Time in Process
Philosophy
David Ray Griffin
The relation of time
as known in human experience to the ultimate nature of reality is one of
the oldest topics of human thought. In traditional thought, both East and
West, reflection on this topic was often made both vital and perplexing by
the conviction that although our experience is undoubtedly temporal the
divine reality is not. In modern times, when belief in a divine reality,
especially a nontemporal one, has faded, concern with the topic has been
spurred by the widespread consensus that time is ultimately unreal for
physics because it is unreal for the objects that it describes.
I addressed this
topic, especially in its modern form, in
“Time and the Fallacy of
Misplaced Concreteness” (1986), which I wrote as an introductory essay to
an edited volume titled Physics and the Ultimate Significance of Time.
In that essay, I dealt with many of the leading thinkers about time,
including G. T. Whitrow, one of the past presidents of the International
Society for the Study of Time. But I did not discuss the position of the
founder of this society, J. T. Fraser, who, along with Milič Čapek,1
has probably read, thought, and written more about time than anyone else
in human history. I have used the invitation to write an essay for this
inaugural issue of KronoScope as the occasion, finally, to relate
my position to Fraser’s.
Being a process
philosopher, I defend, not surprisingly, a version of pantemporalism,
according to which temporality is eternal and coextensive with actuality.
To be actual is to be temporal. I bring out here, even more clearly than
in my previous essay, the idea that this pantemporalism presupposes, and
is presupposed by, panexperientialism, according to which experience is
coextensive with actuality. To be actual is to experience.
This view, besides
not being widespread, also seems obviously false to most thinkers, at
least in the modern West. I defend it on the grounds that, in spite of
the fact that it may initially seem counterintuitive, it can do more
justice to our fundamental intuitions than can its alternatives. These
alternatives, although they have variations, reduce to two (if we leave
aside the positivistic refusal to think about the issue).
One alternative to
pantemporalism is nontem-poralism, according to which time as known in
human experience is ultimately unreal. One form of nontemporalism can be
called transcendental, according to which the nontemporal ultimate reality
transcends human experience, in the sense of being “higher” than it. This
transcendental nontemporal-ism is affirmed by Spinozism, Advaita Vedanta,
some forms of Platonism and Buddhism, and most forms of thought referring
to themselves as “perennialism,” Huston Smith’s version of which I have
engaged in our jointly authored book, Primordial Truth and Postmodern
Theology (1989). A second form of nontemporalism is reductionistic,
according to which the nontemporal ultimate reality is described not by
theology but by physics. This reductionistic nontemporalism is based on
the late modern view that the ultimate nature of reality is treated by
physics, combined with the aforementioned widespread consensus that time
is ultimately unreal for the objects studied by physics.
The other
alternative to pantemporalism is dualism, according to which there are
temporal and nontemporal actualities. Again, variations are possible.
There can be an eternal dualism, according to which nontemporal and
temporal actualities have both existed from all eternity. There can be a
created dualism, as affirmed by Descartes and Newton, according to
which a divine being created both temporal and nontemporal finite
actualities ex nihilo at the outset of the world, so that both
temporality and nontemporality are equally fundamental. (This is true
within the created world, anyway. Whether the ultimate nature of reality
is nontemporal or temporal depends upon whether the divine creator is
itself understood to be nontemporal or temporal.) Finally, there is an
emergent dualism, according to which temporal finite actualities
emerged out of nontemporal finite actualities.
Although I have
assumed that the question of whether reality is ultimately temporal,
nontemporal, or dualistic depends upon the nature of the ultimate actual
being(s), one might hold, as most interpreters have assumed Newton held,
that time can exist absolutely, independently of any temporal being(s). I
have ignored this possibility, however, agreeing with Fraser and most
others on the relational character of time—that time does not exist
independently of temporal processes but only as a relation involving such
processes. Even Newton, in reality, held this view: His God was a
temporal being, so that his “absolute time” was related to successive
states of the divine experience (Čapek, 1986: 301; 1976: xxxiv-xxxv).2
In any case, given this relational view of time, the question of the
ultimate reality of time as we know it in human experience depends upon
the status in the nature of things of this kind of (temporal) experience.
A final preliminary
point: I have been referring vaguely to “time as we know it in human
experience.” By this I mean three features that presuppose but go beyond
time in the Pickwickian sense of “anisotropy,” which is provided by
thermodynamic entropy. Although the differences in the entropy of
successive states means that the order of events when read off in one
direction will be distinguishable from the order when read off in the
other direction, this anisotropy is said not to require the distinction
between “past” and “future.” The order of events as measured by
increasing entropy in fact goes from the past to the future, but
the order of the events, it is said, could in principle go in the
opposite direction, so that the entropy would decrease with time.
Time as known in
human experience is not adequately characterized by anisotropy but also
involves asymmetry, constant becoming, and irreversibility in principle.
Asymmetry means that the relation of the present to the past is
different in kind from the relation of the present to the future. We
express this difference by saying that whereas we anticipate the
future, we remember the past. The past is assumed to be totally
determined, while the future is assumed to be partly determinable. The
past is settled actuality, the future involves potentiality to be
settled. The present, the “now” between past and future, is assumed to be
the time in which potentialities are being settled. Constant becoming
refers to the fact that this “now” does not stand still but always
divides a different set of events into past and future.
Irreversibility in principle means that a series of events could not
conceivably turn around and go in the opposite direction. Events in my
past could not also be in my future. I cannot anticipate past events, or
remember future events, and this fact is not simply a contingent feature
of our experience but is analytic, being built into the very meaning of
“past” and “future.” I will refer to time in this threefold sense not
only as “time as known in human experience” but also as “time in the usual
sense” and simply as “time” or “temporality.”
