Process, Insight, and Empirical Method
An
Argument for the Compatibility of the Philosophies of Alfred North
Whitehead and Bernard J. F. Lonergan and Its Implications for
Foundational Theology.
A
Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Divinity School, The
University of Chicago, for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
December 1983
Thomas Hosinski, C.S.C.
Chapter I:
Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s Interpretations of Empirical Scientific
Method and Philosophic Method [continued]
The Method of Empirical Science
As
noted above, the method of empirical science is rarely the focus of
Whitehead’s analysis. Rather, what Whitehead says about scientific
method usually is said in the context of other discussions and usually
concerns only one or two aspects of his total view of scientific method
raised to elucidate a point he is making within another context. As a
result, Whitehead’s statements about the method of empirical science are
of two main types: general summary statements without a great deal of
detailed analysis, and more detailed considerations of one or two
elements of that method. The plan for this section, then, will be to
begin with, some of his summary statements to give the general view of
his interpretation of empirical scientific method, and then to fill out
the meaning of that, view by reference to his more detailed but more
limited discussions.
The Summary View
Perhaps the best-known of Whitehead’s descriptions of empirical method
occurs within the context of his analysis and defense of speculative
philosophy, the opening chapter of Process and Reality.
Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology
(New York: Macmillan, 1929), Part I, Chapter 1, Section ii hereafter
cited as PR). There are several editions of PR in
circulation. Due to this, all references to PR will first be
given by Part, Chapter, and Section numbers, followed parenthetically by
page references to the two major American editions. The first, preceded
by M, is to the pagination of the original Macmillan edition and its
reprints; the second, preceded by C, is to the recent “Corrected
Edition,” edited by David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York:
The Free Press, 1978), which is sure to become the standard edition for
the future. Thus the reference in this note would be stated as follows:
PR, I.1.ii (M, pp. 6-8; C, pp. 4-5).
There Whitehead notes that the datum for thought “is the actual world,
including ourselves,”
[PR, I.1.ii (M, p. 6; C, p. 4).]
and that this datum presents itself to us for observation in the form of
our immediate experience. Thus, Whitehead argues, “the elucidation of
immediate experience is the sole justification for any thought; and the
starting point for thought is the analytic observation of components of
this experience.”
[Ibid.]
But we
lack a clear-cut and complete analysis of immediate experience. “The
various details which comprise the definiteness of our experience are
not discriminated for us but lie hidden together in the woven fabric of
our lives. As a result, our observation, the starting-point of our
thought, begins with the obvious. To use the image of the fabric, we
begin by noting that a certain color of thread is present in some
places, but not in others; we observe our experience by noting
differences that occur within it. “We habitually observe by the method
of difference. Sometimes we see an elephant, and sometimes we do not.
The result is that an elephant, when present, is noticed.”
[Ibid.]
The
success of this “method of difference” depends on the observed object
being important when it is present, but also on the fact that it is
sometimes absent. If elephants were a constant in our experience, we
would take no special note of them.
There have been interpretations of science that would restrict
scientific method to strict systematization of differences noted in the
observation of nature,
This is the positivist interpretation of scientific method. I will
discuss Whitehead’s response to this interpretation below.
but
Whitehead argues that such an interpretation does not describe the
actual method of discovery. He calls the method of limiting thought to
systematization of observed differences “the method of rigid empiricism”
and notes that this method breaks down “whenever we seek the larger
generalities,”
[PR, I.1.ii (M, p. 7; C, pp. 4-5).]
because
it is incapable of elucidating those components of immediate experience
that are always present. He then presents his summary view of “the
method of discovery” in contrast to this method of rigid empiricism.
In
natural science this rigid method is the Baconian method of induction, a
method which, if consistently pursued, would have left science where it
found it. What Bacon omitted was the play of a free imagination,
controlled by the requirements of coherence and logic. The true method
of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts from the
ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of
imaginative generalization and it again lands for renewed observation
rendered acute by rational interpretation. The reason for the success
of this method of imaginative rationalization is that, when the method
of difference fails, factors which are constantly present may yet be
observed under the influence of imaginative thought. Such thought
supplies the differences which the direct observation lacks.
[Ibid. (M, p. 7; C, p. 5).]
Although Whitehead in the context is interested in showing that this is
the method of speculative philosophy, the method to be used in the
metaphysical analysis of experience, the first part of the quotation
makes it clear that this is also a summary statement of his
interpretation of the general method of the ‘empirical sciences.
This
statement provides us with a handy framework around which to present
Whitehead’s interpretation of empirical scientific method. It
interprets the method of the empirical sciences as consisting of three
stages or moments: (1) particular observation; (2) imaginative
generalization; and (3) renewed observation. These three stages or
moments of empirical scientific method are more generally known among
scientists as (1) observation; (2) hypothesis formation; and (3)
testing.
