Process, Insight, and Empirical Method
An
Argument for the Compatibility of the Philosophies of Alfred North
Whitehead and Bernard J. F. Lonergan and Its Implications for
Foundational Theology.
A
Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Divinity School, The
University of Chicago, for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
December 1983
Thomas Hosinski, C.S.C.
Chapter III:
The Influence of Empirical Method in Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s Analyses
of Human Subjectivity [Continued]
Whitehead’s Analysis of Human Subjectivity [Continued]
Sense Perception and
Causal Efficacy: The “Withness” of the Body and the Persistence of
Personal Identity
In this subsection I shall be
considering only one phase of our experience of subjectivity, the one I
was principally concerned with in the preceding subsection; that is,
that at the outset of any occasion of experience we find the objective
world given to us as the datum for our experience. As we saw very
briefly, the philosophical tradition was unable to find any ground for
this conviction of common human experience and this was due, in
Whitehead’s interpretation, to taking sense-perception alone as
constituting the fundamental fact in the subjective enjoyment of
experience and applying substance-quality categories in the analysis of
the subjective enjoyment of experience so conceived. The result has
been various philosophical schemes of interpretation which clash with
the convictions of our common experience. The resolution of this
problem, then, ought to begin by considering whether the subjective
enjoyment of experience in its original phase is at the most basic level
an instance of sense-perception; and whether the subject enjoying the
experience can be understood metaphysically to be a substance needing
nothing but itself in order to exist. As we shall see, these two
questions are intimately related. Accordingly, I shall begin by
considering whether the most basic fact in the dative phase of human
experience is an instance of sense-perception.
The
Analysis of Human Subjectivity: The Dative Phase
Let us consider the following
situation.
The following is a
modification of the example with which Whitehead begins his discussion
in S, I, ii, p. 2-4.
Suppose that a friend of mine—an artist—and I have taken a long walk,
and that we have been accompanied by my pet dog. At the conclusion of
our walk we enter the living room of my home, and the gaze of all three
of us happens to fall on a chair. My artist friend is struck by the
beautiful color and shape of the chair set against the neutral color and
stark lines of the wall behind it. At the same moment I begin to move
toward the chair with the intention of resting in it, and so does my
dog. What is it that the three of us have perceived? In the first
place, what all three of us have seen is a mere colored shape in
a particular location relative to us. The artist was able to
contemplate that colored shape alone, but the dog and I passed
immediately from our perception of the colored shape to a perception of
an object in which we intended to rest. The dog and I perceived
something we could use for the purpose of rest even though we saw
only a colored shape. Moreover, the particular color of the chair,
which was essential to the artist’s contemplation, was entirely
irrelevant to our purposes.
This example illustrates several
important points about the nature of our perception, points which seem
to contradict the sensationalist account of perception. That account
tells us, most simply, that what we perceive is in fact only the
colored shape. When we think of that colored shape as an object, a
chair, we are actually drawing a conclusion from a rather complex chain
of inference. We recall our past experience of colors and shapes, we
compare this present colored shape to those in which we have rested in
the past, and we draw the probable conclusion that we are now in the
presence of the kind of shape we call (and are in the habit of using as)
a chair. But are such complex inferential operations really required to
get from the colored shape to the chair? In our example there are two
bits of evidence indicating that they are not. First, the artist was
the one who contemplated only the colored shape and did not pass to the
notion of a chair. An artist is a highly trained person. Only at the
cost of hard work in a course of training does he or she acquire this
ability to contemplate color, shape, and relative position while
ignoring the notion of an object or its utility. Human beings do not
need extensive training only in order to keep from engaging in complex
chains of inference. Quite the reverse: we find the avoidance of
complex inference all too easy. Secondly, the dog in our example passed
as swiftly as did I from the perception of the colored shape to the
notion of an object upon which to rest in comfort. Unless we are
prepared to argue that the average dog is as proficient in complex
chains of logical inference as is a human being, this too seems to
indicate that such high levels of intellectual operation are not at
work. The transition from perception of a colored shape to an object
which can be used for purposes having nothing to do with color seems not
to be dependent upon our higher rational abilities. In fact, among the
thousands of times in our lives when we sit in chairs we have never seen
before, there is hardly a one in which we devote even a passing thought
to whether that colored shape is a chair. We seem to have expectations
about the colored shapes as objects, expectations which hardly ever pass
through conscious analysis. Only if the perceived shape is truly odd do
we even devote conscious attention to the matter.
