Process, Insight, and Empirical Method
An
Argument for the Compatibility of the Philosophies of Alfred North
Whitehead and Bernard J. F. Lonergan and Its Implications for
Foundational Theology.
A
Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Divinity School, The
University of Chicago, for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
December 1983
Thomas Hosinski, C.S.C.
Chapter III:
The Influence of Empirical Method in Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s Analyses
of Human Subjectivity [Continued]
Whitehead’s Analysis
of Human Subjectivity [Continued]
Consciousness,
Rationality, and Knowing [Continued]
Intellectual Feelings
and Consciousness: Complex Comparative Feelings
A propositional feeling feels
contraries. Con-sciousness not only feels the contraries, but
iden-tifies them and so knows them for what they are. Consciousness is
the subjective form of a feeling that synthesizes propositional feelings
with physical, or conceptual feelings.
[PR, III.4.i (M, p. 391; C, p. 256).]
A simpler way of saying this is,
propositional feelings merely entertain theory, while consciousness
feels “the contrast of theory, as mere theory, with fact, as
mere fact.”
[PR, II.9.i (M,
p. 286; C, p. 188).]
Consciousness is thus the most primitive form of knowing because it is
the first subjective form of feeling which necessarily involves
judgment. This, I hope, will become more clear as my discussion
proceeds.
Consciousness is the subjective form
of an intel-lectual feeling. “In an intellectual feeling the datum is the
generic contrast between a nexus of actual enti-ties and a proposition
with its logical subjects mem-bers of the nexus.
[PR, III.5.ii (M, p. 407; C, p. 266).]
Consciousness not only feels but
also identifies the components of the datum generic contrast for what
they are. This generic contrast is what Whitehead refers to as “the
affirmation-negation contrast.
[See PR, III.2.iv (M, p. 372; C, p. 243); III.4.iii (M, p.
399; C, p. 261); III.5.ii (M, p. 407; C, pp. 266-267).]
Such a contrast is possible only when a synthetic feeling integrates
propositional feelings with physical feelings.
In awareness actuality, as a process
in fact, is integrated with the potentialities which illus-trate
either what it is and might not be, or what it is not and
might be. In other words, there is no consciousness without reference
to definiteness, affirmation, and negation. Also affirmation involves
its contrast with negation, and negation involves its contrast with
affir-mation. Further, affirmation and negation are alike meaningless
apart from reference to the de-finiteness of particular actualities.
Con-sciousness is how we feel the affirmation-negation contrast.
[PR, III.2.iv (M, p. 372; C, p. 243).]
Consciousness thus arises in the integration of pro-positional feelings
and physical feelings, and is awareness of the real difference between
the ele-ments of its datum. The datum of complex com-parative or
intellectual feelings is the contrast itself, presenting both what is
(by means of the physical prehensions in the integration) and what might
be (by means of the propositional feelings in the integration) with
respect to some aspect of the particular situation in which the
concrescing subject finds itself. The subjective form of the synthetic
feeling of this complex datum is consciousness, the awareness of the
contrast presented in the datum.
This contrast is what has been
termed the “affirmation-negation contrast.” It is the contrast between
the affirmation of objectified fact in the physical feeling, and the
mere potentiality, which is the negation of such affirmation, in the
propositional feeling. It is the contrast between “in fact” and
“might be,” in respect to particular instances in this
actual world. The subjective form of the feeling of this contrast is
consciousness.
[PR, III.5.ii (M, p. 407; C, p. 267).]
Intellectual feelings and their
subjective form of consciousness are thus a special type of
propo-sitional feelings, arising only when the affirmation-negation
contrast has entered into the subjective form of feeling. For example,
when we humans are awake, the affirmation-negation contrast continually
enters into the subjective form of our propositional feelings. We are
constantly judging what is, what is not, and what might be in the focal
area of attention illuminated by consciousness. When we are asleep,
however, or knocked unconscious by a blow or a drug, the
affirmation-negation contrast does not enter into the subjective form of
our propositional feelings. We are in an unconscious state, dreaming or
dreamless. Our presiding “ego” occasion in this unconscious state may
have propositional feelings, but the subjective form of those feelings
does not involve the affirmation-negation contrast. Our dreams, for
example, occur with feelings of complete realism; but only when we awake
can we consciously remember those feelings and determine that the
experience was in fact a dream. In the unconscious dream state there is
no true or false, no judgment; there is only the propositional feeling.