We shall shortly see why it is possible to identify the terms Whitehead
uses for these stages and those in more common use, and further comment
seems unnecessary here.
The
simile Whitehead uses in describing the “method of discovery” is
important, since the image of the mind as an airplane ascending from
particular observation to imaginative generalization and descending to
renewed observation implies that these three stages of empirical method
are linked by movements of the inquiring mind in a dynamic unity. In
this passage Whitehead does not discuss in what these movements of the
mind consist, but he does elsewhere and I will consider them below.
Another point to be noticed about this summary interpretation of
scientific method is that the “flight” of the inquiring mind does not
consist in unbridled imaginative speculation; the “flight” is controlled
by rational and empirical conditions. On the rational side, “the play
of a free imagination” is “controlled by the requirements of coherence
and logic.” Coherence, in Whitehead’s usage, means that the
fundamental ideas employed by the imagination in formulating a
generalized interpretive scheme must presuppose each other so that they
are meaningless if taken in isolation. [PR,
I.1.ii (M, pp. 5, 8-9; C, pp. 3, 6).]
The
requirement of logical perfection means that the ideas thus
employed must not, so far as can be discerned, contain contradictions.
On the empirical side, there are also two requirements: applicability
and adequacy. Applicability means simply that the imaginative
generalization or scheme of interpretation must have some application or
illustration in the facts of experience. In scientific work this is
secured in the first movement from observation to hypothesis or
imaginative generalization; the hypothesis or imaginative scheme is
produced in response to a given set of data observed in experience and
hence the scheme has applicability to that set of data. Adequacy
means that the imaginative scheme must not have a unique illustration,
but must be capable of repeated illustrations in the data of experience.
This is the requirement that in terms more familiar to the scientist
demands repeatability of performance, and in scientific work adequacy is
determined (not finally, but continuously and cumulatively) in the third
stage or moment of empirical method, by testing and renewed observation.
The ultimate requirement for any interpretive scheme if it is to be
trusted in assisting us to recast our thought is that it be illustrated
widely and recurrently in experience.
[PR, I.1.i (M, p. 5; C, pp. 3-4); I.1.ii (M, pp. 8-9; C, p. 5);
I.1.vi (i, p. 25; C, p. 17).]
In
an early essay entitled “Technical Education and Its Relation to Science
and Literature,
Alfred North Whitehead, The Aims of Education and Other Essays
(New York: Macmillan, 1929; Free Press pb. Ed., 1967), pp. 43-59.
Hereafter cited as AE.) (Originally published in Alfred North
Whitehead, The Organisation of Thought, Educational and
Scientific [London: Williams and Norgate, 1917].)
Whitehead gives another summary description of empirical scientific
method, calling it “the logic of discovery” and “the logic of the
discovered”:
The
thought which science evokes is logical thought. Now logic is of two
kinds: the logic of discovery and the logic of the discovered.
The
logic of discovery consists in the weighing of probabilities, in
discarding details deemed to be irrelevant, in divining the general
rules according to which events occur, and in testing hypothesis by
devising suitable experiments. This is inductive logic.
The
logic of the discovered is the deduction of the special events which,
under certain circumstances, would happen in obedience to the assumed
laws of nature. Thus when the laws are discovered or assumed, their
utilisation entirely depends on deductive logic. Without deductive logic
science would be entirely useless. It is merely a barren game to ascend
from the particular to the general, unless afterwards we can reverse the
process and descend from the general to the particular, ascending and
descending like the angels on Jacob’s ladder. [AE,
pp. 51-52.]
This
summary interpretation of empirical scientific method is important
because in describing “the logic of discovery” and “the logic of the
discovered” Whitehead indicates the kind of mental activities by which
the mind moves “from observation to imaginative generalization to
renewed observation in the special sciences. Assuming the starting
point of particular observation, the mind weighs probabilities, discards
irrelevant details, and “divines” the general rules governing the
occurrence of the events under consideration. By this last activity,
“divination” of the general rules, Whitehead clearly means the tentative
formulation of hypotheses, or the stage of “imaginative generalization.”
Thus the first movement from observation to hypothesis consists in an
inductive move from the concrete particularity of the observed events to
a more general or abstract conception of the events to be understood
(more abstract because details deemed to be irrelevant for the purposes
of the science are discarded from consideration). By the weighing of
probabilities the scientist eventually arrives at a hypothetical
formulation of the general rules or “laws” governing all events of the
type under consideration. The hypothesis, in short, is to be
explanatory not only of the observed events from which the thought
process began (applicability), but also of all events of that type as
yet unobserved (the aim at adequacy).