As the basis for
showing the need to affirm pantemporalism and therefore a version of
panexperientialism, I examine, in the first two sections, problems
inherent in nontemporalism and temporal-nontemporal dualism, especially
Fraser’s version of the latter. In the third section, I articulate my
panexperientialist pantemporalism.
I.
Nontemporalism and Temporal-Nontemporal Dualism
The main problem for
nontemporalism, both in its transcendental and its reductionistic forms,
is to explain why time seems to be real, although it is not. If, for
example, the ultimate (and, in fact, only) reality is Brahman, and Brahman
is timeless, then time is an illusion. But how does this illusion arise?
The apparent many are, by hypothesis, really one. All things, including
human beings, are Brahman. If we have the illusion that time is real,
therefore, Brahman must be confused. But that cannot be, because Brahman
is perfect consciousness. We have a paradox.
The reductionistic
form of nontemporalism has a similar problem. It holds that the ultimate
particles constituting the world are timeless, and that we human beings,
along with all other complex things, are simply aggregates of these
timeless particles. The human mind, according to this reductionistic
viewpoint, is not some distinctive type of reality with power to come up
with false notions. In earlier decades, the dominant form of reductionism
was “epiphenomenalism,” according to which the mind is “a nonefficacious
byproduct of the brain.” Epiphenomenalism does give the mind a kind of
reality, thereby seeking to be adequate to the fact that we do have
experiences (whereas the brain, by contrast, is said to be composed of
insentient bits of matter, or insentient matter-energy events). But the
word “nonefficacious” in the definition specifies that the mind has no
power to originate anything. It is an effect, not a cause.
Epiphenomenalism thereby does not explain how the mind, being nothing but
a shadow cast up by the nontemporal stuff of the brain, has come up with
the idea of time.
More recently, the
dominant form of reductionism has been “identism,” according to which the
mind is strictly identical with the brain. This position, if anything,
makes it even harder to understand how the idea of time arises. If the
term “mind” refers only to the brain, or to some of its functions, and if
the brain is composed exhaustively of things to which time in the sense of
asymmetry, irreversibility in principle, and constant becoming does not
apply, then why does time seem real to the “mind”? The common answer is
that time as we experience it arises from the brain’s enormous complexity,
with its billions of neurons. But billions of times nothing is still
nothing. The further answer is that it is not simply a matter of the
number of neurons, but of the extremely complex ways in which they are
interconnected: Each neuron is connected to perhaps 100,000 synapses, so
that the brain has the capacity for trillions of trillions of
configurations. But again, such figures do not answer the question. Even
though there are some cases in which quantitative changes give rise to a
qualitative difference, how is that conceivable in this case? How can
things for which the distinction between past and future is not relevant
in the slightest give rise to something (our experience) for which this
distinction is fundamental?
In both forms of
nontemporalism, the transcen-dental and the reductionistic, an illusion is
said to create an illusion. The human mind is not real and yet is said to
have the power to create the illusion that time is real, an illusion so
powerful that we cannot help thinking in terms of it: Although Einstein
considered it “an illusion,” he admitted that it is “a stubborn one”
(Hoffman, 258).
The stubbornness of
this alleged illusion is the main reason for doubting that it is an
illusion. As Whitehead said, in agreement with William James, the
“stubborn facts,” the ones that will not go away no matter what, should be
taken as the most fundamental facts to which a theory must be adequate.
Science and philosophy are both committed not only to the ideal of being
self-consistent but also to the ideal of being adequate to the facts of
experience. But this purely formal statement of the ideal leaves open the
question, Which of the multitude of apparent facts should be taken as the
most crucial ones in formulating and assessing a theory? Reductionistic
nontemporalists base their position on the fact that time does not seem to
be supplied by physical theory, combined with the assumption that this
physical theory does not involve any important abstraction from the nature
of the objects and interactions it studies. It is on the basis of this
twofold conviction that reductionistic nontemporalists deny the ultimate
reality of time as known in our immediate experience. Because this
nontemporalism is based upon physical science, it prides itself on being
empirical. “Empiricism,” however, is supposed to mean giving more weight
to the immediate data of experience than to recondite speculation. And
yet this so-called empiricism denies the ultimate reality of one of the
most stubborn facts of our immediate experience, our sense of time, in the
name of some of the most recondite speculations ever formulated by human
minds, such as relativity theory and quantum theory.
Whitehead, in
harmony with the best meaning of “pragmatism” in William James and Charles
Peirce, holds that we should not pretend to believe an idea in theory if
we cannot live it in practice. Rather than, with Hume and most modem
thought, supplementing our theories with ideas that we inevitably
presuppose in practice, we should take practice in this sense as the
ultimate criterion for our theories (1978: 13, 156). In Whitehead’s
words, “the metaphysical rule of evidence” should be “that we bow to those
presumptions which, in despite of criticism, we still employ for the
regulation of our lives (1978: 151). I have called these presumptions
“hard-core commonsense notions” (Griffin 1998: Ch. 3; 2000: 98-101; 2001:
29-35). They are common in the sense of being common to all humanity.
This does not mean that they are explicitly affirmed by all people; far
from it. They are often explicitly denied. But they are common in that
they are presupposed by all people in their practice, even if they deny
them with their words (Whitehead’s “in despite of criticism”). They are,
in fact, presupposed even in the very act of verbally denying them. An
example is the notion of causality, in the sense of the real influence of
one thing upon another: If I seek to convince others that causality in
this sense is an illusion, I show by my practice that I believe what my
words deny.