This seems to indicate that in our
naive experience (and in the dog’s) we perceive more than mere barren
sensa, colored shapes. The notion of a mere colored shape seems,
rather, to be a high abstraction from our total act of perception, an
abstraction achieved only by training and quite advanced mental
abilities. Visually a colored shape in a certain place is all we
perceive, yet our total act of perception seems to include something
more than a mere colored shape.
Another of Whitehead’s
examples makes this point quite well. “A young man does not initiate
his experience by dancing with impressions of sensation, and then
proceed to conjecture a partner. His experience takes the converse
route.” PR, IV.4.ii (M, p. 481; C, pp. 315-316).
The subjective enjoyment of experience, even for a dog, seems to involve
some element that does not depend on sensuous perception and yet is
connected with the sense data. There is, then, a complexity in the
initial phase of our experience (our total act of perception), but it is
not a complexity of uniquely human mental operations. Since the dog
clearly enjoys the same complexity of, perception, there must be, below
the level of reflective thought, a joining together of sensuous
perception with some element we might call “nonsensuous perception.”
It is the observation of examples
such as this, and the testimony of our common sense and action that we
are experiencing more than mere sense data, that leads Whitehead to
formulate his theory of the total act of perception. If I am to keep my
study within manageable bounds I cannot here embark upon a detailed
account of Whitehead’s theory.
The major references
for Whitehead’s theory of perception are: SMW, IV, pp. 97-107; V,
pp. 128-134; IX, pp. 209-219; S, I & II, pp. 1-59; PR,
11.2 (M, pp. 95-126; C, pp. 61-82); II.4.vii-ix (M, pp. 184-196; C, pp.
121-128); 11.8 (M, pp. 255-279; C, pp. 168-183); IV.4-5 (M, pp. 472-508;
C, pp. 310-333); AI, XI, pp. 175-190; XIV, pp. 209-219; MT,
II, pp. 20-41 passim; VI, pp. 105-125; VIII, pp. 148-169. Most
of the standard commentaries on Whitehead’s thought have discussions of
the theory.
I will instead highlight a few of the main elements of that theory which
are important for my purposes. It will be easiest simply to layout the
bare bones of Whitehead’s theory, and then to enter into brief
discussions of the major points.
In terms of the analysis summarized
above, Whitehead hypothesizes that our total act of perception is a
fusion of two sorts of perception. What is normally referred to as
“sense-perception” he calls “perception in the mode of presentational
immediacy.” The other, non-sensuous element that seems to be involved
in the total act he calls “perception in the mode of causal efficacy.”
The activity that fuses these two modes of perception into one complex
perception he calls “symbolic reference.” This is an activity of the
perceiving subject which refers data given in presentational immediacy
to data given in causal efficacy, or vice versa. Symbolic reference,
then, is an activity of the perceiving subject alone and belongs to a
late phase of subjective experience. The activities involved in the two
simple modes of perception, however, can with equal truth be referred to
both the perceiving subject and actual things being perceived.
This statement is a
great oversimplification of Whitehead’s theory, but it is, within
limitations, accurate. The limitations concern mainly percep-tion in
the mode of presentational immediacy. The eternal objects which
constitute the sensa illustrate for the percipient certain regions of
the extensive continuum and the geometrical relationships involved.
Ultimately, however, these eternal objects are ingredient not only in
the percipient occasion, but also in a chain of occasions which the
present percipient occasion is inheriting. That chain is constituted
most immediately by bodily occasions but extends to occasion outside the
body. The pure mode of presentational immediacy, then, objectifies a
datum by abstraction; it lifts into prominence an eternal object
ingredient in the datum and uses it to illustrate a certain region of
the extensive continuum in the percipient’s present. One cannot simply
identify the percept in presentational immediacy with the entity
perceived in causal efficacy because of the complexity of the eternal
object’s ingression. That is, the entity perceived in causal efficacy
lies in the past of the percipient occasion, while the eternal object
perceived in presentational immediacy is projected to illustrate a
region in the present of the percipient. Further, there is possible
error introduced by “reversion,” and there is further complexity
introduced by “transmutation” in the later phases of concrescence
whereby the eternal objects properly ingredient in actual entities are
applied by the percipient to nexus. See references in previous note to
S and PR.