In the con-scious state, the propositional feeling is integrated with
physical feelings in the datum which presents the contrast of “in fact
is” and “might be.” Consciousness is the awareness of the judgment
implied by feeling that contrast in the datum.
The subjective form of the
propositional feeling will depend on circumstances . . . It may, or may
not, involve consciousness; it may, or may not, involve judgment . . . .
The subjective form will only involve conscious-ness when the
“affirmation-negation” contrast has entered into it. In other words,
con-sciousness enters into the subjective form of feelings, when those
feelings are components in an integral feeling whose datum is the
contrast between a nexus which is, and a proposition which in
its own nature negates the decision of its truth or falsehood.
The logical subjects of the proposition are the actual entities in the
nexus, as in contrast with imaginative freedom about it. The
conscious-ness may confer importance upon what the real thing is,
or upon what the imagination is, or upon both.
[PR, III.4.iii (M, p. 399; C, p. 261).]
Since consciousness is the subjective form of a synthetic feeling
integrating physical feelings with propositional feelings, this means
that awareness or consciousness always involves both conceptual and
non-conceptual elements. This is the case even for awareness of
concepts.
[See PR, III.2.iv (M, pp. 371-372; C, p. 243).]
Considered in relation to the phases of concrescence, then, an occasion
which is conscious always involves “some element of recollection. It
recalls earlier phases from the dim recesses of the unconscious. . . .
consciousness enlightens ex-perience which precedes it, and could be
without it if considered as a mere datum.”
[Ibid. (M, p. 370; C, p. 242).]
The reason this is important is that
it enables Whitehead to illustrate the ontological difference between a
concept and a percept.
[See Ibid. (M,
pp. 369-372; C, pp. 241-243).]
We have already seen that a pure conceptual feeling does not involve
consciousness, nor does the datum of the feeling involve any reference
to definite fact. A conceptual feeling feels an absolutely abstract
“universal” (an eternal object). A percept necessarily involves
reference to non-conceptual components in its datum. A conscious
percept and conscious aware-ness of a concept both necessarily involve
not only reference to non-conceptual components in the datum but also
necessarily involve the operation of judgment. In the rest of this
subsection I shall attempt to show why this is the case.
In any propositional feeling there
are two physical feelings involved. The first is what Whitehead calls
the “indicative feeling,” and the second is what he calls the “physical
recognition.”
[See PR, III.4.iii (M, p. 397; C, p. 260).] The “indicative feeling” is the
subject’s physical feeling of the entities in the nexus which includes
the logical subjects of the proposition. The “physical recognition” is
“a physical feeling involving a certain eternal object among the
determinants of the definiteness of its datum.”
[Ibid.] This is easiest to understand by
considering an instance of sense perception. Let us say that I am
gazing at a grey rock. According to Whitehead’s analysis there are at
least two physical feelings involved in my perception of the grey rock.
My presiding “ego” occasion is physically prehending the actual entities
constituting the nexus we call “a rock.” My presiding “ego” occasion is
also physically prehending the experience of my eyes. Among the
determinants of the definiteness of the datum contributed by my eyes is
a certain eternal object, which we call “grey.” The subject derives its
conceptual feeling of the eternal object from this second physical
feeling, the “physical recognition.” The conceptual prehension lifts
the eternal object “grey” into prominence. The subject may also
generate a conceptual feeling which is a reversion from this first
conceptual feeling, with a different eternal object as datum. In our
perceptual example, my presiding “ego” occasion may, for some reason,
lift into prominence the eternal object “white” instead of “grey.” In
either case, the conceptual feeling provides the “predicative pattern”
of the proposition, and “the physical recognition is the physical basis
of the conceptual feeling which provides the predicative pattern.”
