix, exclude
certain elements of his behavior and feeling as unacceptable. The
healing process calls for the unconditioned empathic acceptance of the
client’s feelings by the therapist. He must feel his client’s feelings
fully, yet empathetically rather than sympathetically. If the therapist
were to experience these feelings under the same conditions of worth
that the client attaches to them, he would become alarmed and attempt to
fend off the same feelings the client was trying to avoid.12
He must show the client how to accept the full range of his
experiencing, and thereby overcome the inner division within his soul.
Browning makes fully
clear to us the sinfulness of our bondage to our conditions of worth,
but not the sinfulness of our violation of these standards. In the
context of his analysis focusing upon the therapeutic relationship,
these conditions of worth are uniformly depreciated as that which the
good therapist does without as much as possible. In criticizing
Anselm’s concept of sin as a violation of God’s honor, Browning protests
that this implies some condition of worth within God. “It would, in
effect, place within the Godhead a neurotic element that can never serve
as a solid presupposition for the salvation of man.”13 God is
completely without conditions of worth qualifying his empathic
acceptance, and this unconditionedness constitutes the primary sense in
which God is law. “This primary sense in which God is love and law must
be kept separate from other ways of referring to God’s law. The
secondary sense in which God is law refers to the means-end structures
of coercion designed to keep the human situation integrated so that his
law and love in the primary sense can operate with enhanced
effectiveness.”14 In neither sense, then, does divine law
sanction moral norms. Unconditioned acceptance transcends such norms,
while “the means-end structures of coercion” can only refer to the laws
of nature whereby human freedom is kept within constructive bounds.15
Perhaps we may
distinguish between values functioning as creative goals and values used
as conditions of worth. The specific content of these values may be the
same, although their use is different. In the first instance, these
goals derived from God serve as a focus for creaturely striving; in the
second, as a means of exclusion whereby other values are ignored,
destroyed, or suppressed. Yet, as Whitehead saw, these two roles are so
bound up with one another that some values are inevitably lost. “In the
temporal world, it is the empirical fact that process entails loss: the
past is present under an abstraction. . . . The nature of evil is that
the characters of things are mutually obstructive. Thus the depths of
life require a process of selection.”16 Every actualization
is a finite achievement cutting off all other possibilities for that
particular situation and eliminating all elements received from its
immediate inheritance which are incompatible with that one outcome
decided upon. In human experience, this elimination may take the form
of dismissing the unwanted element into the subconscious mind.
In general, if one
takes into account all stages of evolutionary development, the
elimination inherent in finite actualization takes two basic forms. In
simpler organisms the large bulk of incompatible elements are simply
never included in the first place, for the organism is incapable of
absorbing and responding to them. Thus the behavior of elementary
particles and atoms can be explained solely in terms of physical
influences because psychological, cultural, or other such influences
have no impact upon them. The more complex organisms, on the other
hand, are capable of receiving and responding to more influences derived
from their immediate situation than they can handle and therefore must
eliminate some of these in the very process of achieving a definite
result. Thus a molecule’s experience is “unconscious” because it is
incapable of raising any of its feelings into consciousness, while the
subconscious reaches of our experience have been suppressed in the
interests of some definite conscious outcome.
Simpler organisms,
including animals, may be largely understood in terms of the
Aristotelian concept of entelechy, as spontaneously fulfilling their
inherent goals in terms of resources ordinarily commensurate with these
goals. In man, however, conscious awareness of goals as moral norms
takes precedence, because the freedom consequent upon greatly expanded
resources requires more explicit focus. For much of our activity and,
experience, these moral norms need to function as conditions of worth
excluding much of our potential resources for the sake of definite,
stable outcomes. These conditions of worth are not bad in themselves,
but they can become the barrier to further self-growth if allowed to
become rigid, and the allegiance to old values can make us impervious to
the emergence of new values.
Unconditioned
empathic acceptance means that God has no intrinsic conditions of worth
restricting his own experience and activity, but this does not mean that
he has no such conditions for his creatures. Here we must distinguish
between the diverse roles of God and his creatures. God is infinitely
receptive, receiving from his creatures the measure of finite actuality
he acquires. The finite and ultimately arbitrary character of temporal
actualization prevents us from ascribing it directly to God’s own
activity. His function is to foster and direct the process of
actualization carried on by his creatures, and to redress the inevitable
loss involved by integrating all of its results into his living
experience. In the first role he is the ultimate source of all our
values, which serve both as lures for achievement and as conditions of
worth by which our achievements may be judged. In the latter role God
is the ultimate preserver of all, embracing both our achievements and
failures, thereby overcoming the destruction inherent in finite
achievement.