From
this moment of formulation of hypothesis, another movement takes place
which is deductive and consists in prediction. With a grasp of the
implications of the law of nature discovered in the process of
formulating the hypothesis, the scientist uses deductive logic to
predict what events will take place in obedience to this law under
certain circumstances, and devises experiments to test the hypothetical
understanding. When the experiments are conducted, when the imaginative
generalization is confronted with the facts of particular concrete
events, we have the third stage or moment of empirical scientific
method. Here the imaginative scheme (hypothesis) is to some degree
either confirmed or negated by its confrontation with the facts of
observed experience. Thus the movement from hypothesis to testing is
actually both deductive and inductive. It is deductive because
in order to test, the scientist must predict the implications of the
hypothesis, that is, deduce, from the general and abstract hypothesis
what will occur in specific circumstances and particular events. It is
inductive because once the testing has been done, the
confrontation with experience issues in a judgment concerning the
hypothesis: that in these specific circumstances and particular events
the hypothesis either has been confirmed or has been shown to be
erroneous or in need of modification, or that the results have been
inconclusive and further testing is required. Testing requires
deductive thought in order to devise experiments by which to test
hypotheses, and issues in an inductive judgment concerning the
hypothesis.
Whitehead notes this in the continuation of the passage quoted above:
“When Newton had divined the law of gravitation he at once proceeded to
calculate the earth’s attractions on an apple at its surface, and on the
moon. We may note in passing that inductive logic would be impossible
without deductive logic. Thus Newton’s calculations were an essential
step in his inductive verification of the great law.” AE, p.
52. See also “The Organization of Thought,” IS, p. 33: “A more
important question is the relation of induction, based on observation,
to deductive logic. There is a tradition of opposition between
adherents of induction and of deduction. In my view, it would be just
as sensible for the two ends of a worm to quarrel. Both observation and
deduction are necessary for any knowledge worth having.”
Before moving on to consider in more detail each of the elements of
empirical scientific method as Whitehead interprets it, perhaps two
observations might be made. First, it ought to be noted that
Whitehead’s description of scientific method is general. That
is, he is not describing any of the special methods of the particular
sciences, but is trying to describe the general method of thought
employed by all scientists as they do their work, the general method
that governs the development, use, and application of all special
methods. Second, it is important to note that Whitehead is not
constructing a theoretical model of scientific method based on some
philosophical position; his interpretation of scientific method is
descriptive. He means to be describing how scientists actually proceed,
what assumptions they actually make and what general procedures they
actually follow. The importance of this will emerge later in my
discussion.
To
summarize Whitehead’s general interpretation of scientific method, then,
it may be outlined as follows. Thought begins by observation of events
in experience. The mind then follows an inductive movement, discarding
details deemed irrelevant, weighing probabilities, and arriving at the
second stage, imaginative generalization. In this stage a hypothesis is
formulated to account not only for the originating set of observed
events but also for the entire set of like events including those as yet
unobserved. This hypothesis formulates what the observer thinks is the
rule or “law” of nature governing the occurrence of such events. There
is then a deductive movement of thought, predicting what events would
take place under specific circumstances if the hypothesis has indeed
formulated a rule or “law” of nature. This prepares the way for the
third stage of empirical method, testing, in which the hypothesis is
confronted with the concrete facts of experience as the scientist renews
his or her observation in the form of experimentation guided by the
hypothesis. Testing issues in an inductive judgment concerning the
adequacy of the hypothesis.
I
will now discuss several points of this interpretation in more detail.
The Detailed Discussions: The Debate with Positivism
Much
of Whitehead’s discussion of empirical scientific method is carried on
in direct or indirect opposition to the interpretation of science
dominant at the time he wrote, namely, positivism. The positivist
interpretation of science, drawing inspiration from Francis Bacon and
appealing to the philosophical analysis of David Hume, centers attention
on the role of observation. In our experience, positivism holds, we are
acquainted with a succession of things. Because of our sense
perceptions we can analyze our acquaintance into a succession of things
observed. Because of our memories we not only have distinct
observations of the distinct things in succession, but we also have a
comparative knowledge of our successive observations. Hence we build up
a cumulative and comprehensive set of observations, which allows us
finally to detect regularities of sequence and association and identify
patterns of occurrence and recurrence which persist throughout the
series of our observations. The task of science, then, is to describe
the observed recurrence, the patterns, the regularities of sequence.
What we call a “law of nature” is merely a description of “an observed
persistence of pattern in the observed succession of natural things . .
. .”
AI,
VII, vii, pp. 115-116. See also Alfred North Whitehead, The Function
of Reason (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1929; pb. ed.
Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), p. 54. (Hereafter cited as FR.)
