Lewis S. Ford
Transforming Process Theism
S.U.N.Y. Press, 2000
Excerpts selected, with emphases
by Anthony Flood
“The meaning I
propose to give to the future . . . . is an extension of Whitehead’s
analysis of the concrescence or actualization of a present act of
becoming, proposed as a way of explaining how the everlasting divine
concrescence can influence present occasions.”
“. . . the future
[is] conceived in terms of being, which is the ordinary sense, and . . .
as becoming, our extended sense.”
“Whitehead . . . .
did not reckon with the possibility that there could be one future
actuality that is not an occasion . . . .”
“According to the future as becoming, . . . the metaphysical qualities of
the temporal modes are essential. This metaphysical differentiation is
leveled by determinism, since it assigns determinate being to all three
be is to be determinate. To become is to be indeterminate.)
“Every process of
concrescence comes out of the future to become determinate. Whitehead
analyzed its present and past status. His analysis is here extended to
include the future, to include that which has not yet separated itself out
of the divine. . . . . As God withdraws into a more distant future, the
present actualizes itself and becomes past. The same locus was once part
of the divine, is now our present subjective immediacy, and will become
past fact, as the creative advance moves on.”
is in unison of immediacy with us. . . . The everlasting divine
subjectivity will overlap with our own at some juncture. Since we are
present, the juncture will also be in the present experience of God. . . .
. [Contemporaries] are not present [to each other] in that they are
causally independent. Contemporaries are in unison of becoming with the
present occasion, even though not directly present to it. So we may
conceive of God as in unison of becoming with present occasions, yet in
their future in the sense that its indeterminate activity will become the
activity of present occasions subsequently.”
Whitehead, God provides each actuality with its own initial aim, which is
the possibility for its own future, which it strives to actualize. In
this sense God creates the relevant future in terms of which each
actuality can experience and integrate its past into a determinate
“That God is our future providing the aims we strive for is the fulcrum by
which Whitehead’s philosophy can emancipate us from some long-standing
difficulties of the tradition.”
“Either God determines the being of the creature unilaterally or the
determination is achieved by other factors as well.”
the notion ultimately makes sense, then only an omnipotent being could
create the world ex nihilo. Only an all-determinative act could bring
some being into being if there were no other resources involved. . . .
general principle of concrescence takes on special meaning for the history
of evolution. . . . Without that divine aim, however, there would [be]
only chaos and extreme improbability; with it, this mighty world has come
into being out of practically nothing.”
“Since becoming is primary, God should be conceived as perfect becoming,
and the perfection of becoming includes being enriched by that which comes
. [I]f Whitehead’s ‘timeless objects’ were dependent upon becoming for
their existence, then it is possible to conceive of them as derivative
from temporal actualities. They are abstract, because they abstract from
time. . . . [T]ime transcends timelessness. . . . God transcends us as our
. [A]ll present becoming is subjective; all past being (outcome of
becoming) is objective . . . . [W]hat of the future? . . . .
. [W]e assume actuality to have univocal meaning. Aristotle initiated the
tradition of conceiving the actual to be something concretely
determinate. As indeterminate, the future, cannot be actual in this
sense. . . .
“Whitehead treated both concrescing occasions and concrete occasions as
actual, at least insofar as both can serve as basic reasons, according to
the ontological principle (PR, 24).
“Whitehead has discovered a common element between these two types of
actuality: decision. Concrescence, the reduction of many alternative ways
of integration to a final one, is a process of deciding, while the outcome
[the concrete] is something decided. In either case there is decision,
the cutting off of alternatives. ‘”Decision” cannot be construed as a
causal adjunct of an actual entity. It constitutes the very meaning of
actuality.’ (PR, 43)”
the present and the past constitute distinct forms of actuality, why
cannot the future also have its own distinctive kind of actuality? . . .
“Like most of us, Whitehead assumes that the present (and past) alone are
actual. Then the future is merely possible. Then God is presently actual
or merely possible. If only possible, God is an imaginative projection of
our own making. . . .
. [The future] must be less determinate than either the present or the
past. It should be the source of creativity for the present, and it could
also be the ultimate source of aim.
“If so, there are
three modes of actuality: the past as determinately actual, the present as
the activity of determination, and the future as activity, transferring
the power of creativity to the present. . . .
“From whence comes
the creative power of present causation? I argue that it comes from the
transfer of creativity from the future to the present. This transfer can
be conceived as future causation.”