[Ibid.]
The proposition is formed by the subject’s integration of the
predicative pattern with its physical feelings. For example, my
presiding “ego” occasion forms the proposition, “grey rock.”
For purposes of
simplicity I have ignored the transmutation whereby the predicate
belonging to the actual entities is applied to the nexus of perceived
entities, in this case the “corpuscular society” we call the “rock.”
Due to the possible relationships of
the two physical feelings, there are two main types of propositional
feelings. Whitehead calls these “perceptive feelings” and “imaginative
feelings.
[PR, III.4.iv
(M, pp. 399-400; C, pp. 261-262).]
This difference is founded on the
comparison between the “indicative feeling” from which the logical
subjects are derived, and the “physical recognition” from which the
predicative pattern is derived.
These physical feelings are either
identical or different. If they be one and the same feeling, the
derived propositional feeling is here called a “perceptive feeling.”
For in this case . . . the proposition predicates of its logical
subjects a character derived from the way in which they are physically
felt by that prehending subject.
If the physical feelings be
different, the derived propositional feeling is here called an
“imaginative feeling.” For in this case . . . the proposition
predicates of its logical subjects a character without any guarantee of
close relevance to the logical subjects.
[Ibid.]
There are three types of perceptive feelings, “authentic” perceptive
feelings of the “direct” and “indirect” sorts, and “unauthentic”
perceptive feelings.
[See Ibid. (M,
pp. 400-401; C, pp. 262-263).]
These types have to do with the source of the predicate compared to the
actual entities of the nexus which are the data of the “indicative”
physical feeling. If there is no reversion, that is, if the predicative
pattern is derived directly from the “physical recognition,” then the
propositional feeling is “authentic.” The predicate of this proposition
“is in some way realized in the real nexus of its logical subjects.”
[Ibid. (M, pp. 400-401; C, pp. 262).] This, however, does not mean that
the proposition must be true,
so far as concerns the way in which
it implicates the logical subjects with the predicate. For the primary
physical feeling of that nexus by the prehending subject may have
involved “transmutation.” . . . In this case the proposition ascribes to
its logical subjects the physical enjoyment of a nexus with the
definition of its predicate; whereas that predicate may have only been
enjoyed conceptually by these logical subjects. Thus, what the
proposition proposes as a physical fact in the nexus, was in truth only
a mental fact. Unless it is understood for what it is, error arises.
[Ibid., (M, p. 401; C, p.262)]
This is an “indirect authentic perceptive feeling.”
If, on the other hand, there is no
“transmutation,” “then the predicate of the proposition is that eternal
object which constitutes the definiteness of that nexus. In this case,
the proposition is, without qualification, true.” This is a “direct
authentic perceptive feeling.”
[Ibid.]
In the case of these “authentic” feelings, the predicate has realization
in the nexus, physically or ideally, apart from any reference to the
prehending subject.
[Ibid.]
If, in the third and last case, the
predicative pattern arises by “reversion” from the conceptual feeling
derived from the “physical recognition,” then the propositional feeling
is termed “unauthentic.”
In this case the predicate has in it
some elements which really contribute to the definiteness of the nexus;
but it has also some elements which contrast with corresponding elements
in the nexus. These latter elements have been introduced in the
concrescence of the prehending subject. The predicate is thus distorted
from the truth by the subjectivity of the prehending subject.
[Ibid. (M, p. 401; C, p. 263).]
Imaginative feelings arise when the indicative feeling and the physical
recognition are different. The degree of difference can range from one
extreme case in which two nexus, forming the data of the two feelings
respectively, are almost entirely different, to the other extreme case
in which they are almost identical. But in any case there is some
diversity in the feelings and thus some trace of free imagination.
