From
Fortune,
Vol. 29, No. 1, January 1944, 127-128, 139-140, 142, 144, 146, 148, 150,
152, 154.
Text under the title reads: “Man’s behavior, always odder than beasts’,
is now more dangerously odd than ever. Here a philosopher examines the
reasons why.”
On page 126 there is a collage illustrating her theme. The text of the
caption for it, set in the lower left corner of the first page of text
on page 127, reads: “Beasts go realistically about their own business
but man’s head is ever full of notions, expressed in all manner of
symbols. He personifies the sun and moon. He scratches out lines and
triangles representing men and hills. He evolves the compound symbolism
of language and invents the legend of the Tower of Babel to explain the
confusion of tongues. He contemplates his own birth and death, and sees
in the elements a mirror of his own feelings. These activities of man’s
mind are suggested in the collage at the left. In the article beginning
on this page, Susanne K. Langer sketches the process by which man’s gift
for symbol making has led him to his present powers and perplexities.
She sees men struggling with adaptations of old tribal symbols and in
search of symbols adequate for a world community. Mrs. Langer, author
of Philosophy in a New Key, taught for many years at Radcliffe.
At present she is engaged in developing a course in philosophy and logic
as a part of basic general education.”
Posted July 8, 2008
Anthony Flood
The Lord of Creation
Susanne K. Langer
The world is aflame with man-made public disasters, artificial
rains of brimstone and fire, planned earthquakes, cleverly staged
famines and floods. The Lord of Creation is destroying himself. He is
throwing down the cities he has built, the works of his own hand, the
wealth of many thousand years in his frenzy of destruction, as a child
knocks down its own handiwork, the whole days’ achievement, in a tantrum
of tears and rage.
What has displeased the royal child? What has incurred his
world-shattering tantrum?
The bafflement of the magnificent game he is playing. Its rules
and its symbols, his divine toys, have taken possession of the player.
For this global war is not the old, hard, personal fight for the means
of life, bellum omnium contra omnes, which animals perpetually
wage; this is a war of monsters. Not mere men but great superpersonal
giants, the national states, are met in combat. They do not hate and
attack and wrestle as injured physical creatures do; they move heavily,
inexorably, by strategy and necessity, to each other’s destruction. The
game of national states has come to this pass, and the desperate players
ride their careening animated toys to a furious suicide.
They are symbols of the new way of life, which the past two
centuries have given us. For thousands of years, the pattern of daily
life—working, praying, building, fighting, and raising new
generations—repeated itself with only slow or unessential changes. The
social symbols expressive of this life were ancient and familiar.
Tribal gods or local saints, patriarchs, squires, or feudal lords,
princes and bishops, raised to the highest power in the persons of
emperors and popes—they were all expressions of needs and duties and
opinions grounded in an immemorial way of life. The average man’s
horizon was not much greater than his valley, his town, or whatever
geographical ramparts bounded his community. Economic areas were small,
and economic problems essentially local. Naturally in his conception
the powers governing the world were local, patriarchal, and reverently
familiar.
Then suddenly, within some two hundred years, and for many places
far less than that, the whole world has been transformed. Communities
of different tongues and faiths and physiognomies have mingled; not as
of old in wars of conquest, invading lords and conquered population
gradually mixing their two stocks, but by a new process of foot-loose
travel and trade, dominated by great centers of activity that bring
individuals from near and far promiscuously together as a magnet draws
filings from many heaps into close but quite accidental contact.
Technology has made old horizons meaningless and localities indefinite.
For goods and their destinies determine the structure of human
societies. This is a new world, a world of persons, not of families and
clans, or parishes and manors. The proletarian order is not founded on
a hearth and its history. It does not express itself in a dialect, a
local costume, a rite, a patron saint. All such traditions by mingling
have canceled each other, and disappeared.
Most of us feel that since the old controlling ideas of faith and
custom are gone, mankind is left without anchorage of any sort. None of
the old social symbols fit this modern reality, this shrunken and
undifferentiated world in which we lead a purely economic, secular,
essentially homeless life.
But mankind is never without its social symbols; when old ones die,
new ones are already in process of birth; and the new gods that have
superseded all faiths are the great national states. The conception of
them is mystical and moral, personal and devotional; they conjure with
names and emblems, and demand our constant profession and practice of
the new orthodoxy called “Patriotism.”