“. . . [C]reativity
is . . . the underlying power of concrescence, it is the basis of present
actuality. Creativity has the proper indeterminateness. In one sense it is
even more indeterminate than an eternal object, for it cannot be
“Creativity either comes from within an occasion or from beyond it. . .
individual occasion lacks the resources to be the source of its own
creativity. Its creativity is limited to the task it faces in unifying the
multiplicity it receives, which [creativity] is exhausted in the process
of concrescence. An occasion is nothing but what it receives, and what it
can make of what it receives. Whatever it prehends it receives; should it
not also receive the power of prehending? How could this creativity simply
well up from within?
past . . . lacks all active power, for any individual past actuality [a
concretum] is completely devoid of creativity [it was exhausted in the
concrescence]. . . .[I]t is only through the creativity found in the
present that the past can exert influence.
“As long as the
future is thought to contain nothing actual, everything that an occasion
needs must be derived from the past. . . . even though every individual
past actuality has no creativity. (If it had any creativity, it would
still be on the way to becoming past. There is no real pastness unless its
creativity has perished.) If the future is actual, and particularly if
the future is creativity itself, it can be the source of creativity. If
creativity cannot simply well up in the present, nor come from a
creativityless past, it must come from the future.”
“Pure creativity underlies both the actuality of the future and the many
actualities of the present. In the future, creativity constitutes a
single activity, unbounded in its forward reaches, which then becomes
pluralized into the many finite present actual occasions in the creative
advance of nature.”
. [A]im signifies the very real future toward which each concrescence
aims. It is the occasion’s own future, and it is appropriate that it
should come from the future.
is only derivatively existent, but it does not depend upon present or past
actualities for its existence. Aim exists as characterizing creativity,
the actuality of the future. It does not characterize creativity the way
eternal objects or objective forms do. . . . Aim characterizes future
creativity by means of a subjective forming that never becomes objective.
“. . . [O]ne future
creativity is pluralized into the many present concrescences. . . . [T]he
creativity of the nascent occasion is directly continuous with the nearest
portion of the future. The subjective forming of that nearest portion is
most directly relevant to the nascent occasion, such that the aims of the
future become the aims of the present. This involves no objectification. .
. . [T]he nascent occasion starts out as part
of the future actuality, and only in the process of concrescence
individuates itself as a distinct act of creativity.
is needed by creativity in order to give it form. Pure creativity
(without form) is the same in all of its instances. Creativity could only
distinguished in terms of actual occasions if it did not have any form of
gives creativity form. Creativity is formless until aim gives it form.
Actual occasions could not distinguish creativity unless the latter is
what sense, then, could the future be actual? As pure creativity.”
. only the creativity is primarily existent. Aim is derivatively
existent. . . . The aim inherent in each occasion as that toward which it
strives, perishes in the attainment of its goal. Each present instance of
creativity is shaped and focused by its particular concrescence, which is
contrast, future creativity is always moving on, deeper into the far
future even while becoming pluralized in the immediate future into the
many acts of present activity. It is forever future.”
future is indeterminate in contrast to the past, which is determinate,
while the present is the process of achieving the determinate.”
Whitehead all creativity is concentrated in the creative advance, which is
the present in its cosmic extent. Therefore, the future, like the past, is
devoid of creativity. I extend the locus of creativity to include the
future as well.
“This means that
the creativity for a particular locus was once part of the divine
activity, but becomes a finite concrescence resulting in determinate
actuality as that locus shifts relative to the creative advance. There is
continuity between the immediate future and the initial situation of the
occasion, even though the finite part is merely a very small portion of
the divine immensity. [The future approaches backward or “pastward” into
the present.] All present decisions, however, are incremental
determinations of that divine input. . . . God is in us the way the future
is in the present . . . . God as such is purely future.”
the absence of future creativity, could creativity explain the transition
from a completed occasion to a new one? The old occasion has exhausted
its subjective immediacy, for its activity of unification ceases with the
attainment of concrete unity. There must be an influx of creativity for
there to be any new occasions but how can creativity come from that which
is devoid of any further creativity (activity of unification)?
[Creativity = Activity of Unification]
. [A]n intrinsic self-generating creativity explains nothing, while the
past cannot supply it. The influx of creativity is best explained by the
future. Future creativity can account for the ultimacy of creativity
transcending the present. . . .