Whitehead grants that the positivist interpretation “contains a
fundamental truth about scientific methodology.” It expresses “the
first rule of scientific method, -- Enunciate observed correlations of
observed fact. This is the great Baconian doctrine, namely, Observe and
observe, until finally you detect a regularity of sequence.”
[AI, VII, vii, pp. 116-117.]
He
further affirms “all scientific progress depends on first framing a
formula giving a general description of observed fact. . . . At one
stage, the method of all discovery conforms to the Positivist doctrine.”
[AI,
VIII, v, p. 128. Whitehead gives an example from the history of science
in support of this assessment: Newton’s Law of Gravitation (see VII,
vii, p. 116).]
Positivism, however, insists that this is all science is, that
scientific method is merely the description of observed correlations of
observed facts.
AI, VIII, v, p. 128. See also an early statement of this interpretation
in The Concept of Nature, p. 163: “The aim of science is to seek
the simplest explanations of complex facts.”
Whitehead argues that even though this interpretation does describe the
first stage of scientific method, it is inadequate as a complete
interpretation because it ignores the actual practice of scientists and
the goals for which scientists strive. Scientists in fact are not
satisfied with mere description of the observed facts; they are not
satisfied with even a general description of observed facts. Rather,
they desire and work for an explanatory description of observed facts.
In fact they do not rest with simple, generalized descriptions of
observed correlations but develop hypotheses in order to give some
explanatory account of the observed correlations. The history of
scientific discovery is filled with examples which illustrate the
evidence that the positivist interpretation of science ignores.
See Whitehead’s analysis of how the urge toward explanatory description
is manifest in Percy Lowell’s discovery of the planet Pluto (a discovery
which was publicized as Whitehead was writing Chapter VIII of AI),
AI, VIII, v, pp. 126-128. Also see Whitehead’s analysis of how
Newton’s Law of Universal Gravitation, in spite of Newton’s claim that
it was simply a description of sheer fact, is in the end to be
understood as the “weaving” of hypotheses; FR, pp. 51-53.
In
addition to this argument claiming that the positivist interpretation of
science cannot bear confrontation with the facts of scientific activity
and the history of discovery, Whitehead also argues that to limit the
activity of science to mere description of observations ignores the
actual interrelationship of observation and theory in scientific work.
Our
coordinated knowledge, which in the general sense of the term is
Science, is formed by the meeting of two orders of experience. One order
is constituted by the direct, immediate discriminations of particular
observations. The other order is constituted by our general way of
conceiving the Universe. They will be called, the Observational Order,
and the Conceptual Order. The first point to remember is that the
observational order is invariably interpreted in terms of the concepts
supplied by the conceptual order. The question as to the priority of
one or the other is, for the purpose of this discussion, academic. We
inherit an observational order, namely types of things which we do in
fact discriminate; and we inherit a conceptual order, namely a rough
system of ideas in terms of which we do in fact interpret. We can point
to no epoch in human history, or even in animal history, at which this
interplay began. Also it is true that novel observations modify the
conceptual order. But equally, novel concepts suggest novel
possibilities of observational discrimination.
[AI, IX, vi, pp. 154-155.]
In
this passage Whitehead is formulating the basis for his argument that a
consciously elaborated metaphysics is necessary to secure the ultimate
meaning of scientific knowledge and to explore the limitations of
scientific statements.
[See AI, IX, v & vi, pp. 154, 155.]
But
what he says in this passage also has implications for an interpretation
of “scientific method itself. There are two points in particular to
which I wish to call attention. First, Whitehead would seem to be
arguing that there are in fact no presuppositionless observation terms.
Every statement, even the most commonsensical observation statement,
uses words which imply a particular way of conceiving the universe, and
this is true for scientific observation statements as well. The
scientist, using a specialized vocabulary, may think that his or her
terms are free of any particular theory or hypothesis concerning the
matter under investigation, and for the practical and limited concerns
of the special science this may seem to be true. In fact, however,
every observation statement has conceptual implications and contains
unarticulated presuppositions regarding the way reality is conceived.
[See PR,-V.5.ii (M, pp. 494-495; C, pp. 324-325). This is why
metaphysical analysis is so important. It makes explicit the
presuppositions and implications of the special sciences as well as
those of other types of human experience, thus opening them to criticism
and reformulation and hopefully leading to a coherent result that brings
us closer to speaking the truth of reality.
A
second and closely related point Whitehead is making is that observation
is aided, informed, and directed by theory, and that advances in the
observational realm are often caused by development of new hypotheses.
He puts this point well in another place:
One
main law which underlies modern progress is that, except for the rarest
accidents of chance, thought precedes observation. It may not decide the
details, but it suggests the type. Nobody would count, whose mind was
vacant of the idea of number. Nobody directs attention when there is
nothing that he expects to see. The novel observation which comes by
chance is a rare accident, and is usually wasted. For if there be no
scheme to fit it into, its significance is lost. . . .