The term “hard-core”
is added to emphasize the fact that I am not speaking of common sense in
the modern, degenerate sense of the term. Common sense in this
degenerate, soft-core sense has held that the world is only a few thousand
years old, that the Earth is flat, and that God is directly responsible
for hurricanes and droughts (still called” acts of God”). Common sense in
the modern West believes that molecules have no feelings. Now the point
here is not whether these beliefs are true or false (although I consider
all of them to be false); the point is that these beliefs are not
presupposed by all human beings and (which amounts to the same thing) are
not inevitably presupposed in practice. One can deny them verbally
without contradicting oneself by the presuppositions expressed in one’s
practice. This fact makes these soft-core common-sense beliefs different
in kind from the hard-core commonsense notions. The falsity of many of
the former, therefore, cannot be used to cast doubt on the latter.
If hard-core
commonsense notions truly exist, then we have little choice but to assume
that they are true. The reason for this is the need for
self-consistency. If we inevitably presuppose a notion in our practice,
then we contradict ourselves if we deny this notion verbally in our
theory.3
If we are concerned to approach the truth about the nature of reality, we
should take the self-contradiction involved in any denial of hard-core
commonsense notions as sufficient reason to re-examine the premises
involved in the reasoning that would lead to such a denial. We should
ask: If E seems to be a denial of a hard-core commonsense idea, and if A,
B, C, and D, when taken together, imply E, do we really have sufficient
reason for confidence in A, B, C, and D to accept E? For example the
argument might be formulated thus:
A. Physics does
not reveal time in atomic and subatomic particles.
B. Physics deals
with the full, concrete reality of atomic and subatomic particles; at
least it does not abstract from anything about them that would make time
(in the threefold sense of temporal asymmetry, constant becoming, and
irreversibility) real for them.
C. Therefore time
does not exist for subatomic particles.
D. What does not
exist for atomic and subatomic particles does not exist, period.
E. Therefore time
as experienced by humans (and evidently other animals) is an illusion.
Dualists reject D
rather than accepting E, and for good reason: We have immediate awareness
of the reality of time, and it is presupposed in everything we say and
do. But D is a highly speculative belief, many times removed from any
truth directly vouchsafed by immediate experience. Dualists could well
argue that, although A, B, and therefore C are unobjectionable, there is
no reason to accept E. Even though dualism has its problems, they say, it
is better to live with these problems than to deny the ultimate reality of
time.
If D were the only
challengeable premise, I would probably agree. But other premises can be
challenged. Premise A could be challenged, and some physicists and
philosophers do so. This move can allow one to accept B, C, and D without
accepting E. One can be a reductionist, therefore, without being a
nontemporalist. I expect that premise A will continue to be challenged:
If time is ultimately real, and if dualism is false, then physics, to the
degree that it reveals the truth about its subject matter, should
increasingly reflect the existence of time in atomic and subatomic
interactions (as in the study reflected in a report titled “Time Proves
Not Reversible at Deepest Level” [Weiss 1998]).
However, the most
important challenge to make is to premise B, which involves the “fallacy
of misplaced concreteness”—taking the abstractions of physics, which are
based upon very limited interests and methods, as if they were adequate
statements about the full, concrete reality of that level of reality we
call atoms and subatomic particles. Physics, after all, is not
metaphysics. Physics does not pretend to deal with its objects as they
are in themselves. The idea that it tells us all that there is to know
about them is a doctrine of that form of metaphysics known as positivism.
This was the chief point of my previous essay, “Time and the Fallacy of
Misplaced Concreteness” (Griffin, 1986: 22-25). Although this point is
crucial to my present argument as well, I can here only refer the reader
to that earlier essay. Even apart from that argument, one can see that
the reality of time is a given element of immediate experience whereas
premise B is highly speculative, depending upon chains of reasoning with
plenty of room for faulty premises and invalid inferences. We have less
reason to be confident of the truth of B than we do of the falsity of E.
Dualists, however,
take a different approach. While believing the reality of time to be
obvious, they take it to be equally obvious, or at least well-grounded,
that actual things exist for which time (in the threefold sense at issue
here) does not exist. As mentioned earlier, they may think that this
dualism of temporal and nontemporal things has existed eternally, or that
it has existed only since our world was created, or that it emerged still
later. In any case, the chief problem shared by all the forms of dualism
is the problem of interaction. How is it conceivable that temporal and
nontemporal things interact?4
How can those things for which time does not exist—for which there is no
distinction between past and future, for which “now” is meaningless, and
which could move backwards in (what is for us) time--affect, and be
affected by, those things for which time in this threefold sense is real?
And how is it that they happen to be here “at the same time”? It is
sometimes thought that these quandaries can be ignored by simply pointing
to the fact that mind and body, and therefore mind and subatomic
particles, do interact. On the old and indubitable principle that the
actual is possible, the possibility of the interaction of temporal and
nontemporal things is shown by the fact that they do. But this response
begs the question. The question (here) is not whether mind and body
interact; it is, rather, whether the dualists’ description of this
interaction is correct. Given the agreement that mind and body do
interact, the challenge is to conceptualize both mind and body so that
this agreed-upon fact is not inconceivable. This is what dualists have
failed to do. With these general comments about the problematic nature of
nontemporalism and dualism in general, I turn now to J. T. Fraser’s
version of dualism in particular.
2.
Fraser’s Dualistic-Pluralistic Position
Fraser’s position
agrees with my process position on many points. We agree, first, that
creativity is to be prized and that this requires, second, a positive
appraisal of temporality (1980: 143). Fraser is critical of any view,
such as the Platonic view of timeless forms and their temporal imitations,
that suggests “the negation of the idea of creativity in nature in
general, and in the worlds of life, mind, and society in particular”
(1980: 159). He means his own position to support creativity by showing
temporality to be both real and important. Third, Fraser holds a
hierarchical view, rejecting all reductionistic views according to which,
unless something is in physics and its objects, it is not real. Fourth,
he agrees that, in our post-Darwinian world, we cannot have a worldview
that “sees the world as divided into the temporal and the timeless” (1980:
143). Fifth, he believes that our world was not created out of absolute
nothingness but instead emerged out of a primordial chaos.5
Sixth, Fraser accepts the relational view of time, which means that the
reality of time presupposes the reality of temporal things, with time
depending upon the transitions from thing to thing. Seventh, Fraser
agrees that time involves irreversibility in principle, which means that
the idea of time’s going in the reverse direction is meaningless (1982:
110). Eighth, Fraser agrees that there can be no asymmetry and
irreversibility in principle without a “now” (1982: 34). Finally, Fraser
holds that positions that are self-contradictory are to be rejected (1982:
32). This list shows that our overall concerns and also many of our
fundamental intuitions are identical. My only question about Fraser’s
position is whether it carries out his concerns in a way that is
intelligible while honoring all his fundamental intuitions.