The proposition which is the
objective datum of an imaginative feeling has a predicate derived, with
or without reversions, from a nexus which in some respects differs from
the nexus providing the logical subjects. Thus the proposition is felt
as an imaginative notion concerning its logical subjects.
[Ibid. (M, p.
402; C, p. 263).]
If the affirmation-negation contrast
and its correlative subjective form of consciousness enter into
propositional feelings, there is a further rein-tegration of feelings.
This results in two main types of ‘intellectual’ or conscious feelings,
corresponding to ‘perceptive’ and ‘imaginative’ feelings. Whitehead
calls these ‘conscious perceptions’ and ‘intuitive judgments,’
respectively.
[PR, III.5.i (M, p. 406; C, p. 266).]
“Conscious perceptions” are the
complex com-parative feelings arising from the integration of the prehending subject’s “perceptive feelings” with its original physical
feelings.
[PR, III.5.iv (M, p. 409; C, p. 268).]
Thus “conscious perceptions” fall into three types corresponding to the
three types of “perceptive feelings.” A “conscious direct authentic
perceptive feeling” “feels its logical subjects as potentially invested
with a predicate expressing an intrinsic character of the nexus which is
the initial datum of the physical feeling.”
[Ibid. (M, p. 410; C, p. 268).]
There is, in short, immediate
awareness of what the nexus really is.
The integration of the two factors
[origina-ting physical feeling and “perceptive” feeling] into the
conscious perception thus confronts the nexus as fact, with the
potentiality derived from itself, limited to itself, and exemplified in
itself. This confrontation is the generic con-trast which is the
objective datum of the integral feeling. The subjective form thus
assumes its vivid immediate consciousness of what the nexus really is in
the way of potentiality realized.
[Ibid. (M, p. 411; C, p. 269).]
A “conscious indirect authentic
perceptive feel-ing” is exactly the same, but with one important
qualification.
The qualification is that the
secondary con-ceptual feelings, entertained in the nexus by reason
of reversion . . . , have been trans-muted so as to be felt in the
“subject” (the final subject of the conscious perception) as if they had
been physical facts in the nexus.
[Ibid. (M, p. 410; C, pp. 268-269).]
It is this sort of authentic perceptive feeling that can introduce error
into conscious thought. It “can distort the character of the nexus felt
by transmuting felt concept into felt physical fact.”
[Ibid. (M, p. 410; C, p. 269).]
It is to be noted that
this is the same means by which novelty is introduced into the physical
world. Error in authentic perceptions and novelty in the actual world
have the same source; they “arise by conceptual functioning, according
to the Category of Reversion.” Ibid.
This is why, as we shall consider below, even physical feelings must be
criticized in the pursuit of truth. Even authentic perceptive feelings
can be erroneous and hence are dubitable. What is dubitable is not that
the perception has perceived some real frag-ment of the actual world.
Nor is consciousness res-ponsible for the possibility of error, since
the possible distortion originates below the level of conscious-ness.
Rather, the question is whether the physical datum of the conscious
perception is actually defined by the observed predicate.
“It is to be observed
that what is in doubt is not the immediate perception of a nexus which
is a fragment of the actual world. The dubitable element is the
definition of this nexus by the observed predicate.” Ibid. (M,
pp. 411-12; C, p. 270). See also III.4.v (M, pp. 402-403; C, p. 264).
Here we have the most primitive example in consciousness of the fallacy
of misplaced concreteness.
A “conscious unauthentic perceptive
feeling” arises when “the subject by its own process of rever-sion has
produced for the logical subjects a predicate which has no immediate
relevance to the nexus, either as physical fact or as conceptual
functioning in the nexus.”
[PR, III.5.iv
(M, p. 412; C, p. 270).]
This sort of conscious perception, Whitehead points out, is
“practically” the same as “an intuitive judgment in which there is
consciousness of a proposition as erroneous.”
[Ibid.]
“Intuitive judgments” are the
complex com-parative feelings arising from the integration of the prehending subject’s “imaginative feelings” with its original physical
feelings. “Intuitive judgments” also fall into three types:
affirmative, negative, and suspended.