In formulating his theory in this way, Whitehead is accepting the
testimony of common sense. We all know that “symbolic reference” can be
mistaken. For example, we may see the image of a chair in a large mirror
and if we fail to notice that we are looking into a mirror we mistake
the mirror-image to be illustrating the space behind the mirror.
[See S, I, x,
pp. 18-19; I, xi, pp. 23-24; PR, II.2.i (M, pp. 99-100; C, p.
64).]
The mistaken symbolic reference is ours as perceiving subjects. But we
are not mistaken that we have seen a colored shape nor that something is
being illustrated. In other words, in the two simple modes of
perception the data is given to us from the world around us, and
we can consider these data in two equally true ways: as the activities
by which we receive those data and as the activities of “object”
entities which have produced those data for us to receive.
Let us now return to our originating
question. Is the most fundamental fact in the dative phase of an
occasion of experience an instance of sense perception? In order to
answer this question we must consider the nature of perception in the
mode of presentational immediacy.
Gaze at a patch of red. In itself
as an object, and apart from other factors of concern, this patch of
red, as the mere object of that present act of perception, is silent as
to the past or the future. How it originates, how it will vanish,
whether indeed there was a past, and whether there will be a future, are
not disclosed by its own nature. No material for the interpretation of
sensa is provided by the sensa themselves, as they stand starkly,
barely, present and immediate. We do interpret them; but no
thanks for the feat is due to them.
[AI, XI, xii, pp. 180-181.]
Whitehead, in short, is insisting that if we restrict our attention to
the sensa themselves, we find clarity but barrenness. We perceive only
colored shapes having certain geometric relationships to out standpoint.
Yet, we do interpret these sensa. The fact that these interpretations
are by and large satisfying to common sense (though in some instances
liable to error) is proved in the pragmatic test of our actions and in
the common usages of language.
But the evidence on which these
interpretations are based is entirely drawn from the vast background and
foreground of non-sensuous perception with which sense-perception is
fused, and without which it can never be. We can discern no clean-cut
sense-perception wholly concerned with present fact. [Ibid., p. 181.]
Whitehead is arguing, in other words, that sense-perception is not
the most basic fact in the dative phase of an occasion of experience,
and that sense-perception depends entirely upon perception in the more
primitive mode of causal efficacy.
In order to make this claim he must
be able to point to some evidence for the existence of this mode of
non-sensuous perception. This is where consideration of the most basic
fact of our lives, so easily overlooked and taken for granted, is
crucial: we, as perceiving subjects, have bodies, and our
sense-perception is entirely dependent on the prior functioning of our
bodies. We are directly aware that we see “with our eyes,” hear “with
our ears,” feel “with our hands,” and so on. These are vague feelings,
but in them we are directly aware that our sense-perception does depend
entirely on the prior functioning of the body. Secondly, Whitehead
argues
[MT, VIII, p.
159.],
we know from experiments in physiology that a person can be made to have
delusive sense-perceptions simply by making his or her body function
internally by various methods (drugs, electrical currents, etc.). Thus
in any given instance of sense-perception the percipient occasion that
we call “ourselves in the present moment” is inheriting a rather,
extended chain of bodily experiences. For example, consider what is
involved when we say something such as “I see a patch of red.”
Abstracting from the detailed physiological account, there is a datum
being passed from the excited “cells of the retina, through the train of
actual entities forming the relevant nerves, up to the brain. Any direct
relation of eye to brain is entirely overshadowed by this intensity of
indirect transmission.”
[PR, II.4.v (M, p. 180; C, p. 118).]
What we call our sensations, in other words, are the feelings we inherit
from the interconnected chains of bodily experiences, transmitted to the
present experiencing occasion in our brain that we call ourselves.
