Process, Insight, and Empirical Method
An
Argument for the Compatibility of the Philosophies of Alfred North
Whitehead and Bernard J. F. Lonergan and Its Implications for
Foundational Theology.
A
Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Divinity School, The
University of Chicago, for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
December 1983
Thomas Hosinski, C.S.C.
Chapter I:
Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s Interpretations of Empirical Scientific
Method and Philosophic Method [continued]
A Comparison of
Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s Interpretations of Scientific and Philosophic
Method
Having seen Whitehead’s and
Lonergan’s interpretations of empirical scientific method in some
detail, and having seen the main outlines of how science and scientific
method are related to philosophy and philosophic method in their
understandings, there remains the task of comparing these
interpretations. The similarity between Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s
interpretations of empirical scientific method is so manifest that in
the first section I will simply review that similarity in a brief
treatment. In the second section I will discuss their interpretations
of the relation between empirical scientific method and philosophic
method, and the relation between philosophy and the sciences. This will
lead to an awareness of the similarities between Whitehead and Lonergan
that might prove to be grounds for my thesis that there is some degree
of compatibility between their philosophies. It will also lead to an
awareness of the differences between them that my thesis must confront.
The Method
of Empirical Science
Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s
descriptions of empirical scientific method are essentially identical.
Whitehead describes that method as consisting of three major stages,
connected into a continuum by two “movements” or activities of the mind:
I.
Observation; description; “insight;”
induction;
II.
Hypothesis formation (Imaginative
Generalization); “foresight;” deduction; prediction; forecast;
III.
Testing; experimentation; renewed
observation; verification.
Lonergan describes empirical scientific method as consisting of four
major moments linked in a dynamic structure:
I.
Observation; description; questions
and problems;
II.
Insight; urge for expression of
insight;
III.
Hypothesis formulation; deduction;
prediction; forecast;
IV.
Testing; experimentation; renewed
observation; verification.
But Lonergan later assigns moments II and III to the same level of human
consciousness, so that his generalized schematization ends up having
three stages that correspond exactly with Whitehead’s. The reason
Lonergan initially assigns insight to a moment of its own in his
description of empirical scientific method is because of the centrality
insight has for Lonergan’s whole analysis. It is, in short, worthy of
distinction because it serves as the initial clue for Lonergan’s
analysis of the whole cognitional process. Structurally, then, with
regard to the dynamic of the entire process, Whitehead and Lonergan
offer identical interpretations of empirical scientific method. I will
now review the various elements of the method individually and compare
their interpretations.
First of all, Whitehead and Lonergan
agree that experience provides the data for the first moment of
observation. Both are also in basic agreement concerning the necessity
and the role of observation and description.
[Compare ibid.,
pp. 11-12, 18-19, 57-58.]
One difference in their accounts is that Whitehead stresses and analyzes
the influence of hypothesis or theory on observation, while Lonergan
does not devote much attention to this point; yet it must be noted that
Lonergan does allude to this in passing.
[Compare ibid., pp. 20-21, 86.]
Concerning the activities or
operations connecting the first stage to that of hypothesis formation,
Lonergan analyzes the cognitional act of insight and its elements much
more closely and precisely than does Whitehead. But Whitehead does
speak of this activity and, as we saw, even the term “insight” can be
applied to it in Whitehead’s description.
[Compare ibid., pp. 15-16, 25-26, 63-68.]
Both Whitehead and Lonergan agree
that the next major moment in empirical scientific method is the
formulation in an hypothesis of the understanding grasped in insight.
Also, they agree that such a formulation is intended by the inquirer to
be explanatory. [Compare ibid.,
pp. 1 18-19, 23-26, 58-59.]
The cognitional activities which
follow upon the stage of hypothesis formation are deducing the
implications of the hypothesis, forecasting or predicting what will take
place under controlled conditions if the hypothetical understanding is
correct, and the devising of experiments with which to test the
hypothesis. Both Whitehead and Lonergan discuss all these activities,
but Lonergan’s account of the cognitional operations that occur in this
transition to testing and of the relation of these operations is a far
more detailed and precise study. [Compare ibid.,
pp. 15-16, 21-23, 60-61, 81, 84-92.]