[PR, III.5.v (M, pp. 412-413; C, pp. 270-271).]
In all three species of felt
contrast, the datum obtains its unity by reason of the objective
identity of the actual entities on both sides of the contrast. In the
“yes-form” [affirmative intuitive judgment] there is the further ground
of unity by reason of, the identity of the pattern of the objectified
nexus with the predicate. In the “no-form” [negative intuitive
judgment] this latter ground of unity is replaced by a contrast
involving incom-patible diversity. In the “suspense-form” [suspended
intuitive judgment] the predicate is neither identical, nor
incompatible, with the pattern. It is diverse from, and compatible
with, the pattern in the nexus as objectified: the nexus, and its own
“formal” existence, may or may not, in fact exemplify both the pattern
and the predicate.
[Ibid. (M, p. 413; C, pp. 270-271).]
An affirmative intuitive judgment
feels the coherence of the proposition involved in the imaginative
feeling with the nexus of actual entities involved in the indicative
feeling. This coherence occurs only when there is in the complex datum
of the intuitive judgment a single contrast between exemplification and
potentiality, applying both to the actual entities of the nexus and the
complex eternal object. That is, in the
generic contrast each actual entity
has its contrast of two-way functioning. One way is its functioning in
the exemplified pattern of the nexus, and the other way is its
functioning in the potential pattern of the proposition. If in
addition. . . . there be identity as to pattern and predicate, then . .
. there is also the single complex eternal object in its two-way
functioning, namely, as exemplified and as potential. In this case the
proposition coheres with the nexus and this coherence is its truth.
Thus “truth” is the absence of incompatibility of or any “material
contrast” in the patterns of the nexus and of the proposition in their
generic contrast. The sole contrast . . . is merely that between
exemplification and potentiality . . .
[Ibid . (Mt p. 414; Ct p. 271).]
A negative intuitive judgment feels
the presence of an incompatible contrast between the nexus and the
predicate. It feels that the two patterns—the exemplified pattern of
the nexus and the potential pattern of the proposition—are not identical
and are incompatible. “Then the proposition in some sense, important or
unimportant, is not felt as true.”
[Ibid. See
also ibid. (Mt pp. 415-416; C, p. 272).]
A suspended intuitive judgment
occurs when the predicate is felt to have a relation to the objectified
nexus precluding both affirmative and negative intuitive judgment. The
predicate is neither identical nor incompatible with the objectified
nexus. The suspended intuitive judgment “is the feeling of the contrast
between what the logical subjects evidently are, and what the
same subjects in addition may be. This suspended judgment is our
consciousness of the limitations involved in objectification.
[PR, III.5.vi
(M, p. 419; Ct p. 274). See also III.5.v (M, p. 416; C, p. 272).]
Let us consider now the relationship
between conscious perceptions and intuitive judgments. The reason both
are classed together as “intellectual feelings” is that they do not
differ so far as their general description is concerned. In both “the
comparative feeling is the integration of the physical feeling of a
nexus with a propositional feeling whose logical subjects are the actual
entities in the nexus.”
[PR, III.5.v
(M, p. 413; C, p. 271).]
They differ, however, in that intuitive judgments have a more complex
process of origination. Imaginative feelings, it will be recalled,
involve two different physical feelings. There are in this case two
distinct sets of actual entities prehended by the concrescing subject in
its physical feelings; the predicative pattern is derived from one, the
logical subjects from the other. In a perceptive feeling, in contrast,
the indicative feeling and physical recognition are prehensions of one
and the same set of actual entities. Thus in perceptive feelings and
conscious perceptions there is only one set of actual entities involved
in the origination of the propositional feeling: “a conscious perception
is the outcome of an originative process which has its closest possible
restriction to the fact, thus consciously perceived.”
[Ibid. (M, p.
415; C, p. 272).]
In imaginative feelings, on the other hand, one of the sets of actual
entities prehended “is finally eliminated in the process of
origination.”