. .
. Millions had seen apples fall from trees, but Newton had in his mind
the mathematical scheme of dynamic relations: millions had seen lamps
swinging in temples and churches, but Galileo had in his mind his vaguer
anticipation of this same mathematical scheme: millions had seen animals
preying on each other, vegetables choking each other, millions had
endured famine and thirst, but Charles Darwin had in his mind the
Malthusian scheme.
[FR, pp. 72, 73.]
It
is the presence in a scientist’s mind of a hypothesis, a speculative
scheme of thought, which most often directs his or her observation,
which suggests connections between observations, and which reveals
significance in oft-repeated observations. It is the hypothesis or
theory which provides reasonable explanations, at first dimly intuited,
of observed data.
The
extension of observation waits upon some dim apprehension of reasonable
connection. For example, the observation of insects on flowers dimly
suggests some congruity between the natures of insects and of flowers,
and thus leads to a wealth of observation from which whole branches of
science have developed. But a consistent positivist should be content
with the observed facts, namely insects visiting flowers. It is a fact
of charming simplicity. There is nothing further to be said upon the
matter, according to the doctrine of a positivist.
[Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: Macmillan,
1938; Free Press pb. ed., 1968), Chapter VIII, p. 149. (Hereafter cited
as MT.)]
The
positivist interpretation of science fails to take account of this
interrelationship of hypothesis and observation in the actual
development and practice of science.
It is interesting to note that in this critique of the positivist
interpretation of science Whitehead is enunciating arguments and using
methods of interpretation which are being widely used today in the
community of philosophers of science (very often without any apparent
influence from Whitehead’s work). His comments on observation being
preceded by thought and on observations being made and described in
terms of theory are quite similar to the widely influential work of
Norwood R. Hanson (see Patterns of Discovery [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1958], Chapters I & III) which argues that
all data in science are “theory-laden.” Whitehead’s arguments from the
actual history and practice of science are quite similar to the method
of interpretation gaining wide influence today among philosophers of
science; see Frederick Suppe, “Afterword,” in Suppe, ed., The
Structure of Scientific Theories, pp. 618, 650-659, and especially
his treatment of the work of Dudley Shapere, pp. 682-705.
A
further criticism Whitehead raises against the positivist interpretation
of science is that it is impossible to act upon this interpretation.
[See AI, VIII, iv, p. 124.]
As we
have seen, the second movement involved in scientific method is a
deductive operation. Once the scientist has a grasp of the hypothesis
or theory, an understanding of how the hypothesis explains the
originating data, she or he proceeds to deduce the implications of the
hypothesis for sets of events other than the ones originally observed.
The scientist predicts what will happen in specific circumstances
according to the hypothesis. This prediction or forecast is integral to
the process of testing a hypothesis. Proper testing cannot be done if
the scientist is unable to predict what the hypothesis implies about
events to be observed in the future. Moreover, the application of
scientific knowledge in technology is also dependent on forecast or
prediction regarding future events. Without some minimal assurance that
scientific theory will be borne out in future events, technological
applications of scientific knowledge are impossible in theory and
foolhardy in practice. Thus prediction—forecast that future events of
the types analyzed in science will take place in a particular manner—is
an integral part both of scientific method and of the technological
application of science. But the positivist interpretation of science
offers no basis for prediction, no basis for any forecast of the future.
According to the positivist analysis we can know only observed facts and
have no basis for knowledge regarding future events; all we have is a
groundless expectation that they will conform to the pattern of known
observed events. This analysis of science “has never been acted on. It
can never be acted on, for it gives no foothold for any forecast of the
future around which purpose can weave itself.
[Ibid.]
The
positivist account of science, in short, cannot make any sense out of
and indeed would deny the legitimacy of the deductive and predictive
movement integral both to the inductive testing of scientific hypotheses
and to the practical application of scientific research. In this way
its inadequacy as an interpretation of scientific method is further
revealed.
This
positivist denial of our ability to predict or forecast the future
reasonably is actually a denial of any reasonable ground for purposive
thought and action. To limit knowledge to an anemic description of past
events is to eviscerate the possibility of any useful or significant
knowledge. In our actions in the world and in society, in our
reflection and our search for understanding and knowledge, we assume
that the past and the present condition the future. Moreover, the
significance of our understanding and knowledge is related to our belief
that we can anticipate to a better degree the course of future events,
can influence the pattern of future events, plan for them, and, with
regard to the conduct of our own lives; alter our own actions for the
better (however one chooses to define the good). The positivist position
on knowledge inherent in its interpretation of science can give no
account of this sort of assumption and belief, and would judge it a
rationally unfounded “animal faith.” Given the positivist
interpretation of science, “we can describe what has happened; but with
that description all possibility of knowledge ends.”