Finally, both Whitehead and Lonergan
describe the final stage or moment of empirical scientific method as
testing and experimentation. Both note that this involves renewed
observation, and that verification (or falsification) consists in a
judgment on the hypothetical understanding once that understanding has
been confronted with the facts of experience. Again, however,
Lonergan’s analysis of the cognitional operation of judgment is far more
detailed and precise than is Whitehead’s.
[Compare ibid., pp. 15-16, 23-26, 84-92.]
It is significant that both
Whitehead and Lonergan locate understanding and knowing at precisely the
same stages of empirical method. Understanding is initially achieved in
insight, but formulated publicly in hypothesis; and knowing takes place
in and following upon the judgment once the hypothesis has been
confronted with the facts in renewed observation. Both regard this
commitment to testing as essential to empirical scientific method. Both
stress that scientific knowledge is not certain, but limited and only
probable, always remaining open to future revision by the same method
that produces it. Both also note that scientific knowledge is
cumulative and progressive.
Finally, it is significant that
neither Whitehead nor Lonergan is trying to draw up a model of empirical
method designed to fit the requirements of some previously conceived
philosophical scheme. Rather, they both follow the method they are
describing. They arrive at their accounts of empirical scientific method
by studying examples of its application, and they intend their accounts
to be descriptive of the actual practice or performance of scientists
with regard to the general procedures scientists follow, the general
method by which they operate.
Thus Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s
interpretations of empirical scientific method are virtually identical.
They are also complementary. Lonergan’s interpretation offers a very
precise, careful, and detailed account of the various cognitional
operations and their structured relationship that complements and fills
out Whitehead’s account of these activities. On the other hand, in the
one instance of the influence of hypothesis on observation in scientific
inquiry, Whitehead’s account complements and fills out Lonergan’s
account.
However, when we turn to their
interpretations of the relation of empirical scientific method to
philosophy and philosophic method, things are not so simple.
The Method
of Empirical Science and Philosophy
The first obvious similarity between
Whitehead and Lonergan when we consider their interpretations of the
relation of scientific method to philosophy is that in both thinkers the
structure of philosophic method is essentially the same as that of
empirical scientific method. In fact both Whitehead and Lonergan
understand themselves to be operating philosophically with a
generalized empirical method. That is, the method each proposes for
philosophy has the same essential features and structure as empirical
scientific method but without its specializations. It differs from
scientific method in being more general. Also, for both Whitehead
and Lonergan one of the major differences between empirical scientific
method and philosophic method is that these methods are applied to
different data.
There is a difference
between Whitehead and Lonergan on the nature of the data to which
philosophic method is applied, a difference I shall discuss below. But
both are agreed that philosophic method is not applied to the data that
the empirical sciences investigate (at least not initially, in
Whitehead’s case).
But the initial observation I wish to make is that in the philosophies
of both Whitehead and Lonergan the structure of philosophical
method is essentially the same as the general structure of empirical
scientific method. Further, one can say that both interpret empirical
scientific method to be a specialized application of the basic method of
philosophy.
Now as soon as one has said this, a
host of qualifications and distinctions clamor for attention. For
instance, it does not appear that Whitehead and Lonergan mean at all the
same thing by “philosophy.” From Lonergan’s point of view Whitehead
might be accused of leaping immediately to metaphysics without first
working out the necessary cognitional theory and epistemology to ground
his metaphysics. Whitehead might be accused as well of attending to the
wrong data: the ideas and concepts of the sciences and other disciplines
instead of the data of cognitional process. On the other hand, from
Whitehead’s point of view Lonergan might be accused of overlooking the
fact that every scientific statement has metaphysical implications and
that the first requirement of philosophy is an ontology. Lonergan might
further be accused of centering his attention on a highly specialized
sort of experience (the higher levels of human consciousness), whereas
if we hope to understand reality the proper focus of philosophy ought to
be on eliciting the general characteristics present in all experience.
See, for example, the
following statement by Whitehead: “. . . we know of events whose
connection with any mental process, as we it, appears to be doubtful,
incomplete, and extremely unessential to them.