The conclusion which the philosophy
of organism draws, is that in human experience the fundamental fact of
perception is the inclusion, in the datum, of the objectification of an
antecedent part of the human body with such-and-such experiences . . .
This survey supports the view that
the predominant basis of perception is perception of the various bodily
organs, as passing on their experiences by channels of transmission and
enhancement. . . .
The crude aboriginal character of
direct perception is inheritance. What is inherited is feeling-tone
with evidence of its origin: in other words, vector feeling-tone.
[Ibid, (M, pp.
180, 181, 182; C, pp. 118, 119).]
This is the evidence in our
experience that Whitehead frequently
See PR, II.2.i
(M, pp. 98-101; C, pp. 63-65); and “Index” (C. ed.), entry “Body:
withness of.”
calls the “withness of the body;” that is, the direct awareness that all
our sense-perception depends entirely upon the prior functioning of our
bodies, the awareness that we see with our eyes, and so on. This
aspect of our experience is where we find our direct awareness of
“causal efficacy:” we see because we have functioning eyes.
As to the direct knowledge of the
actual world as a datum for the immediacy of feeling, we first refer to
Descartes in Meditation I, “These hands and this body are mine”;
also to Hume in his many assertions of the type, we see with our eyes.
Such statements witness to direct knowledge of the antecedent
functioning of the body in sense-perception. Both agree—though Hume
more explicitly—that sense-perception of the contemporary world is
accompanied by perception of the “withness” of the body. It is this
withness that makes the body the starting point for our knowledge of the
circumambient world. We find here our direct knowledge of “causal
efficacy.”
[PR, II.2.vi (M, p. 125; C, p. 81).]
As is clear from this quotation, Whitehead is arguing that it is through
perception in the mode of causal efficacy that we have direct awareness
or intuition of the objectivity of the world through the inheritance of
our antecedent bodily states. This means understanding that our bodies
are actually a part of the world, a particularly intimate part, to be
sure; but on equal terms with everything else we experience in nature.
See Ibid. &
II.8.i (M, pp. 258-259; C, p. 170); and, most persuasively, MT,
II, pp. 21-22; VI, v, pp. 114-115; VIII, pp. 158-160.
It also means that perception in the mode of causal efficacy is always a
receiving from the past, the past of a split-second ago. The feelings
that we perceive now originated as feelings or experiences of our
bodily organs a few split-seconds ago and were transmitted through the
occasions of our nervous system to the brain where the presiding “ego”
occasion inherits them. In fact this continual inheritance by the
presiding “ego” occasion of the immediately past feelings of bodily
organs is one of the major reasons why we identify ourselves so strongly
with our bodies.
There is also a second type of
inheritance by the presiding ego occasion that we can recognize in our
primitive experience. We have not only the experience of identity with
our bodies, but also the experience of personal identity over time. In
other words, the presiding “ego” occasion inherits not only the
immediately past experiences of bodily organs, but also the experience
of immediately past presiding “ego” occasions.
In human experience, the most
compelling example of non-sensuous perception is our knowledge of our
own immediate past .... [O]ur immediate past is constituted by that
occasion, or by that group of fused occasions, which enters into
experience devoid of any perceptible medium intervening between it and
the present immediate fact. Roughly speaking, it is that portion of our
past lying between a tenth of a second and half a second ago. It is
gone, and yet it is here. It is our indubitable self, the foundation of
our present existence.
[AI, XI, xii, p. 181.]
The present occasion of experience,
then, is constituted in its initial phase by a two-fold inheritance from
the past: the feelings of the functioning body and the feeling of
identity with the experience of past presiding “ego” occasions. A
split-second ago I was feeling this or that emotion, making this
or that observation, entertaining this or that idea, and these stubborn
facts are the ground of my present experience.
The body is mine, and the antecedent
experience is mine. Still more, there is only one ego, to claim the
body and to claim the stream of experience. I submit that we have here
the fundamental basic persuasion on which we found the whole practice of
our existence.