The analogy of the
therapist adequately describes God’s second, consequent role, but may
distort the role of value-commitments both for God and the therapist.
We may say that God acts without values in his unconditioned acceptance,
but values govern both the initial aims he proposes to his creatures and
the way in which what he has fully accepted becomes organized and
integrated into his own experience. Likewise the therapist in
Browning’s eyes may seek to eliminate all value-conditions from the
therapeutic relationship, but this very effort is both motivated and
judged by the specific aim of healing the client’s neuroses.
Browning
distinguishes between feelings and behavior, arguing that behavior
should be controlled by conditions of worth, but not feelings, all of
which are acceptable. But our feelings of failure and worthlessness
ordinarily relate to our behavior, which would have no focus or
direction apart from these value-conditions. What is needed is not an
elimination of value-conditions, but their relativization: the
possibility of their expansion and growth, and the possibility that
failures relative to these values can somehow be redeemed. The
therapist in unconditional acceptance conveys that redemption to the
client, but the ultimate basis for such acceptance lies in God’s
infinite capacity to provide every failure, no matter how severe or
destructive, with some value within the total scheme of things.17
A second corrective
to Browning’s approach may be found in the other major reflection upon
the atonement from a process perspective, that of Daniel Day Williams.18
Williams follows Josiah Royce in placing the meaning of Christ’s
death within the context of the entire community. “Royce sought to
interpret human existence as the search for loyalty to an adequate
cause. Sin is disloyalty to the one really adequate cause, the world of
loyal men. . . . In its memory of Jesus the Church has the foundation
of its existence in the memory of the deed of Jesus who acted in
absolute loyalty to the community in the midst of its disloyalty.19
Royce’s analysis, however, needs to be deepened by an
understanding of suffering, which Williams understands not so much in
terms of undergoing pain as “being acted upon or being conformed to
another in a relationship.”20 Such suffering appears to be
identical with the empathic acceptance of those negativities of
existence which usually cause pain and evil. To Royce’s view Williams
adds “the insight that the reconciliation which creates the new
community comes by way of suffering. Jesus’ suffering becomes the very
word and speech of love finding bodily, historical expression and
creating a new possibility of community.” 21 This suffering,
moreover, discloses God’s own suffering to man. God’s love is absolute
in its integrity, invulnerable to any destruction, but this by no means
implies any impassibility to suffering, which is at the heart of the
most profound love. “If God does not suffer then his love is separated
2 completely from the profoundest human experiences of love, and the
suffering of Jesus is unintelligible as the communication of God’s love
to man.” 22 Through such suffering reconciliation and renewal
of love are effected (in ways more fully explored by Browning), bringing
into existence a new community, the church, which Williams defines as
“the community which lives by participation in the atonement.”23
Here we find the clue
indicating the intrinsic connection between the atonement and the
resurrection, once we recognize that the church is none other than the
resurrected body of Christ. Given our understanding of the way God acts
in cooperative union with his creatures, we cannot see the resurrection
as a unilateral action of God. On the one hand, raising Jesus to
himself cannot simply be a purely arbitrary decision on God’s part, but
one made in response to the intrinsic quality of Jesus’ life, suffering,
and death. He is the one most worthy to be raised, because the living
purpose of Jesus concretely embodied God’s own purpose for mankind.
Were any other person with a narrower outlook or sympathies raised up as
the living source of aims to which we humans would be subordinate, we
could find ourselves subject to a demonic totalitarianism destructive of
the best possibilities inherent in us as separate individuals. A risen
Christ to whom we can subordinate ourselves in good conscience must be
one “whom to serve is perfect freedom.” Jesus can become that risen
Christ only because his living purpose fulfills and does not thwart our
highest alms. On the other hand, the resurrection of the body of Christ
also involves the transformation of individual men into willing members
of that body, and this can only be effected through the atonement.