“That is my reason for
being very shy of leaning too heavily on mind in any endeavor to express
the general character of reality. . . . I am haunted by the seeming
indifference of nature to mind . . .” (“The Idealistic Implications of
Einstein’s Theory,” IS, pp. 145-146, 148.) But note that such
statements are criticisms of idealism, and do not really affect
Lonergan’s critical realism.
Yet lest these apparently major
philosophical differences between Whitehead and Lonergan blind us to the
similarities that do exist in their analyses, I will suspend discussion
of the differences until I have noted the similarities between their
interpretations. Thus for the moment, in spite of the troubling
qualifications at hand, I want to emphasize that the structure of
the philosophic method employed by Whitehead and Lonergan is essentially
the same, and that it is essentially the same as the general structure
of empirical scientific method. This fact suggests the possibility that
there may be some degree of compatibility between Whitehead’s and
Lonergan’s philosophies. The possibility may have been overlooked
because attention has been focused on the apparent differences between
them rather than on their similarities.
If we ignore the differences for a
moment, there are other similarities between Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s
philosophies that begin to surface. For example, it is significant that
both Lonergan and Whitehead understand the general or essential
structure of empirical scientific method to be the underlying general
structure of all human cognitional knowing, not just the scientific and
philosophic forms. Lonergan establishes this in his analysis of “common
sense” and Whitehead implicitly accepts this in his discussion of poets.
How is it that poets give “evidence” for metaphysical analysis? It can
only be because their “intuitions” are observations of and insights into
aspects of experience ignored or inadequately expressed by scientific
explanations, which cause the poet (and the metaphysician) to judge
those explanations incomplete. Thus one can say that for both Whitehead
and Lonergan the general and essential structure of empirical method
underlies and guides all human cognitional knowing.
Next, it is significant that both
Whitehead and Lonergan argue for a philosophical position we can name
“critical realism.” There is a correlation between Whitehead’s and
Lonergan’s critiques of the philosophical tradition. Whitehead
criticizes the “sensationalist” basis of modern epistemology and
separates his position from both Newton and Kant on the basis of his
analysis of abstraction and the notion of the fallacy of misplaced
concreteness. Lonergan is critical of naive realism and separates his
position from both Newton and Kant on the basis of his analysis of
knowing, the real, objectivity, and the notion of “thing” versus “body.”
For both Whitehead and Lonergan the real is what is to be known by
verification in the data of experience (mediated by the operation of
judgment). There are, to be sure, differences in their interpretations,
but there is at least this much similarity between them.
Another similarity between them is
that both understand metaphysics to operate on data supplied by the
empirical sciences (as well as other sources), and both agree that
metaphysics cannot generate this data for itself. Thus both agree on
the fundamental and necessary autonomy of the sciences. Further, in
both Whitehead and Lonergan the appropriation of the data provided by
the sciences is critical appropriation. In both thinkers this critical
appropriation is guided by the basic scheme of interpretation developed
by philosophy, and it establishes both the applications and limitations
of the heuristic structures or generalizations of the sciences.
Also, both Whitehead and Lonergan
insist that if philosophy is to pursue and accomplish its task, latent
metaphysics must be made explicit. Again, there is a difference on the
exact meaning of this statement for the two thinkers, but if we suspend
consideration of those differences for a moment, it is possible to grasp
a functional similarity between their conceptions of the role and task
of metaphysics.
With regard to the empirical
sciences, both Whitehead and Lonergan affirm that by its critical
appropriation of the data of the empirical sciences, metaphysics brings
the sciences coherence, unifies them with each other, and integrates
them with other disciplines and with what is learned from human life as
lived. Again, there appears to be a difference between the specific
meanings of this statement for Whitehead and Lonergan, but there is at
least a functional similarity in their thought on this issue.
Finally, both Lonergan and Whitehead
assert that a properly constructed metaphysics both grounds the sciences
and completes them by producing a general understanding of the world.
The sciences are ungrounded and incomplete so long as metaphysics has
not accomplished its task.
By now, however, the reader will no
doubt object that most of the similarities I have pointed to are nothing
more than abstract similarities of metaphysical function. For example,
while both Whitehead and Lonergan argue that metaphysics grounds the
sciences and completes them, what this means in each of their
philosophies appears to be quite different. For Lonergan, the grounding
of the sciences occurs because metaphysics is able to root the methods
of the sciences in the dynamic structure of human knowing that impels
and guides scientific inquiry.
