More than one visitor has expressed interest
in reading my letter to which
Murray Rothbard’s was a reply. For the
record, and only for that purpose, it is reproduced here and
followed by my reply to his letter. I was not fortunate enough to
receive another written reply, but our conversations continued over the
next decade by phone and over lunch in his
New
York City neighborhood during his summer breaks from teaching at the
University of Nevada.
These letters mark a phase of a journey. If
they occasion laughter, even derision, in the hearts of my fellow Rothbardians, that’s fine with me. They should consider that through
all the ups and downs of that ongoing journey, it is my Rothbardianism
that has survived, not the idealism, not the utilitarianism, not the
classical theism. And all should bear in mind that while are many ways
to find out what I now believe, perusing these letters is probably the
least reliable among them.
Anthony Flood
August 20, 2007
Letters to Murray,
1984
Anthony Flood
July 6, 1984
Dr. Murray N.
Rothbard
5 Pearce Mitchell
Place
Stanford, CA 94305
Dear Dr. Rothbard,
It’s hard to believe
two months have passed since we’ve last talked. Perhaps another twelve
will go by before we do so again, I regret to note. I hope you and Mrs.
Rothbard are enjoying your summer home. Gloria and I are well settled
into our new apartment and are looking forward to a few months of
Sundays in Central Park,
Lincoln Center and the like, and maybe a week in August away somewhere.
Since philosophic communication is easier in a letter than at a bus
stop,1 writing to you is
the one consolation of your absence.
About a week after
your last class, just when I thought I had reached bedrock with your
system of liberty and looked forward to rendering more compact your
Man, Economy & State, I came upon one of the works of the mystic
Alan Watts, Beyond Theology. For the first time in my sixteen
years of reading philosophy, Buddhism became at least intelligible, if
not attractive, and all of May found me devouring seven more of Watts’
books. Watts, who once served the Anglican communion as a priest,
exposed the many biases Western theology students such as myself bring
to their study of Eastern philosophy. And most unexpectedly, Watts has
reawakened my interest in philosophical idealism—between which and
Buddhism I have found not a few parallels—an interest which threatens to
dismantle the neo-Thomist realism I have built up over the last six
years.
The relevance of this
to our common interest in libertarianism is that my revivified idealism
has shaken my confidence in the natural rights approach to liberty and
individualism I learned from your writings. I continue to accept your
argument for the possibility of a stateless economy and your
institutional analysis of the State. But to me that is not enough for a
libertarian challenge to the ethos of statism. In an early draft of
this letter I began to present my alternative philosophic foundation,
which at the moment consists of a coherence theory of truth, a critique
of metaphysical individualism and of the derivative doctrine of the ego,
and—this is the hard part—a part mystical, part utilitarian critique of
morality. I am convinced that nothing compels or repels as does
perceived utility, and into this kind of talk virtually all moral
discourse can be translated. What such a transposition will most
require is universality or systematicity, being the main attraction, to
my mind, of naturalistic theories of morality: I want to know what
“utility maximizers” must realize in order to systematically avoid
aggressing against each other.
My tentative position
is that the realization in question is the Self-knowledge of which
mystical philosophy speaks. If the metaphysical distinction between
persons, and indeed, between any two things, is not absolute, then every
person is identical with the whole of reality and distinguished only by
the awareness that the whole achieves at each personal “node.” All
personal relations in this scheme of things are cases of Self-relation.
All aggression consequently becomes Self-violation and a disutility for
each personal node of the Absolute Self. Since all these ideas require
arguments—without which you may fairly conclude that I have flipped my
lid—I found my treatise growing inordinately long and thought it better
not to delay the letter any longer. Thus I send this shorter version to
you, promising to submit my fuller treatment of the issues when I have
figured out how I will provide it.
If there is any
caution you think I should take as I do this philosophical mining,
please do not hesitate to share it with me. What I learn most from
thinkers such as yourself is not particular positions, but the
reasonable temper that is the surest guide in rooting out error.
Looking forward to
hearing from you soon, I am
Yours for liberty,
Tony Flood
*
* *
Murray
Rothbard's letter to me of August 11, 1984
*
* *
August 24, 1984
Dr. Murray N.
Rothbard
5 Pearce Mitchell
Place
Stanford, CA 94305
Dear
Murray,2
It was a relief to
receive at last your letter of August 11: I was ready to send out
flares. I didn’t mind the lapse of time as much as wondering if I had
your correct address. I will suffer similar pangs of uncertainty until
I hear from you from your Nevada estate.
A skeptical challenge
tempered by friendship and respect was all I wanted from you, and you
did not let me down. What you call “gibberish” is my alternative to the
deceptive sobriety of your materialism. It indeed has, as I wrote, “not
a few parallels” with Buddhism, but is by no means identical with it,
and even less so with the products of the fried-brain crowd you seem to
encounter in your California treks.
Please note that Alan
Watts reawakened a dormant interest in F. H. Bradley’s idealism (even
though Watts never mentions Bradley), an interest side-tracked for five
years by hopes for a very conservative brand of Christian theology.
Reading Watts sparked a search for a philosophical framework to replace
the classical theism that has ceased to inspire me. In this letter I
will limit myself to outlining the compatibility of what must seem most
incompatible: absolute idealistic metaphysics, with its doctrine of the
one true self, and a “rule-utilitarian” libertarianism, which is true
for all persons independently of the degree of their grasp of their true
identity.