The Paradox of Reason and Folly
Of all born creatures, man is the only one that cannot live by
bread alone. He lives as much by symbols as by sense report, in a realm
compounded of tangible things and virtual images, of actual events and
ominous portents, always between fact and fiction. For he sees not only
actualities but meanings. He has, indeed, all the impulses and
interests of animal nature; he eats, sleeps, mates, seeks comfort and
safety, flees pain, falls sick and dies, just as cats and bears and
fishes and butterflies do. But he has something more in his repertoire,
too—he has laws and religions, theories and dogmas, because he lives not
only through sense but through symbols. That is the special asset of
his mind, which makes him the master of earth and all its progeny.
By the agency of symbols—marks, words, mental images, and icons of
all sorts—he can hold his ideas for contemplation long after their
original causes have passed away. Therefore, he can think of things
that are not presented or even suggested by his actual environment. By
associating symbols in his mind, he combines things and events that were
never together in the real world. This gives him the power we call
imagination. Further, he can symbolize only part of an idea and let the
rest go out of his consciousness; this gives him the faculty that has
been his pride throughout the ages—the power of abstraction. The
combined effect of these two powers is inestimable. They are the roots
of his supreme talent, the gift of reason.
In the war of each against all, which is the course of nature, man
has an unfair advantage over his animal brethren; for he can see what is
not yet there to be seen, know events that happened before his birth,
and take possession of more than he actually eats; he can kill at a
distance; and by rational design he can enslave other creatures to live
and act for him instead of for themselves.
Yet this mastermind has strange aberrations. For in the whole
animal kingdom there is no such unreason, no such folly and
impracticality as man displays. He alone is hounded by imaginary fears,
beset by ghosts and devils, frightened by mere images of things. No
other creature wastes time in unprofitable ritual or builds nests for
dead specimens of its race. Animals are always realists. They have
intelligence in varying degrees—chickens are stupid, elephants are said
to be very clever—but, bright or foolish, animals react only to
reality. They may be fooled by appearance, by pictures or reflections,
but once they know them as such, they promptly lose interest. Distance
and darkness and silence are not fearful to them, filled with voices or
forms, or invisible presences. Sheep in the pasture do not seem to fear
phantom sheep beyond the fence, and mice don’t look for mice goblins in
the clock, birds do not worship a divine thunderbird.
But oddly enough, men do. They think of all these things and guard
against them, worshiping animals and monsters even before they conceive
of divinities in their own image. Men are essentially unrealistic.
With all their extraordinary intelligence, they alone go in for
patently impractical actions—magic and exorcisms and holocausts—rites
that have no connection with common-sense methods of self-preservation,
such as a highly intelligent animal might use. In fact, the rites and
sacrifices by which primitive man claims to control nature are sometimes
fatal to the performers. Indian puberty rites are almost always
intensely painful, and African natives have sometimes died during
initiations into honorary societies.
We usually assume that very primitive tribes of men are closer to
animal estate than highly civilized races; but in respect of practical
attitudes, this is not true. The more primitive man’s mind, the more
fantastic it seems to be; only with high intellectual disciplines do we
gradually approach the realistic outlook of intelligent animals.
Yet this human mind, so beclouded by phantoms and superstitions, is
probably the only mind on earth that can reach out to an awareness of
things beyond its practical environment and can also conceive of such
notions as truth, beauty, justice, majesty, space and time and creation.
The Paradox of Morality and Cruelty
There is another paradox in man’s relationship with other
creatures: namely, that those very qualities he calls animality—”brutal,”
“bestial,” “inhuman”—are peculiarly his own. No other animal is so
deliberately cruel as man. No other creature intentionally imprisons
its own kind, or invents special instruments of torture such as racks
and thumbscrews for the sole purpose of punishment. No other animal
keeps his own brethren in slavery; so far as we know, the lower animals
do not commit anything like the acts of pure sadism that figure rather
largely in our newspapers. There is no torment, spite, or cruelty for
its own sake among beasts, as there is among men. A cat plays with its
prey, but does not conquer and torture smaller cats. But man, who knows
good and evil, is cruel for cruelty’s sake; he who has a moral law is
more brutal than the brutes, who have none; he alone inflicts suffering
on his fellows with malice aforethought.