In one place Lonergan
states that the “real presuppositions” of science “are not a set of
propositions but the dynamic structure of the human mind . . .”
Insight, p. 508.
The completion of the sciences occurs because metaphysics is also able
to work out the general characteristics (or the integral heuristic
structure) of proportionate being. For Whitehead, on the other hand,
the grounding of the sciences occurs because metaphysics is able to
exhibit the reasonableness of the fundamental assumptions of scientific
method, and it does this precisely by developing a cosmological scheme
of interpretation that makes explicit the presuppositions about the
cosmos inherent in scientific thought. However, I hope to be able to
show in Chapter III, where such argumentation properly belongs, that
this difference between Whitehead and Lonergan is not as great as it
initially seems. There is, I will argue, a fundamental similarity
between these two positions. In rooting scientific method in the dynamic
structure of human knowing, Lonergan is explaining how the empirical
sciences can explain. But this is exactly what Whitehead is also doing
in exhibiting the reasonableness of the notions of order, causality, and
induction (and induction, after all, is just a shorthand word for the
first two stages of scientific method).
[Compare Thesis,
pp. 31-44, 103-110.]
And so I will attempt to show that there are grounds for arguing a
fundamental compatibility between Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s
understandings of metaphysics, a compatibility that goes beyond a mere
abstract similarity of function.
Having pointed out some
similarities, however, I must now consider the real differences that do
exist between Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s interpretations. The major
difference between them, the difference that seems to dominate and be
the source of all others, is that Lonergan consistently focuses his
inquiry on the knowing process and the subject who is inquiring,
while Whitehead—assuming the unity of the inquiring subject with the
world of experience in which that subject is enmeshed—focuses his
analysis on the object of the knowing process. Though Lonergan
is careful to distinguish his position from Kant’s by pointing out the
real differences between their approaches, the Kantian influence on
Lonergan is nonetheless evident, whereas Whitehead characterizes his
analysis as “a recurrence to pre-Kantian modes of thought.”
PR,
Preface (M, p. vi; C,
p.xi). Whitehead, of course, feels justified in his “recurrence to
pre-Kantian modes of thought” because he is able to exhibit (to his
satisfaction) the deficiencies of Hume’s account of experience, and
Kant’s philosophy in a sense begins with a radical acceptance of Hume’s
account. For Lonergan’s careful distinction of his positions from those
of Kant, see Insight, pp. 339-342.
This basic difference in focus
accounts for almost all the differences between Whitehead’s and
Lonergan’s analyses of particular topics. One major example of this is
their very different analyses of the problem of induction. I did not
discuss Lonergan’s solution to the problem of induction above, but can
do so here very briefly. In the course of his discussion of reflective
understanding, Lonergan discusses the form of arguments from analogy and
generalization, and states that at work in both cases “is the law,
immanent and operative in cognitional process, that similars are
similarly understood. Unless there is a significant difference in the
data, there cannot be a difference in understanding the data.” He goes
on to note that this point has already been established in his analysis
of the heuristic procedure of classical empirical method, and that it
applies as well for statistical method. He then says,
In the simplest possible manner,
then, our analysis resolves the so-called problem of induction. It
makes the transition from one particular case to another or from a
particular case to the general case an almost automatic procedure of
intelligence. We appeal to analogies and we generalize because we
cannot help understanding similars similarly. This solution, be it
noted, squares with the broad fact that there is no problem of teaching
men to generalize. There is a problem of teaching them to frame their
generalizations accurately; . . . There is, above all, a problem of
preventing men from generalizing on insufficient grounds . . . [Insight,
p. 288.]
Thus Lonergan’s solution to the problem of induction is to appeal to the
structure of the knowing process and its “immanent and operative law” of
understanding similars similarly. On the other hand, Whitehead’s
approach to the problem of induction is from the side of the object of
knowing. As we saw, he argues that if induction is to be shown to be a
reasonable presupposition of science, what is needed is an ontological
analysis that can discover in the immediate occasion grounds for
knowledge of past and future. That is, the metaphysical analysis must
be able to exhibit the essential connectivity of the occasion, its
relations to both past and future.