“Creativity and the ontological principle are interdependent. The
ontological principle grounds reasons, or ordinary explanations, in
actualities, while creativity provides the ultimate explanation why
actualities are the only reasons. For ‘actual entities prehend their
predecessors because they are all linked together as the particular
“creatures” of a single creative process’ (EWP, 222). . . .
. [I]f it [creativity] has no independent reality, it is difficult to see
how it has the power to be the creativity for occasions yet to be (RM,
92). Thus, on Whitehead’s terms we have this dilemma: Creativity explains
the concrescent unification of feelings that brings about decision.
Decision is the basis for [any?] actuality and reason whatsoever (PR,
43, 45). On the other hand, pure creativity by itself, since not actual,
lacks the ontological primacy to provide this ultimate explanation, if it
is restricted to present actualities alone. Creativity in some form needs
to be actual in its own right, and this is possible only in terms of
most generally, 'the ontological principle means that actual entities are
the only reasons' (PR, 24). God as the future actual entity is the
ultimate reason why there can be the ongoingness of concrescences. The
infusion of future creativity explains why present occasions actively
concresce, and why they can be actual as ontologically primary in their
own domain of the present. If actuality is to be differentiated according
to its temporal modes, then there must be a future actuality of universal
“[N]ew forms are introduced into the material world, if there is any truth
to the evolution of matter. The more complex material entities become, the
more acute becomes the need for the explanation of their form. . . . [S]elf-determination
also depends on other conditions: whether the occasion has the resources
and power for self-decision, and whether the alternatives can be
differentially valued. If one alternative is just as good as another, any
decision would be quite arbitrary.
any case, there is emergent novelty in the material order, especially as
we ascend to greater complexity. One reason for a theory of occasions
sensitive to novelty is to account for evolution. Such novelty can be
explained by actual occasions. Their categoreal structure is designed to
actualize unrealized possibilities, thus responding to divine persuasion.
If emergent novelty is not just the result of blind chance, there must be
some receptivity to ideal novelty. In terms of his theory, there must
always have been occasions around capable of being persuaded by God for
the natural order to have come into being.”
“Many find panpsychism difficult to accept. [In] Whitehead’s version of
panpsychism . . . each occasion has a physical as well as a mental pole.
As we have seen, Whitehead’s commitment to novelty leads him to posit a
mental pole for every occasion. To be sure, only true individuals
(occasions) and not mere aggregates have mentality. There would be no need
to ascribe mentality, however, to those occasions whose responsiveness has
atrophied. Such occasions would have a limited categoreal structure:
physical prehension, including prehension of the form of unification from
its predecessor, and satisfaction. No possibilities are needed, nor could
they be entertained. . . .”
. [T]he inorganic realm is impervious to any continued novelty, and hence
needs no mentality. Only life and mind need novelty. That means we live in
a world surrounded by actualities that are now dead, though once they were
alive in their own way, perhaps in the deep past. Yet once the novelties
for which they were suited were exhausted, they became insensitive to any
“Actualities now dead, that is, now having lost all mentality, cannot hear
God’s call. That means that God’s power is restricted, insofar as that
power is purely persuasive. Earthquakes, the weather, the collision of
comets, etc. are outside God’s direction, though God once had a hand in
creating them. This may apply also to most plants and animals, and, more
problematically, to brutalized humans.
. [Natural selection] states that once an organism is suited to its
environment, it will produce offspring at a greater rate than its
competitors. In other words, it will manage to persist, and has no need to
evolve further. If so, natural selection may be an added reason for the
lessening sensitivity to divine aim. Novel actualization gives way to
persistence. Persistence signifies the power of the past in contrast to
the power of the present, which is finite concresence.”
“Except for the most primitive of all occasions . . . all occasions are
either persistencies, or include persistencies as subordinate elements.
These persistencies determine the spatiotemporal regions of actualities,
either directly for themselves or indirectly for the inclusive occasions
they participate in. The position and velocity of these persistencies
determine where the next generation of actual occasions will be. They
atomize the continuum inherited from the future into its many occasions.
“This is a more realistic alternative to Whitehead’s proposal that God
determines the initial standpoint of the occasion (PR, 283). For
the sake of the continuity of persistencies and other societies, that task
can safely be delegated to the world.”