The Great Projector
The answer is, I think, that man’s mind is not a direct
evolution from the beast’s mind, but is a unique variant and therefore
has had a meteoric and startling career very different from any other
animal history. The trait that sets human mentality apart from every
other is its preoccupation with symbols, with images that mean
things, rather than with things themselves. This trait may have been a
mere sport of nature once upon a time. Certain creatures do develop
traits and interests that seem biologically unimportant. Pack rats, for
instance, and some birds of the crow family take a capacious pleasure in
bright objects and carry away such things for which they have,
presumably, no earthly use. Perhaps man’s tendency to see certain forms
as images, to hear certain sounds not only as signals but as
expressive tones, and to be excited by sunset colors or starlight, was
originally just a peculiar sensitivity in a rather highly developed
brain. But whatever its cause, the ultimate destiny of this trait was
momentous, for all human activity is based on the appreciation and use
of symbols. Language, religion, mathematics, all learning, science and
superstition, even right and wrong, are products of symbolic expression
rather than direct experience. Our commonest words, such as “house” and
“red” and “walking,” are symbols; the pyramids of Egypt and the
mysterious circle of Stonehenge are symbols; so are dominions and
empires and astronomical universes. We live in a mind-made world, where
the things of prime importance are images or worlds that embody ideas
and feelings and attitudes.
The animal mind is like a telephone exchange; it receives stimuli
from outside through the sense organs and sends the appropriate
responses through the nerves that govern muscles, glands, and other
parts of the body. The organism is constantly interacting with its
surroundings, receiving messages reacting on the new state of affairs
that the messages signify.
But the human mind is not a simply transmitter like a telephone
exchange. It is more like a great projector; for instead of merely
mediating between an event in the outer world and a creature’s
responsive action, it transforms or, if you will, distorts the event
into an image to be looked at, retained, and contemplated. For the
images of things that we remember are not exact and faithful
transcriptions even of our actual sense impressions. They are made as
much by what we think as by what we see. It is a well-known fact that
if you ask several people the size of the moon’s disk as they look at
it, their estimates will vary from the area of a dime to that of a
barrel top. Like a magic lantern, the mind projects its ideas of things
on the screen of what we call “memory”; but like all projections, these
ideas are transformations of actual things. They are, if fact,
symbols of reality, not pieces of it.
Signs and Symbols
A symbol is not the same thing as a sign; that is a fact that
psychologists and philosophers often overlook. All intelligent animals
use signs; so do we. To them as well as to us sounds and smells and
motions are signs of food, danger, the presence of other beings, or of
rain or storm. Furthermore, some animals not only attend to signs but
produce them for the benefit of others. Dogs bark at the door to be let
in; rabbits thump to call each other; the cooing of doves and the growl
of a wolf defending his kill are unequivocal signs of feelings and
intentions to be reckoned with by other creatures.
We use signs just as animals do, though with considerably more
elaboration. We stop at red lights and go on green; we answer calls and
bells, watch the sky for coming storms, read trouble or promise or anger
in each other’s eyes. That is animal intelligence raised to the human
level. Those of us who are dog lovers can probably all tell wonderful
stories of how high or dogs have sometimes risen in the scale of clever
sign interpretation and sign using.
A sign is anything that announces the existence or the imminence of
some event, the presence of a thing or a person, or a change in a state
of affairs. There are signs of the weather, signs of danger, signs of
future good or evil, signs of what the past has been. In every case a
sign is closely bound up with something to be noted or expected in
experience. It is always a part of the situation to which it refers,
though the reference may be remote in space and time. In so far as we
are led to note or expect the signified event we are making correct use
of a sign. This is the essence of rational behavior, which animals show
in varying degrees. It is entirely realistic, being closely bound up
with the actual objective course of history—learned by experience, and
cashed in or voided by further experience.
If man had kept to the straight and narrow path of sign using, he
would be like the other animals, though perhaps a little brighter. He
would not talk, but grunt and gesticulate and point. He would make his
wishes known, give warnings, perhaps develop a social system like that
of bees and ants, with such a wonderful efficiency of communal
enterprise that all men would have plenty to eat, warm apartments—all
exactly alike and perfectly convenient—to live in, and everybody could
and would sit in the sun or by the fir, as the climate demanded, not
talking but just basking, with every want satisfied, most of his life.
The young would romp and make love, the old sleep, the middle-aged would
do the routine work almost unconsciously and eat a great deal. But that
would be the life of a social, superintelligent, purely sign-using
animal.
To us who are human, it does not sound very glorious. We want to
go places and do things, own all sorts of gadgets that we do not
absolutely need, and when we sit downto take it easy we want to talk.