[Ibid. VIII, iii, p. 123. See also MT, VIII, pp.
164-165.]
Whitehead observes that most thinkers who champion this analysis
assert it theoretically and then, ironically, continue to act
purposively and affirm that science does have significance.
If
observed fact be all we know, then there is no other knowledge.
Probability is relative to knowledge. There is no probability as to
the future within the doctrine of Positivism.
Of
course most men of science, and many philosophers, use the Positivist
doctrine to avoid the necessity of considering perplexing fundamental
questions—in short, to avoid metaphysics—, and then save the importance
of science by an implicit recurrence to their metaphysical persuasion
that the past does in fact condition the future.
Indeed, as Hume pointed out, human life cannot be carried on without
this persuasion.
[AI, VIII, iv, pp. 125-126.]
Understanding, Knowledge, and Scientific Method
The
full import of Whitehead’s position on knowledge will be discussed
later, but a brief treatment of its implications here will fill out my
presentation of Whitehead’s interpretation of empirical scientific
method. Knowledge for Whitehead rests on the process of discovery
and is the result of illustrating in the facts of experience the
understanding one has gained of the processes and relations
operative in reality. It is the confrontation of understanding with the
facts of experience which produces knowledge, and knowledge consists in
the elucidation of immediate experience,
This seems to be the final meaning of Whitehead’s assertion that “the
elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for any
thought . . . .” PR, I.1.ii (M, p. 6; C, p. 4).
the
ability to “throw light on” and “clarify” the various components and
processes and their relations that together form the definiteness of our
experience. Thus for Whitehead knowledge is ultimately description, but
description of an explanatory sort that has been tested against the
facts of experience. “The final problem for thought,” says Whitehead,
“is to conceive a complete fact.” [AI,
IX, viii, p. 158.]
If
one considers the structure of empirical scientific method with this
distinction between understanding and knowledge in mind, one can see
that for Whitehead understanding comes in the second moment, in the
formation of the imaginative generalization or hypothesis. Knowledge,
however, can only come as a product of the third moment, when the
understanding is tested by confrontation with the facts of experience
and judged as to its adequacy. After making particular observations,
the scientist weighs probabilities, discards details deemed irrelevant,
and tries to discover what “rule” or “law of nature” is governing the
occurrence of the observed events. In the second major moment of
scientific method the scientist formulates a hypothesis which embodies
an explanatory description of the observed events and as yet unobserved
events of the same type. This is what Whitehead would call
“understanding,” which is fundamentally rational interpretation of
certain aspects of our experience. But understanding, embodied in the
imaginative generalization, is limited, can be erroneous, and is
untested. Understanding needs to be tested against the facts of
experience; and only if it is shown that this understanding elucidates
immediate experience can it be judged to produce knowledge. Hence the
purposive forecast of the future, necessary in order to test a
hypothesis, is according to Whitehead integral to the growth and
development of knowledge.
In
one passage where Whitehead is discussing the world of commerce, he
presents an interpretation of knowledge summarized in his use of the
terms “insight” and “foresight.”
[AI, VI, I, p. 89.]
His purpose is “to illustrate the function of ideas in the provision of
anticipation and purpose”; he is discussing the kind of mentality which
will “promote the general success of a commercial community” taken in
its widest sense.
[Ibid., p. 88.]
I will quote this rather lengthy passage because it has bearing on the
understanding of Whitehead’s interpretation of knowledge and of
scientific method.
. .
. our knowledge of scientific laws is woefully defective, and our
knowledge of the relevant facts of the present and the past is scanty in
the extreme. Thus as the result of all our science, we are ignorant of
that remote epoch when there will be a second collision between the sun
and a passing star, we are ignorant of the future of life on earth, we
are ignorant of the future of mankind, we are ignorant of the course of
history a year hence, we are ignorant of most of the domestic details of
our lives tomorrow . . . .
This
catalogue of ignorances at once reminds us that our state is not that of
blank absence of knowledge. Our ignorance is suffused with Foresight.
Also the basis of our defect in foresight is our scant knowledge of the
relevant detailed facts in past and present which are required for the
application of the scientific laws. . . . Foresight depends on
understanding. In practical affairs it is a habit. But the habit of
forseeing is elicited by the habit of understanding. To a large extent,
understanding can be acquired by a conscious effort and it can be
taught. Thus the training of Foresight is by the medium of
Understanding. Foresight is the product of Insight.
[Ibid., pp. 87, 89.]
The
implications of this passage are significant for the present topic.