Fraser’s entire
enterprise, with its emergentist view of time, seems to be predicated on
the widely held assumption to which I drew attention earlier—that time as
we experience it, with its asymmetry, constant becoming, and
irreversibility in principle, is not real for physical theory and for the
objects it studies. This twofold assumption seems reflected in Fraser’s
statement that “[w]e know about the time of atoms . . . because we write
equations which depict their behavior and those equations tell us about
their temporalities” (1980: 148). This assumption leads him to conclude
that time is an emergent reality.
In Fraser’s account
of evolutionary emergence, there are six distinguishable realms. The
world of quantum physics, which Fraser calls the realm of
proto-temporality, is the second level of existence. Below it in the
hierarchy of temporalities is the atemporal chaos, consisting of
“atemporal processes” with no causal connectedness (1982: 37, 69). Above
the prototemporal world is the eotem-poral realm, in which there is
no “now” and therefore no past, no future, and no asymmetry, only pure
succession (1982: 34). Although I have not found a passage in which
Fraser says so explicitly, I take it that there is no “now” at this level
because there is no experience. A “now” first arises in the next level,
the biotemporal. The unique kind of connectedness among events
that arises at this level is final causation, or goal-directedness, which
provides the basis for a “now” dividing past and future (1982: 154).
Final causation with its “now” arises here, I assume, because experience
arises here. (This assumption would fit with the fact that, although his
term “biotemporal” suggests the realm of the living in general, Fraser
seems to have in mind only animals, not plants.) The next realm is the
nootemporal realm of human beings. The new element here is mentality,
or at least a qualitatively different form of mentality: Fraser sometimes
seems to deny mentality to nonhuman animals altogether, speaking of a pure
“physiological present,” a “perceptual and cognitive set but without
mental content” (1982: 34), whereas he elsewhere speaks of “the difference
in mental capacity between man and the higher apes” (1982: 166). In any
case, what is unique about our species is “long-term expectation and
memory”; other animals have only “some limited foresight and memory”
(1982: 166). The sixth and final realm, called the sociotemporal,
can be ignored here.
Fraser’s account
raises several problems. One problem is that although Fraser has said
that we should not speak of the world as “divided into the temporal and
the timeless” (1980: 143), he seems to do just that. In the first place,
it is not clear how the “atemporal” realm differs, except verbally, from
the strictly nontemporal. If whatever “processes” occur at that level are
atemporal, involving no causal connectedness, so that there is no
transition from cause to effect, then the realm would seem to be strictly
timeless. In the second place, the truly crucial emergence in Fraser’s
scheme is that from the eotemporal to the biotemporal. It is only in the
biotemporal realm that time as we experience it, with a “now” separating a
past and a future, arises. So although there are said to be six levels,
we in essence have a dualism between the top three levels, which are
timely, and the bottom three levels, which are timeless. Fraser could
perhaps overcome this apparent contradiction by simply retracting his
statement about not dividing the world into the temporal and the timeless.
A more serious set
of problems arises from Fraser’s agreement that self-contradictory
positions are untenable. He makes this statement in the context of
discussing the type of time called the “B-series” by J.M.E. McTaggart.
Whereas the A-series is time involving pastness, presentness, and futurity
(which McTaggart considered illusory), the B-series (which McTaggart
thought to reflect the real nature of time) contains no “now” but only the
distinction between earlier and later. In response, Fraser says,
rightly: “the concept of the B-series—a condition of earlier-later but
without a now—is self-contradictory. For that reason, it must be
rejected” (1982: 32). If ideas that are self-contradictory are to be
rejected (and I agree), then some of Fraser’s own ideas are in trouble.
To begin with the
example that is closest to the idea just discussed: Fraser says that the
eotemporal realm involves succession but no “now.” The idea of
“succession,” however, is in the same boat as that of “earlier and
later.” The relevant dictionary meaning of succeed is “to follow in time,
to come after.” If the notion of earlier and later requires a “now,” then
so does the idea of succession.
A second example is
one that Fraser himself admits to involve self-contradictory talk. His
position, he says, is that “time itself has developed along evolutionary
steps.” This leads to a serious difficulty, because “there is no
noncontradictory way in which to state that time evolved in time” (1980:
147). Fraser seeks to mitigate the difficulty here by blaming limitations
of language: The difficulty is due to “prevailing linguistic customs.”
He is certainly right to say that language is limited and limiting, so
that fundamentally new thoughts require us to extend language’s present
limits. But the difficulty here runs deeper. The very concept of time
itself as having evolved in time is self-contradictory, because the notion
of evolution itself presupposes time. We can no more ask how time evolved
than what caused causality to emerge (which, incidentally, makes
problematic Fraser’s notion that the first realm, the atemporal, has no
causal processes). Some things must simply be, eternally, and time—along
with causality, which it presupposes and is presupposed by—must be among
them.