[PR, III.5.vi
(M, p. 417; C, p. 273).]
Only one set remains as provid-ing the logical subjects of the
proposition; this is the set of actual entities prehended in the
“indicative” feeling. The predicative pattern was originally derived
from the other set of prehended actual entities (the physical
recognition). In the process of origination of the imaginative feeling,
this latter set of actual entities is eliminated from the concres-cence.
Despite this difference there is a
fundamental similarity between conscious perceptions and intuitive
judgments. The ground of that similarity is that both types of
intellectual feeling necessarily involve the operation of judgment. In
both types consciousness is the awareness of the judgment involved in
feeling the affirmation-negation contrast in the integration. The
conscious perception or the intuitive judgment is the integration;
consciousness is the subjective form of this integral feeling, grasping
the affirmation-negation contrast in the complex datum of the integral
feeling. This grasping of the contrast necessarily involves the
operation of judgment. The integral intellectual feeling would be
impossible without the operation of judgment, judging what is, what is
not, and what might be. Hence all intellectual feelings necessarily
involve judgment. The difference between conscious perceptions and
intuitive judgments is that the operation of judgment is more primitive
in conscious perceptions and more sophisticated in intuitive judgments
(because of their differing processes of origination which we have just
considered).
It is evident that an affirmative
intuitive judgment is very analogous to a conscious perception. A
conscious perception is a very simplified type of affirmative intuitive
judg-ment; and a direct affirmative intuitive judg-ment is a very
sophisticated case of conscious perception.
[Ibid.]
Consciousness is the subjective form
involved in feeling the contrast between the “theory” which may be
erroneous and the fact which is “given.” . . . Conscious perception is,
therefore, the most primitive form of judgment.
[PR, II.7.ii (M, p. 245; C, p. 162).]
Thus conscious perceptions and
intuitive judg-ments are fundamentally similar in that they both in-volve
judgment which relates conceptual functioning with the non-conceptual
experience of definite fact at the base of our awareness of nature. The
“triumph” of consciousness and the “peak” of mentality, Whitehead
observes,
comes with the negative intuitive
judgment. In this case there is a conscious feeling of what might be,
and is not. The feeling directly concerns the definite negative
prehensions enjoyed by its subject. It is the feeling of absence, and it
feels this absence as produced by the definite exclusiveness of what is
really present. Thus, the explicitness of negation, which is the
peculiar characteristic of consciousness, is here at its maximum.
PR, III.5.vi (M, p.
417-418; C, p. 273-274). See also I.i.ii (M, p. 7; C, p. S); this
observation on the importance of negative judgment is what underlies
Whitehead’s description of the general method of all discovery. See
Thesis, pp. 11-13. See also PR, II.7.ii (M, p. 245; C, p.
161).
Affirmative and negative intuitive
judgments, Whitehead notes, are comparatively rare. More frequent is
the occurrence of suspended intuitive judgments.
[PR, III.5.vi
(M, p. 418; C, p. 274).
The suspended intuitive judgment, we recall, is feeling the contrast
between what the logical subjects evidently are and what they may also
be. The predicate derived from the propositional feeling (the
“imaginative” predicate) does not in the synthetic feeling find identity
with the pattern of the objectified nexus, but neither does it find
incompatibility. The feeling of this contrast thus precludes both
affir-mative and negative intuitive judgment. Whitehead comments that
“this suspended judgment is our consciousness of the limitations
involved in objectification.”
[Ibid. (M p.
419; p 274).]
In the whole process of concrescence, the subject objectifies the actual
entities constituting the datum for feeling by means of only some or one
of their aspects. Objectification necessarily involves limitation; that
is, the actual entities of the datum are not being prehended in the
fulness of their “formal” constitution, but only by means of some
of their constitutive elements. There is limitation and abstraction
even in the simple “pure” prehensions. There is further abstraction and
limitation in the formation of physical purposes and propositional
feelings. Thus the suspended intuitive judgment actually gives the
subject the possibility of “information concerning the objectified
nexus, information that has been eliminated or omitted in earlier phases
of concrescence in both physical and conceptual prehensions. The
suspended judgment is thus a judgment of compatibility. “It is this
additional knowledge of the compatibility of what we imagine with what
we physically feel, that gives this information.”