Whitehead is saying, in short, that understanding is produced by
insight, and understanding in turn is the basis for foresight. Although
he does not say so specifically, it can be concluded from what he says
that knowledge is the product of foresight’s confrontation with the
concrete facts of experience as they become actual. Even in our vast
and multitudinous ignorances “our state is not that of blank absence of
knowledge.” It is not that we do not know at all, but that we know only
very partially some possibilities for the future. This limitation of
our foresight is due to our very limited and partial and incomplete
knowledge of past and present facts. But the knowledge that we do have,
incomplete though it is, is the result of our understanding having in
the past given rise to foresight, purposive expectations and
anticipations which were then confronted with the facts of experience as
they became actual, which in turn allowed us to judge to what extent our
understanding actually conceived the facts as they are.
Now
if we apply this to Whitehead’s interpretation of empirical scientific
method, we can locate the production of understanding and knowledge
within the dynamic of scientific method, and we are given two
generalized terms for the activities of the inquiring mind which connect
the three major moments of empirical scientific method. From
Whitehead’s distinction between understanding and knowledge, it seems
clear that understanding is produced by an inductive movement toward an
imaginative generalization and embodied in the explanatory description
that constitutes the imaginative generalization or hypothesis. The
process or movement of the mind from observation to hypothesis discussed
above and which is productive of understanding can be called “insight.”
The process or movement of the mind which deduces the implications of
the hypothesis and predicts what will happen in specific circumstances
according to the understanding embodied in the hypothesis can be called
“foresight.” When observation has been renewed, when the predictions
concerning future occurrence have been tested by confrontation with the
facts of experience, the result is an inductive judgment concerning the
accuracy or adequacy of the understanding or hypothesis which was tested
against the facts. This judgment can be said to produce knowledge.
The Nature of Scientific Knowledge
To
complete my presentation of Whitehead’s interpretation of empirical
scientific method, something needs to be said about the character of
scientific knowledge. Whitehead maintains throughout his writings that
all understanding and knowledge is partial and limited. No knowledge or
understanding can capture the fullness of concrete experienced reality.
All other reasons aside, the lessons offered by the history of science
would prohibit any reasonable person from claiming to have arrived at an
understanding and knowledge which is unlimited and which will not need
revision in the future. Whitehead has clearly stated his position on
the growth and nature of scientific knowledge in the following passage.
I
need not waste time in pointing out how the finality both of the
cosmological scheme and of the particular law in question [Newton’s Law
of Universal Gravitation] has now passed into Limbo. Newton was
weaving hypotheses. His hypotheses speculatively embodied the truth
vaguely discerned; they embodied the truth in a definite formulation
which far outran the powers of analytic intuition of his age. The
formulae required limitation as to the scope of their application. This
definition of scope has now been provided by recent formulae which in
their turn will, in the progress of science, have their scope of
application defined. Newton’s formulae were not false: they were
unguardedly stated. Einstein’s formulae are not false: they are
unguardedly stated. We now know how to guard Newton’s formulae: we are
ignorant of the limitations of Einstein’s formulae. . . .
Of
course the unknown limitations to Einstein’s formulae constitute a yet
more subtle limitation to Newton’s formula. In this way dogmatic
finality vanishes and is replaced by an asymptotic approach to the
truths.
[FR, pp. 52-53.]
It
is clear from this passage that Whitehead regards the growth of
scientific knowledge as cumulative and progressive, but the growth of
knowledge by the development and consequent verification, falsification,
or modification of hypotheses and theories does not lead to any final
knowledge of truth. Rather, the approach to truth is always asymptotic,
and the measure or proper test of success in the search for knowledge is
“not that of finality, but of progress.”
[PR, I.1.vi (M, p. 21; C, p. 14). See also “The Organization of
Thought,” IS, p. 21: “Success is never absolute, and progress in
the right direction is the result of a slow, gradual process of
continual comparison of ideas with facts.”]
In
what does progress consist? Whitehead gives two answers which are
really two ways of saying the same thing. First, as the above-quoted
passage clearly states, progress is a matter of better knowing the
limitations of our ideas. We have made progress in our approach to the
truth when we are able to determine to a better degree the limits of
applicability of our abstract notions.
In the omitted part of the quotation above, Whitehead says this: “In
scientific investigations the question, True or False?, is usually
irrelevant. The important question is, In what circumstances is this
formula true, and in what circumstances is it false? If the
circumstances of truth be infrequent or trivial or unknown, we can say,
with sufficient accuracy for daily use, that the formula is false.”
FR, p. 53. See also PR, II.3.iii (M, pp. 142-147; C, pp.
93-96).