Fraser’s contrary
idea, that time has not always been but began and then evolved (the title
of Fraser’s book that I am citing is The Genesis and Evolution of Time),
creates more problems of self-consistency. Although Fraser says that the
“atemporal chaos. . . preceded Creation” (1982: 66), he recognizes that
this way of speaking does not really make sense, saying: “We thus imagine
biotemporal ordering where there can be none.” We have to speak this way,
even though it is inaccurate, he says, because we human beings, living as
we do in the nootemporal realm, “are able to give descriptions only in
terms of space and time.” Besides, he suggests, the only alternative
would be equally bad: “Discussing the dynamics of Creation in tenseless
language is awkward and would be just as inaccurate as speaking about
chaos having preceded Creation” (1982: 66). Given Fraser’s starting
point, either of the available positions leads to self-contradiction.
Fraser himself holds, as we have seen, that self-contradiction cannot be
tolerated. It would seem, then, that his starting point should be
rejected, which would mean accepting pantemporalism, according to which
time had no beginning.
The paradoxical
nature of Fraser’s position does not stop there. He says: “Creation was
neither followed nor preceded by other instants, because the relationship
future-past-present had no meaning in the atemporal, or even in the proto-
or eotemporal worlds.” Accordingly, Fraser says, because there could be
no “relations among events corresponding to the notion of before and
after,” we must say that those events were “contiguous with the instant of
Creation” (1982: 132). Fraser adds that we are free to describe these
early periods as if they were temporal intervals, provided we realize that
the description is only a convenient way of speaking (1982: 132). In
other words, although it is customary to say that there were some 10 to 15
billion years of cosmic evolution prior to the rise of life (on our planet
at least), we cannot really say that any time passed at all,
because prior to life the relation of before and after could not occur.
Surely this paradox is intolerable.
A final paradox:
The beginning and the end of the universe become the same event. The
reason is that humans and, in fact, all life will have disappeared, so
that the biotemporal and nootemporal worlds will be no longer. The most
complex world will then again be at the eotemporal level, for which the
distinction of past and future makes no sense. Accordingly, although from
our nootemporal perspective the beginning is in the past and the end in
the future, “from the point of view of the universe itself” the beginning
and the end will be indistinguishable. Accordingly, “by the identity of
indistinguishables we are compelled to conclude that we have been
contemplating only one single event” (1982: 135).
Besides the fact
that the conclusions to which Fraser is led are self-contradictory, or at
best extremely paradoxical and counterintuitive, these conclusions tend to
undermine his deepest concerns. He wants, as we saw, to support the
notion that novelty and creativity are important in the nature of things,
which presupposes, he sees, that temporality is real and important. And
yet he says that “the primordial stratum of the universe” is constituted
by atemporal processes (1982: 37) and that the worlds with real time—the
biotemporal and nootemporal worlds—are merely passing fancies. The
eotemporal “perspective,” in which there is no past, present, and future,
is “the point of view of the universe itself.” Can we take time,
creativity, and novelty seriously while believing that they are, from the
ultimate perspective, passing fancies?
As serious as the
previous problems are, the most serious is the problem of the relation
between the temporal and the nontemporal. Fraser has sought to mitigate
this problem, evidently, by two moves: denying that there is any strictly
nontemporal or timeless realm, and then having a plurality of
temporalities, rather than a stark dualism between the nontemporal and the
temporal. But, as we have seen, his denial of a realm of timeless
actuality seems to be more verbal than real: The atemporal cannot be
distinguished from the strictly nontemporal or timeless. And, although
Fraser speaks of six realms rather than only two, hence apparently
endorsing a plurality rather than simply a dualism, the crucial transition
occurs between the third and fourth levels, the eotemporal and the
biotemporal. Time as we know it, with its “now,” its asymmetry between
past and future, and its irreversibility in principle, arises only in the
biotemporal realm. Although the prototemporal realm and especially the
eotemporal realm—with its anisotropic succession—are together posited as a
buffer zone, an intermediary between the atemporal and the genuinely
temporal, the problem is not really mitigated. It is still the case that
with the emergence of life, at least animal life, we have the one truly
qualitative emergence in the system. The move from the biotemporal to the
nootemporal is called a qualitative difference, but it is really a
difference in degree, not kind: Memory and expectation become much
greater. The move from the prototemporal to the eotemporal is also
called a qualitative change, but it is not really: In neither realm
is there any “now,” any distinction between past, present, and future.
The one truly qualitative change is from the eotemporal to the biotemporal,
because it is with life that time as we know it emerges—evidently
abruptly.
This emergence is
not understandable. The distinctive feature of the biotemporal realm is
said to be final causation. We cannot understand how final
causation--action directed toward a goal—could have emerged out of things
that interact solely by means of efficient causation. Fraser believes
that “the qualitative differences among the temporalities of the stable
integrative levels of nature derive from the radically different
complexities of those levels” (1982: 156). In the shift from the
eotemporal to the biotemporal levels, however, he is positing a miraculous
transmutation that no complexity, no matter how complex, could in
principle explain. Again, billions of times nothing is still nothing. If
the primordial elements contain no experience, therefore no final
causation, therefore no “now,” therefore no asymmetry and irreversibility,
then even a complexity greater than which none can be thought will be a
complexity wholly devoid of experience, final causation, asymmetry, and
irreversibility.
With my summary and
critique, I am emphasizing a point that is more implicit than explicit in
Fraser—the point that time in the usual sense presupposes experience. One
philosopher of time who has stressed this point is Adolf Grünbaum, who
argues that time in the sense of becoming is a mind-dependent property,
from which he concludes that time does not exist in the physical
universe. He sometimes speaks of time as “anthropocentric,” as if, like
Descartes, he attributed mind only to human beings. In more careful
formulations, however, Grünbaum makes clear that he generalizes the kind
of mind presupposed by time in the normal sense to other animals. Where
exactly he would draw the dualistic line between some mind and none at all
is unclear, but it seems to be at about the level of cockroaches,
regarding which Grünbaum is hesitant (1967: 152, 179-80). But wherever
this line be drawn, the point is the same: A dualism between experiencing
and non-experiencing actualities means we must speak of time in the usual
sense as something that does not exist prior to the emergence of mind. I
am using “mind” here in the most generalized sense, as does Grünbaum, to
indicate the presence of experience, however minimal, not in the more
restricted sense that Fraser has in view when he sometimes limits
mentality to human beings. A better way to express the point is,
therefore, to say that time in the usual sense is an
experience-dependent feature.