“However, the continuum of future creativity is not atomized by the
activity of persistencies alone. They determine how it should be
atomized, but cannot bring about that atomization apart from the
creativity they receive from the future. Without it they could not bring
their past particularity into the present. So we should say most
precisely, that the future creativity brings particular persistencies into
the present whereby it [future creativity] becomes atomized.”
that were God to withhold the divine power from the world, it would vanish
in an instant. That is true for the divine creativity, for without it
there could be no further advance into the present. Yet in other respects
the world is quite durable. Much of it can persist without aim. If we
think of spirit as source of aim, the biblical writer is more accurate:
[Job 34:14-15] Life and consciousness depend on novelty, but not
necessarily the primitive elements.
“The transfer of
creativity from the one cosmic future to the many occasions of the present
depends upon persistencies for its dispersal, but it also requires the
exact determination as to which aim is appropriate for which occasion.
This is not clearly specified in Whitehead’s account, yet this is not
something that the nascent occasion can do for itself. Not having yet
received informed creativity, it lacks the discernment or the power to
select its proper aim from the myriads of aims found in God. If so, the
determination of the appropriate aim must be provided for it by God, but
between the future and the present provides a way, but first we need to
make a distinction between what we shall call ‘physical perception’ and
physical prehension. Physical prehension prehends actual entities in all
their concreteness, as opposed to the abstractness of conceptual
prehension. Physical prehension is also the way persistence from the past
is maintained. This is most evident in the structure of concrescence,
which individualizes the process of creativity, whereby the many become
one. The many are many past actualities that persist into the present
occasion. The one is the final feeling of satisfaction that unites all
these persistent elements.
“Persistence is essential if we wish to explain causation. . . .”
causation concentrates on that part of the past that persists into the
present. . . . Since the scope of prehension in the earlier book (Science
and the Modern World) is much broader, I propose for clarity’s sake
that we rename its notion of prehension ‘physical perception.’
Whitehead’s model was clearly perception, but he wished to generalize
from ordinary perception. . . . Early prehension is primarily the relation
between two events in terms of a common eternal object. Looked at from
one end it functions as a generalized form of perception.
“Physical perception is formed on analogy with ‘physical memory.’”
“. . . When
substance theory tries to explain change by reference to the accidents of
some underlying essence inherent in the actuality, it must perforce
abstract from the total concrete actuality. What changes must be less
than the total concrete actuality. If this were not so, there could be no
accidental features to be exchanged. On the other hand, unchanging
substantial persistence is a very accurate description of the past, which
remains what it is unchanged. In itself, the past is forever the same.
Theories of substance cannot explain change as well as theories of
process. But they may be able to explain stability and persistence better
than theories of process.”
“Physical perception contrasts with the persistent elements of physical
prehension. The sensa that occasions perceive from distant occasions shape
our inner experience, but its objectification has little impact, except
indirectly in terms of its subjective response expressed in terms of its
subjective forms. Each of us enjoys a rich inner perceptual experience,
but this has little impact on any successor occasions other than upon one
thread of personal experience and memory.
“Physical perception may explain one feature of our ordinary perception
better than prehension. Prehension is either in concrescence or
satisfaction, that is, either in unification or final unity. Unification
suggests a measure of indeterminacy, yet we can perceive sharply and
clearly. If perception were indeterminate, we should expect everything to
be slightly out of focus, as it were. On the other hand, the unity of
satisfaction is intolerant of any addition. Anything occurring subsequent
to the satisfaction can only be externally related to it. Yet not only is
perception determinate, but it is capable of receiving further sensations.
The subjectivity of the perceiver transcends what has been already
perceived to allow for subsequent perceptions as well.”
“[H]ybrid prehension is superfluous in a world where God influences
occasions by the infusion of creativity informed by aim, and where in
place of living persons inclusive occasions share their creativity
informed by aim with included occasions.”
importance of physical perception becomes evident when we consider how God
as future perceives past actual occasions. For the past can only persist
as far as the present. Physical prehension is the means of bringing the
past forward. If there were future physical prehensions, the past could
persist into the future.
“Future perception abstracts from the partial persistence inherent in
physical prehension. By the same token, there are no physical prehensions
for God to unify, as is the case with finite occasions. If there were, it
would be possible for the future to bring about a determinate past without
the intervention of the present. The present differs from the future in
that it can bring about the determinate past. The future, by indefinitely
formed creativity, brings about the present instead.