Rights and property, social position, special talents and virtues, and
above all our ideas, are what we live for. We have gone off on a
tangent that takes us far away from the mere biological cycle that
animal generations accomplish; and that is because we can use not only
signs but symbols.
A symbol differs from a sign in that it does not announce the
presence of the object, the being, condition, or whatnot, which is its
meaning, but merely brings this thing to mind. It is not a mere
“substitute sign” to which we react as though it were the object itself.
The fact is that our reaction to hearing a person’s name is quite
different from our reaction to the person himself. There are certain
rare cases where a symbol stands directly for its meaning: in religious
experience, for instance, the Host is not only a symbol but a Presence.
But symbols in the ordinary sense are not mystic. They are the same
sort of thing that ordinary signs are; only they do not call our
attention to something necessarily present or to be physically dealt
with—they call up merely a conception of the thing they “mean.”
The difference between a sign and a symbol is, in brief, that a
sign causes us to think or act in face of the thing signified,
whereas a symbol causes us to think about the thing symbolized.
Therein lies the great importance of symbolism human life, its power to
make this life so different from any other animal biography that
generations of men have found it incredible to suppose that they were of
purely zoological origin. A sign is always embedded in reality, in a
present that emerges from the actual past and stretches to the future:
but a symbol may be divorced from reality altogether. It may refer to
what is not the case, to a mere idea, a figment, a dream. It
serves, therefore, to liberate thought from the immediate stimuli of a
physically present world; and that liberation marks the essential
difference between human and nonhuman mentality. Animals think, but
they think of and at things; men think primarily about
things. Words, pictures, and memory images are symbols may be combined
and varied in a thousand ways. The result is a symbolic structure whose
meaning is a complex of all their respective meanings, and this
kaleidoscope of ideas is the typical product of the human brain that we
call the “stream of thought.”
The Need of Symbolic Expression
The process of transforming all direct experience into imagery or
into that supreme mode of symbolic expression, language, has so
completely taken possession of the human mind that it is not only a
special talent but a dominant, organic need. All our sense impressions
leave their traces in our memory not only as signs disposing our
practical reactions in the future but also as symbols, images
representing our ideas of things; and the tendency to manipulate
ideas, to combine and abstract, mix and extend them by playing with
symbols, is man’s outstanding characteristic. It seems to be what his
brain most naturally and spontaneously does. Therefore his primitive
mental function is not judging reality, but dreaming his desires.
Dreaming is apparently a basic function of human brains, for it is
free and unexhausting like our metabolism, heartbeat, and breath. It is
easier to dream than not to dream, as it is easier to breathe than to
refrain from breathing. The symbolic character of dreams is fairly well
established. Symbol mongering, on this ineffectual, uncritical level,
seems to be instinctive, the fulfillment of an elementary need rather
than the purposeful exercise of a high and difficult talent.
The special power of man’s mind rests on the evolution of this
special activity, not on any transcendently high development of animal
intelligence. We are not immeasurably higher than other animals; we are
different. We have a biological need and with it a biological gift that
they do not share.
Because man has not only the ability but the constant need of
conceiving what has happened to him, what surrounds him, what is
demanded of him—in short, of symbolizing nature, himself, and his hopes
and fears—he has a constant and crying need of expression. What
he cannot express, he cannot conceive; what he cannot conceive is chaos,
and fills him with terror.
If we bear in mind this all-important craving for expression we get
a new picture of man’s behavior; for from this trait spring his powers
and his weaknesses. The process of symbolic transformation that all our
experiences undergo is nothing more nor less than the process of
conception, which underlies the human faculties of abstraction and
imagination.
When we are faced with a strange or difficult situation, we cannot
react directly, as other creatures do, with flight, aggression, or any
such simple instinctive pattern. Our whole reaction depends on how we
manage to conceive the situation—whether we cast it in a definite
dramatic form, whether we see it as a disaster, a challenge, a
fulfillment of doom, or a fiat of the Divine Will. In words or
dreamlike images, in artistic or religious or even in cynical form, we
must construe the events of life. There is great virtue in the
figure of speech, “I can make nothing of it,” to express a failure to
understand something. Thought and memory are processes of making
the thought content and the memory image; the pattern of our ideas is
given by the symbols through which we express them. And in the course
of manipulating those symbols we inevitably distort the original
experience, as we abstract certain features of it, embroider and
reinforce those features with other ideas, until the conception we
project on the screen of memory is quite different from anything in our
real history.