Ibid. Hence the importance
of suspended judgments for progress in science. See ibid. (M,
p. 419; C, pp. 274-275).
It is important to note that the
suspended intuitive judgment is not a judgment of probability concerning
the truth-value of the proposition in relation to the logical subjects.
Such a judgment is a derivative or inferential judgment made in
abstrac-tion from the subject of the intuitive judgment, as I shall
discuss below. Instead, the intuitive suspended judgment is a judgment
of fact concerning the self-constitution of the judging subject, and it
is a judgment of compatibility.
The judgment tells us what may be
additional information respecting the formal constitu-tions of the
logical subjects, information which is neither included nor excluded by
our direct perception.
This is a judgment of fact
concerning ourselves.
[Ibid. (M, p.
419; C, pp. 274-275).]
Likewise affirmative and negative intuitive judg-ments function as
judgments of fact concerning the self-constitution of the judging
subject. The affirmative intuitive judgment affirms that the pre-dicate
is an element of our direct perception; the ne-gative intuitive judgment
affirms that it is not; the suspended intuitive judgment affirms that it
is neither included nor excluded by our direct per-ception.
Metaphysically, then, the main
function of intui-tive judgments and also of conscious perceptions has to
do with the concrescence of the judging subject. Specifically, it has
to do with the final modification of subjective aim. Conscious
perceptions and intuitive judgments are the simplest examples of the
ontological function of judgment and knowledge. They are the synthetic
feelings in which the operation of judgment elucidates and modifies the
unconscious processes which without judgment result in the unconscious
commitment of ourselves as subjects. Consciousness, in other words,
introduces critical ability into the concrescence of the subject.
Consciousness introduces precision, clarification, greater powers of
discrimination; it enables the subject to interpret, or respond to, its
experience more carefully. Judgment thus functions as a modification of
decision.
In unconsciousness, decisions are
made on the basis of valuation but without benefit of criticism. Appetition is blind. The subject commits itself to propositions by
decisions made without the benefit of judgment. In consciousness,
judgment appears as the means of criticizing decisions, as an important
way of modifying subjective aim. It is a way of valuating the
valuations underlying decisions. Consciousness and judgment are a way
of concentrating attention upon topics of importance and interest to the
conscious judging subject. In this way emotional intensity is
heightened, Importance is increased and the subject gains more control
over what it allows to lure its commitments. A subject commits itself
in its decisions regarding propositions. Propositions lure the subject
toward decision and commitment. Judgment is the critique of these
propositional lures, and it enables the decision to be strengthened or
weakened or changed entirely by reinforcing the final decision with
knowledge.
“The main function of
these [intellectual] feelings is to heighten the emotional intensity
accompanying the valuations in the conceptual feelings involved, and in
the mere physical purposes which are more primitive than any
intellectual feelings. They perform this function by the sharp-cut way
in which they limit abstract valuation to express possibilities relevant
to definite logical subjects. In so far as these logical subjects, by
reason of other prehen-sions, are topics of interest, the proposition
be-comes a lure for the conditioning of creative action. In other words,
its prehension effects a modification of the subjective aim.
“Intellectual
feelings, in their primary function, are concentration of attention
involving increase of importance. This concentration of attention also
introduces the criticism of physical purposes . . .” PR, III.5.v (M, p.
416; C, pp. 272-273). See also PR, II.9.ii (M, p. 294; C, p. 193): “A
judgment weakens or strengthens the decision whereby the judged
proposition, as a constituent in the lure, is admitted as an efficient
element in the concrescence, with the reinforcement of knowledge. A
judgment is the critique of a lure for feeling.”