MT, VIII, p. 161. See
PR, II.4.x (M, p. 197; C, p. 129): “. . . in our experience, we
essentially arise out of our bodies which are the stubborn facts of the
immediate relevant past. We are also carried on by our immediate past
of personal experience; we finish a sentence because we have
begun it.”
This two-fold inheritance of the
immediate past, of which we have direct awareness, is the strongest
evidence in our experience for the existence of non-sensuous perception
or perception in the mode of causal efficacy. In human experience it is
a compelling example of how the actual world presents itself as the
datum for a present occasion of experience. Further, our experience
testifies that most fundamentally the subject’s reception of this datum
is not through mere sensation, that is, a bare, passive, uninvolved
receptivity merely entertaining sense data. Rather the human subject’s
reception of the datum has the character of “feeling” or “emotion.”
Whitehead’s use of
these words to describe the fundamental character of prehensions and
their subjective forms is clearly derived from an understanding of human
experience, and equally clearly extends the meaning of those words far
beyond normal usage when applied to any occasion of experience in the
metaphysical theory. They become technical terms, along with prehension
and subjective form, used for their suggestiveness. There is, however, a
serious question as to their meaning when thus extended. What does it
mean to say that an occasion in a sub-atomic particle has “feelings?”
In Whitehead’s view such usage is justified because he is convinced
that it is on the level of human feelings and emotions that we find the
analogue for the “how” of experience. Since in human experience
all reception of data occurs accompanied by subjective feeling, then it
is legitimate to hypothesize that any occasion of experience is a
reception of given data with subjective feeling. (This is one of the
reasons why Whitehead’s ontology and metaphysics can be characterized as
aesthetic.) Ultimately, however, Whitehead admits that “however such
elements of language be stabilized as technicalities, they remain
metaphors mutely appealing for an imaginative leap.” PR, I.1.ii
(M, p. 6; C, p. 4).
The initial phase of any act of experience is what Whitehead terms the
“conformation of feeling.”
[See AI, XI,
xiv, pp. 183-184; and PR, passim (see “Index” to C. ed.,
entry “Conformity, conformal feelings.”)]
This means that in the initial phase of any present occasion of
experience the subject “feels” the immediate past occasion of experience
in the same way as it subjectively felt. Initially the present
continues the feelings of the past. That is how the datum makes itself
felt, and how it is received.
An example will clarify what
Whitehead means. Let us take the example of an angry man and let us
consider the present occasion of his experience.
[Whitehead uses this
example in AI, XI, xiv, pp. 183-184.]
How is the man angry now? According to White-head’s analysis we
must understand the anger in the present to be the inheritance of the
immediate past, both the antecedent bodily experiences and the
antecedent personal experience. In the immediate past the man was
angry. This involved both the physiological experience of anger and the
personal (“mental”) experience of anger. The initial phase of the man’s
present experience is the inheritance of his immediate past, and this
inheritance is two-fold. His present “ego” occasion is inheriting the
physiological feelings of anger from the body and is inheriting (or
remembering) the immediate past “ego” occasion as experiencing anger.
The datum for his present experience is his immediate past with its
feelings of anger, and he inherits that datum with that same feeling of
anger. In short, the man’s present feeling conforms to the feelings of
his past. The subjective form (the “how”) of his present experience is
the same feeling that was the subjective form of his immediate past
experience.
I must note here two
points I shall discuss below. First, it is clear that in this doctrine
of the conformation of feeling in the initial phase of an occasion of
experience Whitehead finds, as he says, “the primary ground for the
continuity of nature.” (Ibid.) It is to this activity in
experience that he appeals in order to illustrate the actual basis of
the notions of connexity, order, law, and causation. Secondly, note that
this doctrine raises the problem of the basis of novelty. How does the
man cease being angry? How can anything new arise if experience
always begins with the conformation of feeling? This is the problem
addressed by the rest of Whitehead’s theory of concrescence and which I
shall consider in the following subsections.