As Browning has
shown, the function of atonement is to overcome those structures of sin
which cause us to deny and distort the love of God in our lives. These
structures arise from the absolutizing of those value-conditions given
to us by God into conditions of acceptability whereby we judge our
failures and worthlessness in such a way as to alienate ourselves from
God’s love. Moreover, these structures that tend to isolate us as
individuals save as they bring us together in terms of the fairly rigid
social patterns of “life under the law.” Before we can become members of
the body of Christ, these structures must be broken down, in order to
free us from limiting self-concepts, from the tendency to minimize and
downgrade the values we aspire to in a desperate effort to avoid
self-judgments of failure which accompany the acceptance of divine
values. Given the greatly expanded resources at man’s disposal, coupled
with God’s invariant aim at the maximum intensity and enrichment of
experience, it is inevitable that the ordinary human achievement will
fall short of its originally intended goal. The Christian recognition
of original sin appreciates this gap between the initial aim envisioned
by God and the final outcome achieved by man in every human event.
Low-level achievement
may well be insensitive to this gap either because the original
resources are too meager or because there is insufficient awareness of
the aims as received from God. But any high-grade achievement depends
upon richer resources and upon increasing awareness of these initial
aims which in their vibrant intensity may well outrun the achievements
they evoke. Therefore, for the very awareness of more intensive aims we
must be reassured of our acceptability despite our failures.
Reconciliation through atonement places our ultimate acceptability upon
a different plane from the judgment of our success or failure in terms
of our initial values, thereby enabling us to aspire to those values
with greatly reduced risk. Until we are thereby enabled to aspire to
the highest values available to us as individual human beings, we cannot
be in a position to aspire to those values transcending ourselves which
direct the activity of the whole body of Christ. Without atonement,
therefore, the resurrection of Christ would not have been possible—for
there would be no individual human beings capable of being transformed
into members of that body.
Through participation
in the body of Christ we continue to experience this concrete embodiment
of divine love, for Christ accepts, cherishes, and affirms us in
precisely the same manner in which we accept our own bodies. We have
become part of him, and, just as we cannot, he cannot limit his selfhood
merely to his mind, excluding the activity of his body. Our
acceptability before God is no longer simply dependent upon our
individual roles as separate human beings, for we have become part of
Christ, and concretely participate in his acceptability before God.
Jesus’ suffering and death have inaugurated a process of reconciliation
which continues its work of concretely exhibiting to us the love of God
in the body of Christ’s resurrection.
Throughout this
discussion we have insisted upon God’s suffering, in apparent
contradiction of the common assumption that God dwells in unbroken
bliss. This language has been unavoidable, in order to emphasize that
God is totally involved in our lives, including the negativities of our
experience. His happiness is not purchased by the exclusion of our
misery. Nevertheless, there is merit in the ancient concern over the
alleged heresy of Patripassianism. That concern is ill-expressed in the
usual protective doctrine that only part of the Godhead suffered, the
Son but not the Father. How are we then to understand John’s word that
the Father so loved the world that he was willing to give up the Son
(John 3:16)? Is this done at no cost to him? I take the deepest meaning of this
concern to lie in the conviction that God is never defeated by evil. He
can absorb all evil and overcome it. “He saves the world as it passes
into the immediacy of his own life. It is the judgment of a tenderness
which loses nothing that can be saved. It is also the judgment of a
wisdom which uses what in the temporal world is mere wreckage.” 24
Evil lies in the
mutual obstruction of things; their conflict and disharmony engender
suffering and loss. No matter what the conflict, God possesses infinite
conceptual resources in his primordial nature whereby an appropriate
pattern can supplement these conflicting elements, thereby transforming
them into a harmonious good. In themselves the elements conflict, but
not as taken up into the larger texture of meaning.25 This
analogy appears distressingly feeble, but only because our human powers
of aesthetic creativity are so feeble. We can reconcile conflicts by
the addition of clarifying distinctions and imaginative constructs, but
only theoretical, not actual conflicts. We can create harmony from
discordant sounds by the addition of further sounds, but only in music.
We can transform gross evil into tragic beauty, but only on the stage,
only in make-believe, when the proper aesthetic distance has been
achieved. Our powers of imaginative reconciliation are very restricted
indeed. We should not underestimate the powers of an unlimited
imagination to over-come the conflicts of finite actualities.