The great service of
Grünbaum and Fraser, especially when taken together (because of Grünbaum’s
more explicit focus on the experience-dependent nature of time), is that
they bring out the paradoxical, even self-contradictory, implications for
time that follow from any dualistic view of reality (taking dualism to
mean that the actual world is composed of both experiencing and
non-experiencing actualities). This message will be an uncomfortable one
for most people in our culture, insofar as they, on the one hand, are
dualists, and yet they, on the other hand, presuppose that time has always
existed—at least as long as our universe has existed. They assume that it
makes sense to debate whether the universe is, say, 15 or only 12 billion
years old, to try to figure out what happened during the first billion
years of cosmic evolution, to try to understand the nature and order of
the developments on Earth that led to the emergence of life, and so on.
And they assume that time in the usual sense—with its distinction between
past, present, and future and its irreversibility—was all along, so that
when we try to reconstruct the cosmic past our intention is to speak about
the order in which things really happened, not simply to tell an “as if”
story because we as temporal beings can do no other. Most people assume,
in other words, that time as we know it did not suddenly come into
existence with the rise of human beings, or even with the rise of animals
or life itself. They believe, of course, that the experience of
time emerged only when beings with experience arose. But they assume that
this is an experience of something that had pre-existed it, that the
experience did not create its own object. They do not assume that
all the events prior to this emergence of experiencing things were all
contiguous with the first moment of creation, as if no real time passed
between, say, the formation of the Milky Way and the rise of amino acids
on the Earth. The suggestion that those events that are described in our
science books as occurring 10 billion years ago and those that are
described as occurring four billion years ago were, in reality,
simultaneous with each other, because both of them were contiguous with
the moment of creation, would strike them as absurd, even unthinkable.
And yet Fraser and
Grünbaum are right: Time in the usual sense cannot be thought to exist
without experience. It follows, then, that if experience is a contingent
feature of the universe, arising only with the emergence of some
particular species of being, time is likewise emergent. Of course, it is,
as Fraser admits, hard to enunciate this position without
self-contradictory expressions: One can hardly help saying that
“experience first arose at a particular time” and therefore that “time
first arose at a particular time.” But if the widely-held dualistic
assumption is maintained, no alternative is possible. The great merit of
Fraser’s work, from my perspective, is that it brings out and forces us to
face the various paradoxes about time that must be swallowed if dualism is
assumed.
We are confronted,
therefore, by a clash between two intuitions that probably seem equally
fundamental to most people. The one is the reality of time, back at least
to the beginning of our universe; the other is the truth of dualism, in
the sense of a division in the world between experiencing and
non-experiencing actualities. Many thinkers who are dualists, given this
definition, refer to themselves, to be sure, not as dualists but as
materialists. Being reductionists, they deny that the word “mind” or
“experience” refers to a type of actuality, entity, or substance that has
equal ontological status with non-experiencing matter. But such thinkers
are, in fact, cryptodualists. Regardless of how much they may
loathe the idea of dualism, they are dualists in terms of the above
definition, because they think of the world as divided between actual
things with experience and actual things wholly devoid of experience. The
difference between self-confessed and closet dualists in respect to time
is that the self-confessed dualist will speak of time as a real emergent,
whereas the cryptodualist is more likely to say that time as we experience
it is an illusion. But both must say, if they think as clearly about it
as do Fraser and Grünbaum, that time as we know it cannot be attributed to
the “history” of the universe “prior to” the rise of experiencing beings.
Both types of dualists are, as the words in scare quotes indicate, forced
into paradoxical expressions.
The question, then,
is what to do about this clash between two seemingly fundamental
intuitions. One possibility is simply to make the best of it, as Fraser
seeks to do. A second option is to try to overcome the tension by
rejecting dualism in favor of materialism with its attendant
nontemporalism. But this, as we have seen, provides only a pseudosolution:
People, being examples of experiencing beings, cannot really deny the
existence of such, so that the result is a cryptodualism with all the same
problems. The only other possibility is to reject dualism from the
opposite direction, by denying the existence of non-experiencing things.
It is this panexperientialist position, with its attendant pantemporalism,
that I have advocated.
3.
Panexperientialist Pantemporalism
I have elsewhere
tried to layout the Whiteheadian panexperientialist position completely
enough to make it intelligible and convincing (Griffin 1998). Here I can
only provide a brief sketch aimed at showing how such a position would
lead to the pantemporalist conclusion that time has always existed, which
would avoid all the problems created by the notion that time is emergent.
The basic twofold
idea, which was first developed by Whitehead (except to the extent that it
was anticipated by Buddhists), is that there is only one type of actual
thing and that all actual things are momentary events. Enduring
individuals, such as protons, atoms, and minds, are temporally ordered
societies of such events, with perhaps from a dozen (in human minds)
to over a billion (in protons) such events occurring in a second. An
event, in other words, can be more or less brief. The important point is
that enduring individuals that move through space, such as protons and
photons, are not the finally real things, the fully actual
entities. The fully actual entities are the momentary events, and they do
not move through space. They happen when and where they happen,
constituting and filling a particular spatiotemporal locus. What we call
locomotion, or motion through space, is a result of the different
spatiotemporal loci of successive events within the enduring
individual—which is, again, a temporally ordered society of these
spatiotemporal events. Whitehead used the word “occasion” to refer to
this spatiotemporal extensiveness of the events. All truly actual
entities, he said, are” actual occasions.”