But
how do we become better aware of the limitations of our ideas, how do we
become more able to determine the limits of applicability of our
abstract notions? We do so by a continual testing of our concepts, a
continual reformation of our way of conceiving reality a we confront our
concepts with the concrete facts of the experience we are endeavoring to
describe, understand, and know.
Progress in truth—truth of science and truth of religion—is mainly a
progress in the framing of concepts, in discarding artificial
abstractions or partial metaphors, and in evolving notions which strike
more deeply into the root of reality.
[RM, IV, 1, p. 127.]
As
is evident, Whitehead believes this position to have applicability to
all forms of cognitive knowing. As we shall see in some detail below,
although there is certainly progress in knowledge within each of the
special sciences and all forms of human knowing, it is philosophy in
particular that has as its chief responsibility the determination of the
limits of applicability of all concepts and the framing of concepts
“which strike more deeply into the root of reality.”
See, for example, Whitehead’s judgment of Newton’s Scholium in
PR, II.3. iii (M, pp. 142-143; C, p. 93), where he observes that
“the penalty of its philosophical deficiency is that the Scholium
conveys no hint of the limits of its own application. The practical
effect is that the readers, and almost certainly Newton himself, so
construe its meaning as to fall into what I have elsewhere termed the
‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness.’ It is the office of metaphysics to
determine the limits of applicability of such abstract notions.”
Thus
this topic of the character of scientific knowledge leads naturally to a
consideration of the relation between science and philosophy in
Whitehead’s thought. Before entering into this discussion, however, it
might prove helpful to summarize Whitehead’s interpretation of empirical
scientific method.
Summary
The
basic method of empirical science is a process of discovery, testing,
and continual revision of ideas and concepts in light of what has been
discovered in the confrontation between concepts and the concrete facts
of observed experience. The structure of this basic method consists of
three stages or moments connected by two activities or “movements” of
the inquiring mind and issuing in an inductive judgment. The first
moment is observation and description of some aspect of experience. The
description in science involves delineation of the types of “things”
observed, and also some attempt to obtain quantitative decisions
regarding the occurrence of the observed “things.”
[See MT, VII, pp. 141-142.]
The mind then begins its inductive movement, abstracting from the full
definiteness of the observed events, discarding details deemed
irrelevant, and (often under the conscious or unconscious guidance of
some dimly intuited hypothesis of causal connection) introducing the
notion of patterns in which the observed events seem to occur.
[See MT, pp. 142-143.]
The
mind is striving not just for a generalized description of the observed
events, but for an explanatory description, and this most often involves
the tracing of causal connections between the observed events. This
whole inductive movement striving for explanation can be called
“insight.” It results in the second stage or moment of empirical
scientific method, the central creative moment of hypothesis formation.
In this moment the scientist formulates a hypothesis to give an
explanatory account not only of the observed events which first
stimulated the inquiry, but an hypothesis which the scientist hopes will
elucidate the occurrence of all similar types of events. In this stage
of the method the scientist has formulated an understanding of what
factors seem to be influencing and governing the occurrence of the type
of events under investigation.
Having formulated an explanatory hypothesis which embodies the
imaginatively generalized understanding, the scientist then moves toward
the third major moment of scientific method. This movement consists in
deducing the implications of the hypothetical understanding and in
predicting what will happen under certain circumstances according to the
hypothesis. In this way the hypothetical understanding is prepared for
testing, and we may refer to this second movement in scientific method
as “foresight.” Foresight leads to the third major moment of empirical
method, testing, in which the hypothetical understanding is confronted
with the facts of concrete experience. By renewed observation (now more
sharply focused by means of the formulated rational interpretation) and
experimentation the scientist attempts to test the accuracy and adequacy
of the hypothetical understanding. Testing results in some inductive
judgment concerning the hypothesis, verification or falsification
The terms “verification” and “falsification” are being used loosely
here, as they are used by practicing scientists, not with the
philosophical sophistication and qualifications of contemporary
discussions of the verification-falsification issue in the philosophy of
science. Whitehead would, of course, agree that no scientific
hypothesis can be verified in any final sense, but he would argue that
within limitations and for practical purposes scientific hypotheses can
be verified. See the quotation on pp. 26-27 above, and the quotations
on p. 16 note 1 and p. 27 note 3.
(or
the judgment that the results have been inconclusive). It is at this
point that one can speak of scientific method having led to knowledge,
for in Whitehead’s interpretation knowledge is the product of the
confrontation of understanding with the facts of concrete experience.
The knowledge produced by empirical scientific method, however, is
never final. The method yields cumulative and progressive results that
follow or define an asymptotic approach to the truth; but cognitive
knowledge never is a complete grasp of the fullness of concrete
experience.
Forward to
The Method of Empirical Science and Philosophy
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