Our redemption is
found not only in the assurance that our unacceptability is accepted,
but that the evil inherent therein is transformed into lasting value, a
good we can dimly appreciate. “For the perfected actuality passes back
into the temporal world, and qualifies this world so that each temporal
actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience. For
the kingdom of
God is with
us today. . . . What is done in the world is transformed into a reality
in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world. By
reason of this reciprocal relation, the love in the world passes into
the love in heaven, and floods back again into the world.”26
In the provision of novel aims for our ongoing activity, in the
wellsprings of our renewed selfhood received afresh from above, God
discloses the redemptive value whereby he cherishes our past. This
sense of transformed meaning is very elusive, and exceedingly hard to
describe. We can only refer the reader to the final chapter in
Adventures of Ideas, in which Whitehead tries to explain this
ultimate “Peace.” We cannot hope to improve on his words.
Jesus had this
“Peace,” this assurance of ultimate victory throughout his life and
ministry. It was what sustained his radical obedience, confirmed his
quiet sense of authority, and encouraged him to address God as his
father. Yet at the very end of his life this “Peace” deserted him: “My
God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?” (Mark 15:34). Jesus did not die a “good” death, with the serene nobility of a
Socrates, but in the painful awareness that the intimate presence of God
had been withdrawn in the ultimate hour, and he had been abandoned as
one rejected. Jürgen Moltmann has recently underscored this
forsakenness, challenging us to come to terms with this horrifying
prospect. He argues that it can only be described in inner-trinitarian
terms: “The abandonment on the cross which separates the Son from the
Father is something which takes place within God himself.”27
Yet for the Son to be abandoned by the Father, there must be two
distinct subjectivities within the Godhead. Many ontologies can permit
this, but not Whitehead’s. As we have seen in our discussion of Lionel
Thornton’s Christology any distinct subjectivity is necessarily a
distinct actuality. Any doctrine suggesting three subjectivities within
the Godhead automatically degenerates into tritheism. How, then, can we
understand this abandonment, this radical bereavement Jesus felt?
As we have seen, the
experience of redemptive love, “Peace,” renewing life, is intimately
bound up with the provision of initial aims. God is at work in every
life providing it with novel aims at every turn, and Jesus was
profoundly sensitive to this. Yet these aims, to be relevant, must
express real possibilities for the moment; otherwise they could not be
actualized under the circumstances. Each occasion of experience is free
to actualize itself within the parameters of its causal past, but only
within those parameters, since this past provides the content of its
actualization. Normally the past allows us some leeway, but it can be
coercive, restricting our future within very narrow confines. The
initial aim articulates God’s evaluative gift of these real
possibilities, but they may be severely constrained. “The initial aim
is the best for that impasse.” But if the best be bad,
Whitehead can speak of the ruthlessness of God.28 In the hour
of Jesus’ deepest need, he could not feel the presence of God, because
there were no redemptive possibilities that God could provide, no aims
which could vouchsafe to him the infinite resourcefulness of the divine
life in clothing his actions with resplendent meaning, sending him forth
with renewed courage. For Jesus, there was only the cross and death.
In his cross the weakness of God is revealed, as he stood by powerless
to comfort his beloved. The worst of it was that God intimately
experienced Jesus’ awareness that this sustaining grace had suddenly
been taken from him. God did not abandon Jesus, but he knew this
abandonment, as Jesus knew it, in the depths of his being.
“What is inexorable
in God,” Whitehead continues, “is valuation as an aim towards
‘order’; and ‘order’ means ‘society’ permissive of actualities with
patterned intensity of feeling arising from adjusted contrasts.”29
This abstract description is very general, applying equally well to
molecules, amoeba, trees, rabbits, man, and that which transcends man in
some new transhuman organic society. The ruthlessness of God is
Inexorable in evoking new intensities of being. Thus the very act in
which Jesus felt abandonment in his death enabled the emergence of the
lure for resurrection in the near future. In this transhuman body we
need no longer fear abandonment of God in death, for even that can
contribute to ongoing life. Jesus underwent the abandonment of God, so
necessary for the emergence of the resurrected body, in order that we
might be spared this experience.