. [Whitehead] insists that divine feeling be physical as well as
conceptual, for it were purely conceptual, it could be entirely
independent from the world. Then the coherence and interdependence between
God and the world would be lost, for God would be independent from the
world as in classical theism. Yet interdependence can also be preserved if
we require that divine experience be perceptual as well as conceptual.
“Perceptual feeling is inherently particular and temporal. The actualities
are perceived in terms of their sensa, to be sure, but the actualities
perceived result from concrescence, and each has its location. The
experience of God [i.e., God’s experience of the world] would be
the same, whether God were to physically prehend or to perceive the world.
. Physical prehension retains an element of persistence, whereas physical
perception does not. Both may be conceived as two species of a more
general notion of physical prehension. Then we could take the retention
of location to be the distinguishing character of the genus, with two
species: causal and perceptual. This would have the advantage of showing
that although God responds to the contingencies of the world, God is not
caused or coerced by the world, since perceptual prehension abstracts from
this coercive element.
. Perception in the mode of presentation[al] immediacy abstracts from the
massive experience of causal efficacy. . . . It . . . is subject to the
errors of delusion and illusion. What prevents similar ills from befalling
“Divine perception ranges over the entire domain of the past. It is direct
even for distantly situated actualities, for it perceives their sensa
abstracting from all intermediate transmission. . . .
. [At the] instant between the end of one occasion and the beginning of
another . . . . God immediately perceives the newly emergent past, and
retains that memory forever. Whether we call this perfect memory or
immediate experience is immaterial, for God experiences every past in
complete immediacy, what just happened now or thousands of years ago.
. Divine perception is independent of any objective persistence, since it
is derived from the perfection of divine memory, the epitome of subjective
“Pure subjective persistence is really only possible for the future. . . .
Freed from any objective persisting of the past, the future may retain its
concrescent immediacy and hence subjective persistence forever. By not
having any past persistents to unify, future concrescence has nothing to
objectify. This is one reason why God is imprehensible.
. [T]here is also the refocusing of divine perceptions at each potential
standpoint along the interface between the future and the present. These
standpoints are determined by the way the persistencies atomize the future
continuum. In order to provide each nascent occasion with its appropriate
aim, God needs to experience precisely the same experience that the
nascent occasion will at the outset of its concrescence. By anticipating
that standpoint, God can perspectively draw upon the immediate divine
experience of occasions just achieving determinate being. In this way
divine perceptions and present physical prehensions exactly parallel each
other, except that the physical prehensions also incorporate persistent
elements from the past.
divine experience from that standpoint evokes an evaluative response.
Purely abstract, nontemporal possibilities do not evoke such evaluations,
except indirectly, for the true good or evil consists in the way
possibilities are realized under particular conditions. . . . The way God
experiences those conditions together shapes the indefinite subjective
forms, which inform the creativity that is infused in the nascent
occasion. Because God shares the same standpoint and experience with the
occasion, albeit on the future side of the divide, the aim devised by God
will be naturally appropriate to every contingency that arises.
“Persistence is largely unconscious, and does not need conscious
direction. It is the continued presence of the past operating
independently from any present reaction to it. Only concrescent response
is enhanced by consciousness. . . .
“Perception is physical in the sense that it perceives the sensa of a
given actuality, and it perceives those sensa as spatiotemporally located
in the actuality. It is, however, not physical in the sense that it
abstracts from the persistence of the actuality. For the purposes of
consciousness, I submit that the former sense is the more relevant.
Perception contrasts with other conceptual feelings which abstract from
the spatiotemporal locatedness of the actuality as well.
“Thus, on this view consciousness arises from the contrast between
propositional feeling and its corresponding perception, not its
corresponding physical prehension of persisting elements. If so, God is
conscious in the same way that sophisticated occasions are. Perception is
the basis for consciousness, not persistence.
[That is, perception, not persistence, is the basis for consciousness.
There may be perception without consciousness, but no consciousness
“Divine creativity in the future is one activity in contrast to the
present. The present is individualized into many potentially competing
occasions, but the future is individualized as a whole.
Individualization, not size, is the relevant factor. . . . God acts
pantheistically, but this is compatible with a theism, provided the
theistic activity takes place in a future mode.
“Divine creativity is necessarily very indeterminate, if it is the task of
present occasions to render actuality determinate. . . Cellular and
particularly occasions of the mind have much richer subjective experience,
yet are only indirectly objectified. The infinite subjective divine
experience results in no finite determinateness, yet its infusion of
informed creativity fuels and coordinates the activities of the universe.”