It is possible to
bring a metaphysical egoist to libertarianism without any recourse to
objectivistic rights. All he need understand is praxeology and its
consequent “rule-utilitarian” libertarianism: the observance of the
rules of liberty (the self’s ownership of its body; homesteading;
voluntary exchange) make members of a libertarian society better off
than they would be without their observance. They would be better off,
that is, with respect to their overall individual peaceful pursuits of
happiness, not necessarily with respect to the peaceful pursuit of any
particular utility. Arguments for “natural rights” cannot add one iota
of cogency to the praxeological proofs of the universal harmony of
interests on the free market.
But metaphysical
egoism’s world of mutual strangers is ever forestalling a war of all
against all, because each ego is a potential threat to the security of
each unknown, externally related other. As Hobbes taught, people will
sacrifice whatever degree of liberty is necessary to avoid violent
death: egoistic fear of neighbor toward neighbor is the mainstay of
statism. There have, of course, been absolute idealists who have gone
beyond defending their philosophical concept of a public realm of right
called the “state” toward an apologia for existing states, but the
thrust of that concept has ever been a defense of individual freedom
through self-knowledge. Such knowledge is complemented by praxeological
theory and its libertarian implications. There is a range of approaches
to libertarian propaganda, from one assuming little self-knowledge on
the part of the potential convert, to one addressed to more enlightened
souls. The degree of self-knowledge is a “variable” coordinate with the
“constants” of praxeology.
I incline to the
platonic view that the problem of evil is not so much that of a bad will
but of ignorance, which in the end is self-ignorance. By refuting
“pragmatic” resistance to total liberty, praxeology overcomes one kind
of ignorance. But the valuation of liberty’s (second-order) utility as
the set of rules best facilitating the pursuit of other (first-order)
utilities is a rather abstract proposition, which by itself is not
robust enough to subdue the urge to gain a satisfaction through
aggression. What is needed is a deliberate, principled adherence to the
rule of non-aggression. This ethical policy is a function neither of
the suspension of time-preference nor of the intuition of occult
“natural rights” but rather of the direct perception, however dim and
distracted, that one’s potential victim is in some sense identical with
oneself.
Ethical performance,
therefore, is as much utility-maximization, the pursuit of “enlightened
self-interest,” as any other human action. The greater one’s
enlightenment as to who the self really is, the more the limits assumed
by metaphysical egoism are transcended, and therefore the more likely
one is to find the commission of aggression repugnant. A society
comprised entirely of enlightened individuals would manifest the laws of
praxeology, but the self-conception of its utility-maximizing members
would outlaw in their hearts the very thought of aggression. To the
degree that this perception of identity is absent, to that degree
unethical behavior will be unleashed. Nothing intellectually inhibits
that perception as does metaphysical egoism; nothing reinforces it as
does absolute idealism.
Father Toohey’s
suspicion of capital letters would ironically apply to his own
references to God and to himself as “I.” No doubt excessive
capitalization can be self-defeating, but I fail to see how I offend in
this way. You yourself have proven the effectiveness of capitalizing
“State” while avoiding the danger of treating its referent as a concrete
entity. I do not need to capitalize “self,” but it is convenient to do
so when referring to the absolute self of which finite personal selves
are emanations.
Al though your
friendly ridicule is a small price to pay for your audience, I hope you
take your “Cosmic Toe-nail” retort less seriously than the space you
gave it suggests. In my letter I argued that if the metaphysical
distinction between persons is not absolute, then every person is
identical with the whole of reality and distinguished only by the
awareness that the whole has achieved at that particular point of focus.
If no distinction is absolute, then all distinctions are relative, in
which case reality is one unbroken whole, any of whose parts is but a
focal point or “node.” The real identity of personal nodes (actually of
the emanating Self “behind” them) is knowable by them, and when known,
makes interpersonal aggression virtually impossible on the basis of
simple, clearly perceived Self-interest. To refute me, you need only
give me an example of a real “absolute distinction” (not one that
holds between abstract concepts), or show me that the relativity of all
distinctions does not imply that reality is one unbroken whole.
There are just a few
more comments. Until I find copies of the Cohn and Kolakowski books, I
will remain in suspense about their bearing on our discussion. Your
distinction between finders and seekers, I mean, Finders and Seekers, is
intriguing, but why your implied negative regard for Seekers? I do
not see “seven years of Buddhism” ahead of me. My desire for a world of
unhampered markets with its benefits to mankind is as real as my desire
for self-understanding and peace. What I am sharing with you is my
attempt to integrate these goals. Surely we are not so close to the
libertarian goal that my “anarchristian” speculations are simply
uncalled for.
Hoping you have
enjoyed your summer at Stanford, that this letter reaches you before
your move to Nevada, and that I will get your devastating criticism of
these few pages very soon, I am
Your Unregenerate
Seeker,
Tony
1 After sessions of his
Seminar on the History of Economic Thought,
I would wait with him for his uptown bus (from New York University to
the Upper West
Side), often deciding to ride with him. It was during those talks that
we got to know each other.
2 I took his signing of his letter with just
“Murray” as the go-ahead for addressing him with such familiarity, although
that did not come easy for this product of a Jesuit military high school
education. I later saw how important it was to him that the
younger people who were excited about his writings connect with
him, and so how quickly he would correct any well-intentioned youngster
who began his remark or question with
“Dr. Rothbard
. . .”
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