The judgment may be correct or incorrect, the knowledge accurate or
mistaken, but it remains a real fact in the constitution of that subject
that this judgment has entered into and determined its
self-constitution.
“This judgment
affirms, correctly or incorrectly, a real fact in the constitution of
the judging subject. Here there is no room for any qualification of the
categorical character of the judgment. The judgment is made about
itself by the judging subject, and is a feeling in the constitution of
the judging subject.” PR, II.9.ii (M, p. 291; C, p. 191).
The reader will have noted that the
type of judgment I have been discussing is not the type of judgment with
which we are familiar in reflective thought. It is, instead, the type
of judgment involved in the data originating reflective thought. It
also bears a resemblance to the intuitive flash of insight I have
discussed in Chapters I and II, an act which grasps in a single moment
the problem and the solution. This is the act of discovery, filled with
emotion, necessary to progress in reflective thought but occurring at an
intuitive level. The important point to notice is that the judgment
involved in conscious perceptions and intuitive judgments is primarily
concerned with the self-constitution of the judging subject. It is only
when concern shifts from the self-constitution of the judging subject to
the truth-value of the proposition in abstraction from the judging
subject that we arrive at the level of reflective thought. We also
arrive at this level in the attempt to convert a suspended intuitive
judgment to belief or disbelief by means of inferential process. [See PR, III.5.v (M, p. 416; C, p. 272); vi (M, p. 418; C,
p. 274).]
Here, finally, we come to the type
of judgment of which human beings alone, so it appears, are capable.
Whitehead refers to this final type
of judgment as “inferential” or “derivative” judgment. It is
“deriva-tive” because any affirmation about the logical sub-jects of a
proposition made in abstraction from the judging subject “is obviously
‘affirmation’ in a sense derivative from the meaning of ‘affirmation’
about the judging subject. Identification of the two senses will lead to
error.”
[PR, II.9.ii
(M, p. 291; C, p. 191).]
In short, such judgment, with its concern not for the self-constitution
of the judging subject but for the truth-value of the proposition in
abstraction from the judging subject, transcends the subjectivist
principle.
“. . . there is
abstraction from the judging subject. The subjectivist principle has
been transcended, and the judgment has shifted its emphasis from the
objectified nexus to the truth-value of the proposition in question.”
Ibid. (M, pp. 291-292; C, pp. 191-192).
This is the self-transcendence of the human knower. Whitehead has
surprisingly little to say about derivative judgment.
The entire discussion
of derivative judgment is PR, II.9.ii (M, pp. 291-292; C, pp.
191-192).
I shall suggest why this is the case in the following subsection.
Before turning my attention to an
evaluation of Whitehead’s ontological approach to epistemological
issues, there are yet two points I must briefly men-tion. The first is
Whitehead’s description of his theory of judgment. His argument is
brief.
This judgment is concerned with a
conformity of two components within one experience. It is thus a
“coherence” theory. It is also con-cerned with the conformity of a
proposition, not restricted to that individual experience, with a nexus
whose relatedness is derived from the various experiences of its own
members and not from that of the judging experient. In this sense there
is a “corres-pondence” theory. But, at this point of the argument, a
distinction must be made. We shall say that a proposition can be
true or false, and that a judgment can be correct, or
incorrect, or suspended. With this distinction we see
that there is a “correspondence” theory of the truth and falsehood of
propositions, and a “coherence” theory of the correctness, incorrectness
and suspension of judgments.
[PR, II.9.ii
(M, pp. 290-291; C, p. 191).]
I shall point out the significance of this description in the third
major section of this chapter.
Finally, I must also note that it is
in the context of discussing propositions and judgments that White-head
offers his most detailed attempt to justify in-ductive inference. [PR, II.9.v-viii (M, pp. 303-316; C, pp. 199-207).]
To pursue his argument here would
take me too far afield from my concern. I shall return to this issue in
Chapter IV.
Now I must ask, What does
Whitehead’s ontological approach to epistemology accomplish?
Forward to
Knowing and Concrescence
[Forthcoming]
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