Conception is a necessary and elementary process; what we do with
our conceptions is another story. That is the entire history of human
culture—of intelligence and morality, folly and superstition, ritual,
language, and the arts—all the phenomena that set man apart from, and
above, the rest of the animal kingdom. As the religious mind has to
make all human history a drama of sin and salvation in order to define
its own moral attitudes, so a scientist wrestles with the mere
presentation of “the facts” before he can reason about them. The
process of envisaging facts, values, hopes, and fears underlies
our whole behavior pattern; and this process is reflected in the
evolution of an extraordinary phenomenon found always, and only, in
human societies—the phenomenon of language.
The Language Line
Language is the highest and most amazing achievement of the
symbolistic human mind. The power it bestows is almost inestimable, for
without it anything properly called “thought” is impossible. The birth
of language is the dawn of humanity. The line between man and
beast—between the highest ape and the lowest savage—is the language
line. Whether the primitive Neanderthal man was anthropoid or human
depends less on his cranial capacity, his upright posture, or even his
use of tools and fire, than on one issue we shall probably never be able
to settle—whether or not he spoke.
In all physical traits and practical responses, such as skills and
visual judgments, we can find a certain continuity between animal and
human mentality. Sign using is an ever evolving, ever improving
function throughout the whole animal kingdom, from the lowly worm that
shrinks into his hole at the sound of an approaching foot, to the dog
obeying his master’s command, and even to the learned scientist who
watches the movements of an index needle.
This continuity of the sign-using talent has led psychologists to
the belief that language is evolved from the vocal expressions, grunts
and coos and cries, whereby animals vent their feelings or signal their
fellows; that man has elaborated this sort of communion to the point
where it makes a perfect exchange of ideas possible.
I do not believe that this doctrine of the origin of language is
correct. The essence of language is symbolic, not signific: we use it
first and most vitally to formulate and hold ideas in our own minds.
Conception, not social control, is its first and foremost benefit.
Watch a young child that is just learning to speak play with a toy;
he says the name of the object, e.g.: “Horsey! horsey! horsey!” over and
over again, looks at the object, moves it, always saying the name to
himself or to the world at large. It is quite a time before he talks to
anyone in particular; he talks first of all to himself. This is his way
of forming and fixing the conception of the object in his mind,
and around this conception all his knowledge of it grows. Names
are the essence of language; for the name is what abstracts the
conception of the horse from the horse itself, and lets the mere idea
recur at the speaking of the name. This permits the conception gathered
from one horse experience to be exemplified again by another instance of
a horse, so that the notion embodied in the name is a general notion.
To this end, the baby uses a word long before he asks for
the object; when he wants his horsey he is likely to cry and fret,
because he is reacting to an actual environment, not forming ideas. He
uses the animal language of signs for his wants; talking is still
a purely symbolic process—its practical value has not really impressed
him yet.
Language need not be vocal; it may be purely visual, like written
language, or even tactual, like the deaf-mute system of speech; but it
must be denotative. The sounds, intended or unintended, whereby
animals communicate do not constitute a language, because they are
signs, not names. They never fall into an organic pattern, a meaningful
syntax of even the most rudimentary sort, as all language seems to do
with a sort of driving necessity. That is because signs refer to actual
situations, in which things have obvious relations to each other that
require only to be noted; but symbols refer to ideas, which are not
physically there for inspection, so their connections and features have
to be represented. This gives all true language a natural tendency
toward growth and development, which seems almost like a life of its
own. Languages are not invented; they grow with our need for
expression.
In contrast, animal “speech” never has a structure. It is merely
an emotional response. Apes may greet their ration of yams with a shout
of “‘Nga” But they do not ‘‘Nga’’ between meals. If they could talk
about their yams instead of just saluting them, they would be the
most primitive men instead of the most anthropoid of beasts. They would
have ideas, and tell each other things true or false, rational or
irrational; they would make plans and invent laws and sing their own
praises, as men do.
Articulate Forms
The history of speech is the history of our human descent. Yet
the habit of transforming reality into symbols, of contemplating and
combining and distorting symbols, goes beyond the confines of language.
All images are symbols, which make us think about the things
they mean.
This is the source of man’s great interest in “graven images,” and
in mere appearances like the face of the moon or the human
profiles he sees in rocks and trees. There is no limit to the meanings
he can read into natural phenomena. As long as this power is
undisciplined, the sheer enjoyment of finding meanings in everything,
the elaboration of concepts without any regard to truth and usefulness,
seems to run riot; superstition and ritual in their pristine strength go
through what some anthropologists have called a “vegetative” stage, when
dreamlike symbols, gods and ghouls and rites, multiply like the
overgrown masses of life in a jungle. From this welter of symbolic
forms emerge the images that finally govern a civilization; the great
symbols of religion, society, and selfhood.
