From
The American Political Science Review, 51:3, Sep. 1957, 776-787. A
reply from Samuel P. Hunting-ton, perhaps best known as the author of
The Clash of Civilizations, was published in the next issue (51:4,
Dec. 1957, 1063-1064) and is appended to Roth-bard’s piece
hereinunder. I can
find no record of his opinion of Huntington’s reply, but would
appreciate hearing from any one who knows what it was.
Anthony Flood
January 12, 2010
Huntington on Conservatism: A Comment
Murray N. Rothbard
After cogently demonstrating that conservatism can only be a purely
situational rather than ideational ideology—a defense of any existing
institutions against fundamental challenge—Professor Hunting-ton ends
his article by calling on liberalism to liquidate itself “for the
duration.”1 Defining the challenge to American institutions
as communism, Huntington urges American liberals to “lay aside their
liberal ideology” and adopt conservatism as their defense until the
communist threat is ended. Yet, on his own evidence, the precedents for
this advice are dismal indeed. For everyone of the four great
manifestations of conservatism he lists (the defense of the estates
against the rise of absolute monarchy; the defense against Puritan
dissent; the defense against the French Revolution; and the defense of
the South against abolition) failed signally in its object. Since all
these conservative upsurges lost to the forces of radical change, and
since defense of the old order was their only purpose, Huntington’s
willingness to rely on this weapon now is puzzling indeed.
But this is not all. If conservatism is hopeless as a weapon to defend
the institutional status quo, then, on Huntington’s own terms, it
is also a pointless and absurd ideology, since it has no inherent
ideational validity. Perhaps the consistent failure of conser-vatism in
its previous struggles with one radical ideology after another can be
explained more fully. As Huntington points out, so long as existing
institutions are universally accepted, there is no need for a
conservative ideology of defense. Conservatism arises in reaction to the
attractions of a new ideational philosophy, one necessarily radical and
at variance with current institutions. But, on Huntington’s own
account, conservatism is not a rational defense of these institutions,
but rather the contrary: a blindly tropistic hostility to change,
whatever it may be. Pitting a coherent ideology against a tropism will
tend to provoke an unequal contest, with the ideational philosophy the
victor. For men, even those who care little about constructing a
philosophic system, must have some set of idea-tional principles
with which to view social institutions. The deeply interested parties
search for a set of principles, and the less interested are generally
content to accept their principles from socially appointed leaders whom
they respect. But some set of principles must be chosen. The necessity
for this choice is indicated by Huntington’s admission that the reason
the society was not previously in turmoil was that everyone had adopted
the same ideational system, and only quarreled over interpretations
within that system. It was precisely the flowering of a contrasting
set of principles that constituted the challenge to existing
institutions. But if society must choose some ideational viewpoint, and
if conser-vatism is not ideational at all, then conservatism will
necessarily fail in the struggle. For a radical idea-tional ideology
tries to convince people by the use of reason, while the conservative
ideology, relying on blind instinct, can only scorn reason. Now,
conceding to the enemy the monopoly of reason is fatal, for any ideology
whatever can appeal to emotions alone. The set of ideas which seems to
have reason on its side possesses the great advantage of the force of
conviction that, in the long run, is likely to overcome mere resistance
to the new and unfamiliar. For the once new, as Huntington himself
points out, soon becomes the familiar and old; and this applies to
ideologies as well as institutions. By Huntington’s own (and accurate)
definition, communism itself is rapidly becoming “conservative.”
The proper answer to the radical challenge of a new ideology is to adopt
not conservatism but a contrasting radicalism, to oppose reason with
reason. If this means changing existing institutions, then so much the
better. Since Huntington is professedly a “liberal” (however the term
be defined), the rational approach for him to adopt toward American
institutions is to transform them to accord more nearly with the liberal
ideal. This should be the “answer” to communism, an answer in rational,
ideational terms. Since it is not arguable, blind adherence to the
status quo is no “answer” at all.