[See Thesis, pp. 31-35.]
Thus in order to resolve the problem
of induction Whitehead proposes a metaphysical analysis of the object of
human knowing. These two approaches to the problem could hardly seem
more different.
Another example of this difference
of focus accounting for their diverse treatments of particular topics
can be found in their discussions of abstraction. Since Whitehead’s
focus is on the object of knowing, he stresses the fullness of the
concrete data of experience. The major point he makes is that
abstraction operates by attending to only a few aspects of the data
while ignoring numerous other aspects. He clearly states that
abstraction is necessary for conscious experience and thought, and that
progress in understanding is made by dealing with the data of experience
in this way. He insists, however, that abstraction always deals with
only some aspects of the data, and that reality is far more than we can
capture in our abstractions. There is a strong sense in Whitehead’s
writing that while abstractions are necessary and the only tools with
which we can work, abstractions are impoverished in comparison to the
experience of reality.
[See ibid., pp. 35-42.]
Lonergan, on the other hand, because his focus is on the process of
knowing, speaks of abstractions as fundamentally enriching.
So far from being a mere
impoverishment of the data of sense, abstraction in all its essential
moments is enriching. Its first moment is an enriching anticipation of
an intelligibility to be added to sensible presentations; there is
something to be known by insight. Its second moment is the erection of
heuristic structures and the attainment of insight to reveal in the data
what is variously named as the significant the relevant, the important,
the essential, the idea, the form.
[Insight, p. 88; see also p. 89.]
Because one’s goal is understanding and at the initial moment of inquiry
all one has is sense data, abstraction can be interpreted as an
enrichment since it gives one something to be understood, erects ways of
going about reaching an understanding, and stimulates the occurrence of
insights. One began with only sense data, and now one has
understanding. There is throughout Lonergan’s writing a strong sense of
the thrill of understanding, the enrichment it brings to the inquiring
subject. This difference between Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s accounts of
abstraction reflects their difference of focus.
One could go on listing such
differences of treatment on special topics, but the point seems fairly
clear. There is, however, another major difference between Whitehead
and Lonergan which does not appear to be the result of a difference in
focus alone, and I must call attention to it here. Whitehead makes no
claim for permanence for his metaphysical system. In fact he expects it
to be revised in the future as knowledge, even though ever partial and
limited, draws asymptotically nearer the truth. Lonergan, on the other
hand, because his focus is on the dynamic structure of knowing rather
than any particular content of knowing, asserts that the basic structure
not only of his cognitional theory and epistemology but also of his
metaphysics cannot be revised. The terms he uses and the way in which
he describes the structure might be improved upon, but any improvement
would have to use the same basic structure his analysis has discovered,
and so that structure itself cannot be revised. This difference between
Whitehead and Lonergan over the issue of permanence in metaphysical
interpretation is a problem I will have to confront in Chapter III of my
study.
Thus far in the discussions and
employment of the philosophies of these two seminal thinkers, the
differences between them have for the most part dominated. Most
theologians employing the thought of one or the other seem to regard
these differences as irreconcilable. Lonergan himself apparently
perceives the difference between his philosophy and Whitehead’s to be
irreconcilable.
In discussing how
transcendental method leads to metaphysics, Lonergan says that this
would be “a metaphysics where, however, the metaphysics is
transcendental, an integration of heuristic structures, and not some
categorial speculation that reveals that all is water, or matter, or
spirit, or process, or what have you.” Method, p. 25. If this
statement is intended to refer to Whitehead’s “process” metaphysics,
then I hope to show that this remark is an example of how even the most
acute of inquirers can occasionally fail to understand.
Yet in this section I have found that there are a number of similarities
between Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s interpretations of empirical
scientific method and of philosophic method. It is my suspicion that at
least some of these similarities are not insignificant. Using these as
clues, and entering more fully into Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s
philosophic discussions, I hope to show in Chapter III that there are
grounds for establishing that their philosophies are at least in some
respects compatible.
Forward to
Chapter II: The Tenability of Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s
Interpretations of Empirical Scientific Method:
Karl Popper on Scientific Method and Knowledge
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