What does an image “mean?” Anything it is thought to resemble. It
is only because we can abstract quite unobvious forms from the actual
appearance of things that we see in drawings in two dimensions as images
of colored, three-dimensional objects, find the likeness of a dipper in
a constellation of seven stars, or see a face on a pansy. Any circle
may represent the sun or moon; an upright monolith may be a man.
Wherever we can fancy a similarity we tend to see something
represented. The first thing we do, upon seeing a new shape is to
assimilate it to our own idea of something that it resembles, something
that is known and important to us. Our most elementary concepts are of
our own actions, and the limbs or organs that perform them; other things
are named by comparison with them. The opening of a cave is its mouth,
the divisions of a river its arms. Language, and with it all articulate
thought, grows by this process of unconscious metaphor. Every new idea
urgently demands a word; if we lack a name for it, we call it after the
first namable thing seen to bear even a remote analogy to it. Thus all
the subtle and variegated vocabulary of a living language grows up from
a few roots of very general application; words as various in meaning as
“gentle” and “ingenious” and “general” spring from the one root “ge”
meaning “to give life.”
Yet there are conceptions that language is, constitutionally unfit
to express. The reason for this limitation of our verbal powers is a
subject for logicians and need not concern us here. The point of
interest to us is that, just as rational, discursive thought is bound up
with language, so the life of feeling, or direct personal and social
consciousness, the emotional stability of man and his sense of
orientation in the world are bound up with images directly given to his
senses: fire and water, noise and silence, high mountains and deep
caverns, the brief beauty of flowers, the persistent grin of a skull.
There seem to be irresistible parallels between the expressive forms we
find in nature and the forms of our inner life; thus the use of light to
represent all things good, joyful, comforting, and of darkness to
express all sorts of sorrow, despair, or horror, is so primitive as to
be well-nigh unconscious.
A flame is a soul; a star is a hope; the silence of winter is
death. All such images, which serve the purpose of metaphorical
thinking, are natural symbols. They have not conventionally
assigned meanings, like words, but recommend themselves even to a
perfectly untutored mind, a child’s or a savage’s, because they are
definitely articulated forms, and to see something expressed in such
forms is a universal human talent. We do not have to learn to use
natural symbols; it is one of our primitive activities.
The fact that sensuous forms of natural processes have a
significance beyond themselves makes the range of our symbolism, and
with it the horizon of our consciousness, much wider and deeper than
language. This is the source of ritual, mythology, and art. Ritual is
a symbolic rendering of certain emotional attitudes, which have become
articulate and fixed by being constantly expressed. Mythology is man’s
image of his world, and of himself in the world. Art is the exposition
of his own subjective history, the life of feeling, the human spirit in
all its adventures.
Vision and Legacy
Yet this power of envisagement, which natural symbolism bestows, is
a dangerous one; for human beings can envisage things that do not exist,
and create horrible worlds, insupportable duties, monstrous gods and
ancestors. The mind that can see past and future, the poles and the
antipodes, and guess at obscure mechanisms of nature, is ever in danger
of seeing what is not there, imagining false and fantastic causes, and
courting death instead of life. Because man can play with ideas, he is
unrealistic; he is inclined to neglect the all-important interpretation
of signs for a rapt contemplation of symbols.
Some twenty years ago, Ernst Cassirer set forth a theory of human
mentality that goes far toward explaining the vagaries of savage
religions and the ineradicable presence of superstition even in
civilized societies: a symbol, he observed, is the embodiment of an
idea; it is at once an abstract and a physical fact. Now its great
emotive value lies in the concept it conveys; this inspires our reverent
attitude, the attention and awe with which we view it. But man’s
untutored thought always tends to lose its way between the symbol and
the fact. A skull represents death; but to a primitive mind the skull
is death. To have it in the house is not unpleasant but
dangerous. Even in civilized societies, symbolic objects—figures of
saints, relics, crucifixes—are revered for their supposed efficacy.
Their actual power is a power of expression, of embodying and
thus revealing the greatest concepts humanity has reached; these
concepts are the commanding forces that change our estate from a brute
existence to the transcendent life of the spirit. But the symbol-loving
mind of man reveres the meaning not through the articulating form
but in the form so that the image appears to be the actual object
of love and fear, supplication and praise.