The other crucial
feature of these actual events is that each is an experience. Whitehead
therefore said that each actual occasion is an “occasion of experience.”
To be an experience does not necessarily involve conscious experience, or
even sensory experience. Experience with sensory data and/or
consciousness (let alone the self-consciousness involved in being able to
anticipate one’s death) is a derivative, high-grade, very rare form of
experience. Thought and sensory data are high-level products of
experience, not its foundations. In other words, just as the
spatiotemporal extensiveness of the occasions of experience can vary
enormously, so can the complexity and sophistication of the experience.
Dogs have simpler experiences than do humans; mice, cockroaches and
amoebae have increasingly simpler experiences; and molecules, atoms, and
then electrons have experiences so remote from ours that we can say
nothing about them beyond certain abstract features that they must be
thought to have in common with our own experience if ontological dualism
is to be avoided. We can say that each event exists not only for others
(as an object of their experience) but also for itself (assuming that this
expression is used in the most general sense, far removed from any
necessary connection with self-consciousness).
Beyond this negative
assertion, it is difficult to find a word to suggest positively the nature
of this experience (here what Fraser says about the limitations of our
inherited language is particularly germane, because our language has been
heavily shaped by dualistic assumptions). But Whitehead considered the
terms “feeling,” “emotion,” and “appetite,” taken in the most general
conceivable sense, to be among the least misleading. He says, for
example, that “the emotional appetitive elements in our conscious
experience are those which most closely resemble the basic elements of all
physical experience” (1978: 163). In explicating this idea, he says
something that moves us a step closer to the issue of time:
The primitive form
of physical experience is emotion—blind emotion received as felt
else-where in another occasion and conformally appropriated as a
subjective passion. (1978:62)
This expresses
Whitehead’s notion of “prehension,” which is his more technical term for
“feeling.” A prehension grasps a prior occasion of experience and
appropriates some of its feelings for itself. The word “appetite,” used
above, indicates that the appropriation is not simply for itself in a
narrow sense, but that there is also an orientation toward the future.
Each occasion of experience actualizes itself in such a way as to pass on
experiential energy to subsequent occasions. This idea results, of
course, from generalizing a ubiquitous feature of our own experience all
the way down. This general structure of experience means that there is
something analogous to both memory and anticipation (or expectation) in
all occasions of experience.
The implications for
the question of time are obvious. As Fraser and Grünbaum have rightly
seen, time as we know it is unthinkable apart from an experienced “now”
that distinguishes between past and future. The words that point to this
twofold experience are “memory” and “anticipation.” Fraser and Grünbaum
conclude, given their dualistic assumptions, that time is therefore unreal
in the physical world. But if we can talk about “physical experience,”
about the presence of at least some iota of experience at even the most
elementary level of nature, then we can say that time is real there, too.
The notion that each
event prehends previous events—and this feature, that prehension is always
of antecedent events, is fundamental—gives us not only time’s
asymmetry but also its irreversibility. A prehension should not be
thought to be simply a primitive form of sensory perception, at least if
sensory perception is thought to involve merely a representation of
an external thing. Rather, prehension involves an actual grasping of the
prehended object, so that that object is included within the prehending
experience. This means that, insofar as we speak of the prior, prehended
event as the cause and the prehending experience as the effect, the cause
has literally (if only partially) entered into the effect. And this gives
time its irreversibility in principle. In Whitehead’s words: “This
passage of the cause into the effect is the cumulative character of time.
The irreversibility of time depends on this character” (1978: 237).
As Fraser has
rightly seen, time as mere succession, which he assigns to the eotemporal
realm, does not give irreversibility. But this does not mean, according
to the panexperientialist view, that we should say that “once upon a time”
time had this character of mere succession. Rather, mere succession is an
abstraction from the full nature of time. In Whitehead’s words:
Time in the concrete
is the conformation of state to state, the later to the earlier: . . .
pure succession is an abstraction of the second order, a generic
abstraction omitting the temporal character of time. (1959: 36)
The two unique
elements of this Whiteheadian view—the idea that enduring things are
really temporally-ordered societies of momentary events, and that each
event is an experience with memory and anticipation—makes it possible for
us to reject the conventional view that time even in the limited sense of
anisotropy does not exist for single atoms, and that time in this limited
sense first comes into existence with aggregations of atoms complex enough
to suffer entropy increase (a decrease in order).
That conventional
view assumes a materialistic-substantialist notion of an atom. That is,
the atom is assumed to be simply a bit of matter (or matter-energy) that
endures as a numerically self-identical individual through space and (what
from our perspective is) time. If time is not something that exists
absolutely in itself, but only as a result of temporal relations, then
time can only exist when truly temporal relations occur. But atoms
conceived as material substances buzzing through space do not provide the
types of relations needed for true time, because their only changes are
locomotive. In such a universe, there would be nothing to designate one
configuration of atoms as having been in the past of another
configuration. Even something as remotely analogous to time in our sense
as mere anisotropy could arise only with complex aggregations of atoms
that could become increasingly less ordered; the direction of this change
could be said to establish time of a sort, especially because this
direction “happens” to coincide with our own sense of time: The further
into the past we look, the greater was the order (at least if we ignore
the enormous increase in local order brought about by chemical and
biological evolution on our planet); the further into the future we look,
the greater will be the entropic disorder. But this coincidence is said
to be purely fortuitous. And that follows, given the materialistic-substantialist
view of atoms, because there is no reason in principle why the processes
that have happened in, say, the past 10,000 years could not reverse
themselves. The teacup that was broken this morning could spontaneously
reassemble itself; the photons arriving from the sun could reverse
direction, and so on. Such an eventuality is said to be extremely
unlikely, of course, but it is not ruled out in principle. Entropy
increase does not give us irreversibility in principle.