Whitehead argues that this example,
though particularly vivid, illustrates what happens in every occasion of
experience in its initial phase. I ought to note that Whitehead’s
theory of conformation of feeling is not restricted to the sort of
experience we usually term “emotional” but includes as well what we
would call purposive or intentional experience. Intentions and purposes,
in other words, arise from feelings (in Whitehead’s technical usage),
are themselves felt, and are inherited in exactly the same way described
above. Again, an example will clarify what Whitehead means. Let us
consider a human being uttering a sentence.
[See , XI, xiii, pp. 181-182; and PR, II.4.x (M, p. 197;
C, p. 129).]
Even the briefest of sentences spans
several occasions in the life-history of a person. By the time the
speaker reaches the concluding syllable of the sentence, all the other
syllables in the sentence lie in his or her past. Considered as mere
sensation or sensuous perception there is nothing in any of the spoken
syllables that has any inherent connection or reference to any of the
other syllables. They are mere sounds. Indeed, the sentence might
never before have been uttered in the history of the human race, and so
presented to the speaker and to us an entirely novel combination of mere
sounds. Yet the speaker was somehow carried from one occasion to
another until the sentence was complete, and we, the listeners, were
carried along with him or her. The complete sentence illustrates some
inherent connection between several occasions in the life histories of
the speaker and ourselves, yet consideration of the mere sensa, the
sounds, reveals no basis for such connection.
In Whitehead’s understanding, this
is another example of the primacy of non-sensuous perception and can
only be understood as each successive occasion in the speaker’s
life-history inheriting the as yet incompletely actualized intention of
uttering the entire sentence. The subjective form of each occasion—the
intention to utter the complete sentence—is inherited conformally in the
initial phase of each succeeding occasion until the intention is
fulfilled.
This account, of
course, remains incomplete until I discuss in the following subsections
the responsive and originative phases of an occasion of experience, and
introduce the notion of subjective aim.
We have here, Whitehead insists, an instance of perception in the mode
of causal efficacy: “we finish a sentence because we have begun
it.”
[PR, II.4.x (M, p. 197; C, p. 129).]
The past with its subjective form of
intent to utter the complete sentence is felt and continued in the
present occasion; the subjective form of the present occasion conforms
to the feeling it inherits from its past. While such non-sensuous
perception does not have the sharp and vivid precision of
sense-perception, still there can be no doubt about its existence in our
experience.
[AI, XI, xii,
pp. 182-183.]
These examples point to the evidence
in our experience establishing not only that perception in the mode of
causal efficacy exists, but also that it is the more primitive mode of
perception. Sense perception, or perception in the mode of
presentational immediacy, has been shown to be wholly dependent upon
perception in the mode of causal efficacy. Underlying the vivid and
precise awareness of our sense perception we find the subtle but
fundamental awareness that we see, hear, taste, smell, and feel only
because we have a body that is functioning. The common-sense obviousness
of this point is initially an obstacle to grasping its significance. But
once the point has been grasped, its obviousness is a compelling piece
of evidence for the existence and primitiveness of perception in the
mode of causal efficacy. Further, such basic elements of our common
experience as emotion and purpose—which on the sensationalist account
are made to be the dubious outcome of apparently groundless inferences
concerning the data of sense—now find their ground in the more primitive
portion of our experience underlying sense perception, that portion of
experience ignored by the sensationalist account.
See, among many
possible references, PR, II.7.ii (M, p. 246; C, p. 162):
“Experience has been explained in a thoroughly topsy-turvy fashion, the
wrong end first. In particular, emotional and purposeful experience
have been made to follow upon Hume’s impressions of sensation.”
Emotions and purposes are incorrectly interpreted if understood as
private subjective passions and notions read into the data of
experience. Instead, they arise from the data themselves as the present
subject inherits its past. Since feeling and purpose are in fact rooted
in the experience of causal efficacy, Whitehead concludes, they are more
primitive elements of experience than are sense perception and
inference.