Because of this constant identification of concepts with their
expressions, our world is crowded with unreal beings. Some societies
have actually realized that these beings do not belong to nature, and
have postulated a so-called “other world” where they have their normal
existence and from which they are said to descend, or arise, into our
physical realm. For savages it is chiefly a nether world that sends up
spooks; for more advanced cults it is from the heavens that supernatural
beings, the embodiments of human ideas—of virtue, triumph,
immortality—descend to the mundane realm. But from this source emanates
also a terrible world government, with heavy commands and sanctions.
Strange worship and horrible sacrifices may be the tithes exacted by
the beings that embody our knowledge of nonanimalian human nature.
So the gift of symbolism, which is the gift of reason, is at the
same time the seat of man’s peculiar weakness—the danger of lunacy.
Animals go mad with hydrophobia or head injuries, but purely mental
aberrations are rare; beasts are not generally subject to insanity
except through a confusion of signs, such as the experimentally produced
“nervous breakdown” in rats. It is man who hears voices and sees ghosts
in the dark, feels irrational compulsions and holds fixed ideas. All
these phantasms are symbolic forms that have acquired a false factual
status. It has been truly said that everybody has some streak of
insanity; i.e., the threat of madness is the price of reason.
Knowledge and Tyranny
Because we can think of things potential as well as actual, we can
be held in nonphysical bondage by laws and prohibitions and commands and
by images of a governing power. This makes men tyrants over their own
kind. Animals control each other’s actions by immediate threats, growls
and snarls and passes; but when the bully is roving elsewhere, his
former domain is free of him. We control our inferiors by setting up
symbols of our power, and the mere idea that words or images convey
stands there to hold our fellows in subjection even when we cannot lay
our hands on them. There is no flag over the country where a wolf is
king; he is king where he happens to prowl, so long as he is there. But
men, who can embody ideas and set them up to view, oppress each other by
symbols of might.
The envisagements of good and evil, which make man a moral agent,
make him also a conscript, a prisoner, and a slave. His constant
problem is to escape the tyrannies he has created. Primitive societies
are almost entirely tyrannical, symbol-bound, coercive organizations;
civilized governments are so many conscious schemes to justify or else
to disguise man’s inevitable bondage to law and conscience.
The Great Symbols
Slowly, through ages and centuries, we have evolved a picture of
the world we live in; we have made a drama of the earth’s history and
enhanced it with a backdrop of divinely ordered, star-filled space. And
all this structure of infinity and eternity against which we watch the
pageant of life and death, and all the moral melodrama itself, we have
wrought by a gradual articulation of such vast ideas in symbols—symbols
of good and evil, triumph and failure, birth and maturity and death.
Long before the beginning of any known history, people saw in the
heavenly bodies, in the changes of day and night or of the seasons, and
in great beasts, symbolic forms to express those ultimate concepts that
are the very frame of human existence. So gods, fates, the cohorts of
good and evil were conceived. Their myths were the first formulations
of cosmic ideas. Gradually the figures and traditions of religion
emerged; ritual, the overt expression of our mental attitudes, became
more and more intimately bound to definite and elaborate concepts of the
creative and destructive powers that seem to control our lives.
Such beings and stories and rites are sacred because they are the
great symbols by which the human mind orients itself in the world. To a
creature that lives by reason, nothing is more terrible than what is
formless and meaningless; one of our primary fears is fear of chaos.
And it is the fight against chaos that has produced our most profound
and indispensable images –the myths of light and darkness, of creation
and passion, the symbols of the altar flame, the daystar, and the cross.
For thousands of years people lived by the symbols that nature
presented to them. Close contact with earth and its seasons, intimate
knowledge of stars and tides, made them feel the significance of natural
phenomena and gave them a poetic, unquestioning sense of orientation.
Generations of erudite and pious men elaborated the picture of the
temporal and spiritual realms in which each individual was a pilgrim
soul.
Then came the unprecedented change, the almost instantaneous leap
of history from the immemorial tradition of the plow and the anvil to
the new age of the machine, the factory, and the ticker tape. Often in
no more than the length of a lifetime the shift from handwork to mass
production, and with it from poetry to science and from faith to
nihilism, has taken place. The old nature symbols have become remote and
have lost their meanings; in the clatter of gears and the confusion of
gadgets that fill the new world, there will not be any obvious and rich
and sacred meanings for centuries to come. All the accumulated creeds
and rites of men are suddenly in the melting pot. There is no fixed
community, no dynasty, no family inheritance—only the one huge world of
men, vast millions of men, still looking on each other in hostile
amazement.
