From
Jewish Theology and Process Thought,
edited by Sandra B. Lubarsky and David Ray Griffin, Albany: The State
University of New York Press, 1996, Chapter 7, 95-125.
Process Theodicy, Christology, and the Imitatio Dei
David Ray Griffin
Introduction
I.
Process Theodicy
II.
Process Christology
II. The Imitatio Dei [and Notes]
The central
religious question is whether there is a Holy Reality, meaning a reality
that is worthy of worship with one’s entire being, to which one’s life can
rightfully be committed without reserve. According to the biblical
perspective, there is a Holy Reality: a God who created the world and is
providentially active in it. From this perspective, the apparent evil in
the world can become a theological problem, because this apparent evil, if
taken to be genuinely evil, can be regarded as falsifying God’s total
goodness and thereby God’s worthiness of worship. For many people, the
Holocaust was an evil that cannot be rationalized as merely apparent evil.
It was, in fact, an evil so great as to provide the ultimate challenge to
belief in a Holy Reality creative of and providentially active in the
world. The task of theodicy for Jews and Christians (and other theists)
is to try to meet that challenge. The question of this essay is whether
the process theology based on the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead and
Charles Hartshorne can produce a theodicy that is adequate to the basic
beliefs of Jewish and Christian faith and is credible in the light of the
enormity of evil in the world, especially the Holocaust.
As well as
intensifying this theoretical problem of evil, which theodicies try to
solve, the Holocaust brings to consciousness another problem for Christian
faith. Christianity teaches that God is loving and just, and that we are
to worship God by developing the kinds of virtues befitting those who
believe in such a Holy Reality. One of the best-known lists of these
virtues includes love, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, gentleness,
and self-control (Galatians 5:22-23). When one reads the history of the
Christian treatment of Jews, however, these virtues hardly leap off the
page. The way blacks and Native Americans have been treated by white
Christians in the United States is also not a pretty tale. Whether or not
one sees the Holocaust as exceeding previous atrocities qualitatively, it
poignantly raises the question of Christian faith’s practical value.1
For, as has been pointed out many times, the Nazis could draw on Christian
writings and precedent for much of their propaganda and practice. And,
even if it could be maintained that the perpetrators of the Holocaust were
no longer Christian, the fact remains that they were rather immediately
post-Christian: One would expect that the virtues instilled by
Christianity would still be quite dominant. From this perspective, the
Holocaust constitutes an overwhelming indictment of Christianity,
especially in the light of the prior and later atrocities committed by
those in countries in which Christianity has been the dominant form of
religion.
Sometimes
indictments of Christianity in terms of its practical fruits seem to
presuppose a view of the “natural goodness” of human nature prior to its
being “corrupted” by “dogmatic religion.” Such a view is naive. Human
beings have thought in terms of “us” and “them” in every part of the
earth, as far back as recorded history goes, and have often resorted to
force to deal with “them,” sometimes very brutally. This is a tendency of
human nature. It would be judging any religion by impossible standards to
indict it for not totally eradicating this tendency. What we can hope for
is that it be mitigated. The question is whether a fair reading of
history suggests that Christianity has aggravated this tendency at least
as much as it has mitigated it. Judgments about this are very difficult
to make. But I would say that, at the very least, Christianity has not
produced the virtues it advocates to the degree that one could reasonably
expect and, further, that it has to an extent aggravated the tendency to
use coercive force against “aliens.”
It has rightly been
pointed out that Christian-Jewish relations cannot simply be
categorized as one more example of the relations between “us” and “them.”
Christianity arose as a sect of Judaism; being a “Jew” who is not a
“Christian” is in effect a denial of the central Christian claim; and the
early antagonism of the “Christians” to those Jews who did not agree with
them and ostracized them is reflected in the Sacred Scripture of the
Christians in such a way that Judaism took on special theological
significance. Due to these facts, the Christian attitude toward and
treatment of Jews is a special case, although it is also an example of the
more general human tendency to reduce those who are different to objects
against whom the use of force is justifiable.
I have indicated
three problems:
(1)
the general problem of theodicy, especially in the light of the
Holocaust;
(2)
the problem of the practical value of Christianity, especially
with regard to the inculcation of the virtues of “love, peace, patience,
kindness, goodness, gentleness, and self-control” in relation to those who
are perceived as different in some significant respect; and
(3)
the problem of the special animus that has been manifested by
Christians toward Jews and Judaism.
The first problem is
a purely theoretical one, which in principle can be solved by theological
reformulation. The second and third problems are practical ones,
involving the attitudes and behavior of Christians; but they are rooted in
part in theoretical beliefs, so that theological reformulation could be
relevant to overcoming them. I believe that at the root of the
theoretical dimension of all three problems is one and the same issue: the
understanding of God’s power in relation to the world. God has been
understood by traditional Jewish and Christian theology as having
coercive omnipotence. This idea has led to an insoluble problem of
evil; it has contributed to an anti-Judaistic Christology; and it has
aggravated the coercive tendencies of those who have been informed by the
biblical vision of the Holy Reality. My threefold thesis is that process
theology’s conception of God’s omnipotence as persuasive can solve the
theoretical problem of evil, that it can remove the basis for an anti-Judaistic
Christology, and that, to the extent that it would become widely
informative of people’s perception of the Holy, it would mitigate their
tendency to use coercion. I will discuss these three issues in order.
Posted July 8, 2007
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Process Theodicy
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