As we have seen in
the last chapter, this risen Christ is a living subjectivity, distinct
from the divine subjectivity. In this our proposal has a distinctly
Arian flavor: Christ is temporally created, not begotten. On the other
hand, we also agree with Athanasius that the Logos, the second member of
the Trinity, is nontemporally begotten “before all worlds.” We can be
both Arian and Athanasian by denying the one point they share in common,
namely, the identification of the risen Christ with the preexistent
Logos. Here Arius errs philosophically in supposing this preexistent
Logos could be created in time and errs religiously in worshiping that
which is other than God. The living subjectivity of Christ is
temporally emergent, but not “in the beginning,” nor even in the birth
or baptism of Jesus. Jesus died so that Christ might be born. But
Christ is not to be worshiped in himself, but serves only as a mediator,
magnifying the availability of God to us. In him the divine aims for
our lives can be intensified in a way not possible without him. Yet the
very fact that he is our privileged means of access to God, such that
only in Christ do we encounter the fullness of God, should not blind us
to the createdness and relativity of even the risen Christ. There may
be other transhuman societies, in the future or even now, just as there
may be other living societies embracing intelligent life on other
worlds, or even emergent forms capable of incorporating the fullness of
Christ within an unimaginable intensity and richness of being. The
possibilities which the divine creative Word holds for the future are
inexhaustible, and any restriction of that Word to the risen Christ
bespeaks a parochial anthropocentrism we should eschew.
Yet while the Christ
is created, temporally emergent in the resurrection, he truly incarnates
the Word of God addressed to our situation. His subjectivity is
temporally emergent, yet the objective principle that he embodies
relative to our need is grounded in the very fabric of the transcendent,
primordial God. For the purpose of explicating this inner complexity of
the Godhead the ancient doctrine of the Trinity is highly illuminating,
as we shall see in the next chapter.
Notes
1. John Courtney Murray, The Problem of God (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1964), pp. 25-29.
2. Gen. 6:6; Jer. 31:20; Isa. 63:15. Cf. Kazoh Kitamori, The
Theology of the Pain of God (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1965).
3. Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God (New York: Harper & Row,
1974), esp. pp. 182 ff.
4. PR, p. 521.
5. Ibid., pp. 523-33.
6. Al,
pp. 380-81.
7. PR, p. 521.
8. Ibid., p. 533.
9. Ibid., p. 373.
10. Don S. Browning, Atonement and Psychotherapy (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1966).
11. Ibid., p. 101.
12. Ibid., p. 194.
13. Ibid., p. 230.
14. Ibid., p. 201.
15. Browning bases his study on Hartshorne’s process theism, and it is
appropriate to interpret his theory of the divine imposition of the laws
of nature in terms of coercion. Cf. Charles Hartshorne, A Natural
Theology for Our Time (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1967), pp.
101-2, 120. Yet this need not be the case if, as Whitehead argues, the
laws of nature summarize the average response of the creatures to divine
persuasion. On this difference between Hartshorne and Whitehead, see
Two Process Philosophers, ed. Lewis S. Ford (American Academy of
Religion: AAR Studies in Religion 5, 1973), pp. 75-79.
16. PR, p. 517.
17. See also Browning’s argument, Atonement and Psychotherapy,
pp. 149-53, that the effectiveness of psychotherapeutic
acceptance depends upon a wider context of divine acceptance, which we
would argue is in turn justified by God’s capacity to infuse anything
with imaginative value.
18. Daniel Day Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love (New
York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 173-91.
19. Ibid., pp. 180-81.
20. Ibid., p. 182.
21. Ibid., p. 184.
22. Ibid., p. 185.
23. Ibid., p. 188.
24. PR, p. 525. These words are easily misunderstood as
meaning that there is some residue of unredeemable evil that God cannot
overcome. Yet all being, no matter how evil and
recalcitrant, can be saved; it is becoming that cannot be
preserved, for becoming necessarily ceases (“perishes”) in the
attainment of being. The indeterminacy of becoming is replaced by the
determinateness of being.
25. See my essay on divine persuasion, cited in Chapter 3, note 22.
26. PR, p. 532.
27. Moltmann, The Crucified God, pp. 151-52. See the
whole context, pp. 146-53.
28. PR, p. 373.
29. Ibid., pp. 373-74.
Posted June 13,
2007
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