A sane, intelligent animal should have invented, in the course of
ten thousand years or more, some sure and obvious way of accommodating
indefinite numbers of its own kind on the face of a fairly spacious
earth. Modern civilization has achieved the highest triumphs of
knowledge, skill, ingenuity, theory; yet all around its citadels,
engulfing and demolishing them, rages the maddest war and confusion,
inspired by symbols and slogans as riotous and irrational as anything
the “vegetative” stage of savage phantasy could provide. How shall we
reconcile this primitive nightmare excitement with the achievements of
our high, rational, scientific culture?
The answer is, I think, that we are no longer in possession of a
definite, established culture; we live in a period between an exhausted
age—the European civilization of the white race—and an age still unborn,
of which we can say nothing as yet. We do not know what races shall
inherit the earth. We do not know what even the next few centuries may
bring. But it is quite evident, I think, that we live in an age of
transition, and that before many more generations have passed, mankind
will make a new beginning and build itself a different world. Whether
it will be a “brave, new world,” or whether it will start all over with
an unchronicled “state of nature” such as Thomas Hobbes described,
wherein the individual’s life is “nasty, brutish, and short,” we simply
cannot tell. All we know is that every tradition, every institution,
every tribe is gradually becoming uprooted and upset, and we are waiting
in a sort of theatrical darkness between the acts.
Because we are at a new beginning, our imaginations tend to a wild,
“vegetative” overgrowth. The political upheavals of our time are
marked, therefore, by a veritable devil dance of mystical ideologies,
vaguely conceived, passionately declared, holding out fanatic hopes of
mass redemption and mass beatitudes. Governments vie with each other in
proclaiming social plans, social aims, social enterprises, and demanding
bloody sacrifices in the name of social achievements.
New conceptions are always clothed in an extravagant metaphorical
form, for there is no language to express genuinely new ideas. And in
their pristine strength they imbue the symbols that express them with
their own mystery and power and holiness. It is impossible to disengage
the welter of ideas embodied in a swastika, a secret sign, or a
conjuring word from the physical presence of the symbol itself: hence
the apparently nonsensical symbol worship and mysticism that go with new
movements and visions. This identification of symbolic form and
half-articulate meaning is the essence of all mythmaking. Of course the
emotive value is incomprehensible to anyone who does not see such
figments as expressive forms. So an age of vigorous new conception and
incomplete formulation always has a certain air of madness about it.
But it is really a fecund and exciting period in the life of reason.
Such is our present age. Its apparent unreason is a tremendous
unbalance and headiness of the human spirit, a conflict not only of
selfish wills but of vast ideas in the metaphorical state of emergence.
The change from fixed community and ancient local custom to the
mass of unpedigreed human specimens that actually constitutes the world
in our industrial and commercial age has been too sudden for the mind of
man to negotiate. Some transitional form of life had to mediate between
those extremes. And so the idol of nationality arose from the wreckage
of tribal organization. The concept of the national state is really the
old tribe concept applied to millions of persons, unrelated different
creatures gathered under the banner of a government. Neither birth nor
language nor even religion holds such masses together, but a mystic bond
is postulated even where no actual bond of race, creed, or color may
ever have existed.
At first glance it seems odd that the concept of nationality should
reach its highest development just as all actual marks of national
origins—language, dress, physiognomy, and religion—are becoming mixed
and obliterated by our new mobility and cosmopolitan traffic. But it is
just the loss of these things that inspires this hungry seeking for
something like the old egocentric pattern in the vast and formless
brotherhood of the whole earth. While mass production and universal
communication clearly portend a culture of world citizenship, we cling
desperately to our nationalism, a more and more attenuated version of
the old clan civilization. We fight passionate and horrible wars for
the symbols of our nations, we make a virtue of self-glorification and
exclusiveness and invent strange anthropologies to keep us at least
theoretically set apart from other men.
Nationalism is a transition between an old and a new human order.
But even now we are not really fighting a war of nations: we are
fighting a war of fictions, from which a new vision of the order of
nature will someday emerge. The future, just now, lies wide open—open
and dark, like interstellar space; but in that emptiness there is room
for new gods, new cultures, mysterious now and nameless as an unborn
child.