However, if an atom
is not a bit of insentient piece of matter that remains numerically one
through (what to us is) time, but a series of occasions of experience,
each of which includes its predecessors in itself and projects itself into
its successors, then time in the full-fledged sense exists already for a
single atom. Each atomic event has temporal relations with its
predecessors and its successors (as well as with other events).
Asymmetry, irreversibili-ty, and constant becoming are already there, with
anisotropy being simply an abstraction therefrom. We do not, therefore,
have to say that time emerged sometime within the creation and then try to
figure out when and how this occurred, and to swallow the paradox involved
in saying that it did occur. There has been time as long as atoms, or
even subatomic enduring individuals, such as electrons and photons, have
existed. The idea that time exists wherever such entities exist is built
into their description as “temporally ordered societies.” Time exists
with such entities because of the temporal relations among the momentary
events constituting these enduring individuals.6
But if we had to
stop there, we would still have the paradox involved in saying that time
arose once upon a time. And this paradox is just as serious whether we
locate it a million years ago, a billion years ago, or twenty billion
years ago. And it is as serious whether we say that a nontemporal God
created temporal things and thereby time (which always evokes the
question, “What was God doing before this?”), or that temporal
things evolved out of a nontemporal chaos. The panexperientialist view
says that our world did indeed evolve out of a chaos of processes or
events (rather than having been created out of absolute nothingness,
whether by God or spontaneously), but that there were temporal relations
even in that chaos.
To call that
pre-creation situation a “chaos” means that it had no enduring
individuals, even ones as primitive as photons and electrons. Rather, all
the events occurred randomly, with none of them organized into temporally
ordered societies in which each event largely repeats the form embodied in
its predecessor. But even in this chaotic state (which, by hypothesis, is
the nature of so-called empty space today), temporal relations occurred.
Each event prehended, and thereby was causally affected by, prior events,
meaning events that had already enjoyed their “now”; and each event
causally influenced, and thereby was prehended by, later events. (Events
are contemporaneous with each other when neither causally affects the
other.) Given this view of what actual entities are, therefore, we need
not, with Fraser, suppose that the pre-creation chaos was comprised of
processes that are acausal and thereby atemporal. We can suppose that
time, with its asymmetry, irreversibility, and constant becoming, existed
even in this chaos.
In this way, this
form of panexperientialism implies pantemporalism. And the opposite,
which is the main point of this paper, is equally true: Pantemporalism
implies panexperientialism. I have suggested that any position that
denies pantemporalism, the view that time has always existed, inevitably
runs into paradoxes, some of which are so strong that they must be called
self-contradictions. We can avoid these self-contradictions, if we carry
out the logical implications of our premises, only by affirming
pantemporalism. And we can do this, once we realize the connection
between time and experience, only by affirming pan-experientialism. This
doctrine of panexperientialism, in spite of the fact that it initially
seems so counterintuitive, especially to modern minds, turns out to be the
key to protecting some of our basic intuitions—including our
intuitions about time.7
We
should take this route because the two sets of intuitions are not really
on the same level. The reasons for initially considering
panexperientialism counterintuitive turn out to be defeasible, whereas our
intuitions about time are hard-core common-sense notions, which are
indefeasible: We cannot deny them without running into
self-contradiction.
Notes
1
Milič Čapek died in 1997. My review of his last book, The New Aspects
of Time: Its Continuity and Novelties: Selected Papers in the Philosophy
of Science, edited by Robert S. Cohen, was published in tribute to
Čapek in Process Studies 27/3-4 (1998): 345-48.
2
Whiteheadian process philosophy and theology, while disagreeing with
Newton about divine power, agrees with him about divine temporality. Some
critics of process thought have used this point against it, arguing that
the idea of a cosmic “now,” which temporalistic theism implies, has been
rendered otiose by special relativity theory. I have replied to this view
in Griffin 1992.
3
A similar point is made by members of the school known as “critical
theory,” especially Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel, in their criticism
of modes of discourse that force their proponents into “performative
self-contradictions.” Such self-contradictions arise, explains Martin
Jay, “when whatever is being claimed is at odds with the presuppositions
or implications of the act of claiming it” (1993: 29).
4
It was partly Henri Bergson’s later realization that his first book,
Time and Free Will (1889), contained this insoluble problem that led
to his new view of matter in Matter and Memory (1896), according to
which what we, from without, call matter has, in itself, memory and
thereby temporal duration.
5
I have discussed this issue at some length in “Creation out of Nothing,
Creation out of Chaos, and the Problem of Evil.” Stephen T. Davis, ed.,
Encountering Evil, 2nd edition (Philadelphia: Westminster/John Knox,
2001), 108-25.
[An
earlier (1981) version of this essay is available elsewhere on this site
as “Creation
out of Chaos and the Problem of Evil.”—A.F.]
6
The idea that time is ultimately unreal, of course, is not based entirely
on the idea that time does not exist for the ultimate units of nature.
Another basis for nontemporalism, or eternalism, is the occurrence of
so-called precognitive experiences. Although true precognition, which
would mean having noninferential (perceptual) knowledge of an event prior
to its occurrence, would indeed suggest the unreality of time, there is no
good reason to give this interpretation to events of apparent
precognition, because there are numerous alternative interpreta-tions
available. I have discussed this issue in Griffin 1997: 90-95; Griffin
2000: 228-29; and most fully in Griffin 1993: 270-75.
7
Panexperientialism is also necessary, I argue elsewhere (Griffin 1997: Ch.
2; Griffin 1998: Chs. 7-10; Griffin 2000: Ch. 6), to protect our
intuitions about the reality of freedom and even consciousness.
[See
Griffin’s related
“Panexperientialist Physicalism and the Mind-Body
Problem” elsewhere on this site.—A.F.]
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Posted April 18,
2007