These observations of the character
of our experience necessitate a revised understanding of the subject
enjoying experience. The subject can no longer be understood
metaphysically to be a substance requiring nothing but itself in order
to exist. On the contrary, the most primitive aspects of human
experience are feelings of derivation: the inheritance of bodily states
and the inheritance of past personal experience with the conformation of
feeling. The subject enjoying experience, then, is not some isolated,
independent substance. In the initial phase of a present occasion of
experience the subject arises from the world it inherits with conformity
of feeling. The subject is not a substance but a center of activity, a
functioning, a process: it is the unity of that occasion of experience
arising from the becoming of the experience itself. The subject of a
present occasion of experience is initially created in its activity of
receiving the past. The actual world, the objective content of the
datum for present experience, is the essential ground for the creation
of subjectivity. In short, the subject cannot be (or, more precisely,
cannot become) without its initial dependence upon and inheritance of
the actual objective world of the immediate past. In other words, the
objective actual world as the datum for experience is the initial
condition of the possibility of subjectivity. Subjectivity is
derivative from objectivity. One can with equal truth regard this
interface between objectivity and subjectivity, between the immediate
past and the present, as both the activity of the objective world making
itself felt in the present (its immediate future),
This is what Whitehead
calls the “superjective nature” of an actual entity.
and the activity of the subject in its initial phase of receiving the
world as datum for experience. The subject is created from and by the
past but in the present by its own activity of receiving the past. The
subject, in its initial phase, is the feeling here and
now of what is there and then to be felt.
This is the “vector
character” of feeling or prehension in its initial phase. See, for
example, PR, II.3.i (M, p. 133; C, p. 87): “Feelings are
‘vectors’; for they feel what is there and transform it into what
is here.” Or again, see II.3.v (M, p. 182; C, p. 119): “The
crude aboriginal character of direct perception is inheritance. What is
inherited is feeling-tone with evidence of its origin: in other words,
vector feeling-tone.” See also SMW, IX, p. 217: “Thus no
individual subject can have indepen-dent reality, since it is a
prehension of limited aspects of subjects other than itself.”
The primitive form of physical
experience is emotional—blind emotion—received as felt elsewhere in
another occasion and conformally appropriated as a subjective passion.
In the language appropriate to the higher stages of experience, the
primitive element is sym-pathy, that is, feeling the feeling
in another and feeling conformally with another.
PR,
II.7.iii (M, p. 246; C, p. 162).
This, of course, is only the first part of the story of
subjectivity. Its completion lies in the following subsections.
The subject, then, cannot be
conceived as an independent substance requiring nothing but itself in
order to exist and qualified by abstract universals (i.e., the mere
entertainment of sense-data). From the beginning the subject is
involved in dependent and constitutive relationships to the actual
objective world. In the dative phase of experience the subject begins
to arise from the activity of receiving the objective actual world into
itself. The subject is thus to be conceived as the product of its own
“constructive functioning”;
The full meaning of
this statement will not appear until we consider the later phases of
concrescence. But it is germane to the present topic of the initial
receptive phase of experience to point out that it is the foregoing
analysis of the initial phase and its relation to the subject that
causes Whitehead to invert Kant’s analysis, and yet pay him the highest
of compliments. See PR, II.6.v (M, p. 236; C, p. 156): “Thus for
Kant the process whereby there is experience is a process from
subjectivity to apparent objectivity. The philosophy of organism
inverts this analysis, and explains the process as proceeding from
objectivity to subjectivity, namely, from the objectivity, whereby the
external world is a datum, to the subjectivity, whereby there is one
individual experience. . . .
“We have come now to
Kant, the great philosopher who first, fully and explicitly, introduced
into philosophy the conception of an act of experience as a constructive
functioning, trans-forming subjectivity into objectivity, or objectivity
into subjectivity; the order is immaterial in comparison with the
general idea.”
but that functioning begins with the completely dependent activity of
accepting into itself the legacy of particular existents in its past
(i.e., the experience of other subjects objectified for it by
conformation of feeling). Only by such a revised understanding of the
subject can philosophy pay its due to the deliverance of our common
experience that the present, in a fundamental and unavoidable way, is
the child of the past.
This description of Whitehead’s
revised under-standing of the subject must await completion in the next
subsections. We have now seen, however, an important part of
Whitehead’s analysis of human subjectivity, and I must consider how he
generalizes this analysis into a metaphysical interpretation of reality.
Forward to
The Metaphysical
Hypothesis: The Theory of Concrescence, Initial Phase
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