“Some have regarded God as ‘outside’ spacetime, as if this were possible.
Perhaps more precisely, they have thought of God as not extensive at all.
. . . But . . . God’s consequent nature is everlasting.
. Yet when the consequent nature is conceived as everlasting,
extensionality seems to follow inexorably, provided we assume the fusion
of space and time. In any case, my account presupposes divine
extensionality, in order to account to [for] the way the active
future impinges on the present.”
continuum is intended to span the modes. It is neither actual nor
potential, or it can be the same when characterizing the potential and the
extensive continuum is not a category of existence. The extensive
continuum is not a distinct formative element. The extensive continuum
cannot be understood in terms of the formative element, God; or in terms
of the formative element, creativity; or in terms of the formative
element, eternal objects.)
objective forms are not uncreated but emergent, . . . the future domain of
the extensive continuum needs to be reconceived. It is not ‘already’
fully spread out before us in objective fashion, but is still in the
“This does not mean that the past is constituted by a fully definite
continuum. The task of coordinate division renders the continuum more
definite, but this task need not be completed.
. While our own anticipations may project features on the future, such as
times and places for meetings, etc., the primary projections for the
extensive continuum are natural projections, arising from extensive
tendencies of determinate persistencies. Here the motions of the heavenly
bodies may be used as an example, since their well-established momenta are
expected to continue unchanged into regions of the far future.
. the future loci of the extensive continuum are not just projected out
over nothing. According to the ontological principle, the divine future
concrescence grounds their existence. (If God were a present concrescence,
that grounding would be problematic, as there would be no actuality
inherent in the future.) That these future loci have derivative existence
depends on God, but what they are follows from the projections from the
past and present.”
. we can reconceive the extensive continuum in terms of the common
extensional properties of one vast society embracing all actualities and
all temporal modes.”
my theory, the extensive continuum can apply to the divine creativity of
the future as potential extensionality, even though not in any objectified
form capable of coordinate divisibility. . . .
“While past actualities concretely manifest one portion of the extensive
continuum, and the divine concrescence fills future regions, we cannot say
that the future extensive continuum objectifies God. It is more accurate
to say that past (and present) occasions objectify the region of God, for
the influx of future creativity into present occasions first becomes
objectifiable in terms of their finite outcomes. Yet while this may be
thought to be an objectification of the region God inhabits, it is not
purely that. The future extensive continuum is not an objectification of
any actuality, but a projection on the future in terms of past
“Actual occasions were conceived by Whitehead as extremely small, giving
them a very sharp standpoint from which to prehend and order the world.
In contrast God as future has an extremely large standpoint, for the
divine region reaches from the present to the most distant place in far
future as is necessary to encompass synoptically the entire multiplicity
of the world. The divine experience is always unifying itself, but at any
one instant it is only provisionally unified.”
extremely large standpoint of God diffuses any possible conflict with
relativity physics. . . .
order for God to experience and to reconcile the differing inertial
systems, God must be temporally thick. Actual occasions differ widely, but
still within very narrow parameters. It is the nature of the present to be
very brief in comparison with the past and the future. The active future,
on the other hand, is potentially infinite. This extensiveness allows for
there to be intermediate unifications of divine experience, first
according to a particular inertial framework, then mediating activity
enabling the experiences of differing frameworks to be unified or allowing
for experience to be ordered in another way that obviates the need for any
frameworks. Ultimately, but only in the distant future, God would
experience the entire universe as one.
“Each experience would require God to project godself [himself] into a
more future perspective, thereby enlarging the extent of the active
future. Surrendering the near future to the present is counterbalanced by
reclaiming the far future from the nothingness beyond.”
the usual views of time, which are limited solely to being, there is only
activity in the present as things become actual. The past is already
fixed, and the future contains nothing actual. If, however, the future is
active, then there is activity not only in the present but [also] in the
wide reaches of the future.”
may conceive the creative advance as whatever [present or future] is in
unison of becoming with the present concrescing occasion. . . .
. God ‘now’ occupies regions of the extensive continuum that we will
occupy later on, yet in those regions God is in unison of becoming with
us. The scope of what is in unison of becoming with us needs to be
enlarged to include both contemporaries and future activity.
“Since the future is to be understood primarily in terms of the de facto
activity inhabiting it, we would be advised to conceive it not as an
actual infinity, but as a potential infinity, that which is capable of
being increased without any limit.