Why indeed does Huntington support the existing institutions? His
article gives only brief hints, but enough to demonstrate a striking and
inherent incon-sistency of conservatism: while basically situational, it
is still, almost shame-facedly, ideational in part. Thus, Huntington
argues for conservatism as follows: “conservatism is the intellectual
rationale of the permanent institutional prerequisites of human
existence. It has a high and necessary function. It is the rational
defense of being against mind, of order against chaos, . . . of the
institutional prerequisites of social order” (pp. 460, 473). If
conservatism has indeed so exalted a role, then it is not, as Huntington
asserts, a purely positional ideology; it is ideational as well. For
what can be more systematic and ideational—more rational—than an
assertion of the necessities of existence? Clearly Huntington has
overdrawn his case; conservatism is ideational as well as situational.
Let us examine Huntington’s six-point list of the generally agreed-upon
conservative creed. Points (2) and (6) are clearly and solely
situational; the appeal to “prescription” and the presumption for
settled government are purely tropistic appeals to the status quo
whatever it may be. These bear out Huntington’s thesis. But the other
points have differ-ent implications. Point (1), that man is a religious
animal, can be positional, in lending divine sanction to the status quo.
It can also cut the other way, however, by providing a buttress for the
self-same universal principles of natural law that Huntington recognizes
as the age-old enemy of conservatism. Point (4), that the community is
superior to the individual and that human nature is the source of evil,
is irrelevant to situational concerns. It is, on the contrary, an
ideational statement. In an existent laissez-faire,
individualist society, for example, such a position would imply radical,
and therefore ideational, changes from current institutions. The same
is true of point (5), that men are unequal and that hierarchy is
inevitable. For example, if a few members of an Israeli kibbutz
were to put forth this doctrine it would be radical indeed. Of the six
cardinal features of the conservative creed, therefore, two are
situational, two are ideational, and one can be used in either way.
I have purposely held to the last his point (3), that reason should be
eschewed in favor of habit and emotion—that logic should be abandoned
for concrete experience—because, while situational, this doctrine holds
special interest. For it is not only situational; it is an implicit
confession that the ideational strands in the defenses of
existing institutions are so weak that they fail to stand up under
analysis. In short, the conservative, after putting forth ideational
doctrines, refuses to defend them by the use of reason. Apparently
believing them too weak for defense, he retreats to take his stand
finally upon habit and emotion and to leave reason to his enemies. This
is the ultimate and really distinguishing feature of the conservative
philoso-phy.
Conservatism should either be defined as a situational or as an
ideational ideology; otherwise, hopeless confusion of meanings will
continue indefin-itely. If conservatism is best defined positionally,
and I agree with Huntington that this is the best definition, then
points (4) and (5), and probably (1), should be dropped from the catalog
of conservative views. The ideational strands should be separated out,
and used to form a frankly ideational and radical system.
Huntington’s necessary “prerequisites” are, then, ideational, and not
conservative at all. The footnote in which he denies the possibility of
a “conservative defense of sheer chaos” and his designation of Nazi
Germany as “chaos,” is an attempt to escape his dilemma (p. 459n). For
if conservatism is situational and necessary, then all existing
institutions must and should be defended, including Nazi institutions
when they were in existence. Hence Huntington’s attempt to banish
totalitarian societies from the rubric of “existing institutions.” But
he cannot have it both ways. If conservatism is good, then this
situational defense of the status quo is good always and
everywhere, whatever institutions exist: whether they be liberal,
communist, Nazi, slave, or canni-balistic. On the other hand, if he
would balk at defense of anyone set of institutions, then he has already
abandoned conservatism for good and all: he has transcended the immanent
and adopted the ideational. The question, in short, is not whether he
approves of Americans defending their existing institutions against
challenge. The critical question is: does he equally approve of such
defense by Soviet Russia, South Africa, and Yemen?
Huntington is very severe with the New Conser-vatives. He calls them
vague as to the institutions they would defend and the enemies they
would counteract. He sees communism as the only plau-sible threat to
America. But the New Conservatives do not agree. It seems to me that
most of them are quite clear on the nature of the enemy: it is
democratic socialism. The New Conservatives therefore oppose: (1) the
economic and political system of socialism, i.e., the complete
control by the state of the economic and political order; and (2) the
social and cultural implications of democracy, i.e., egalitarianism,
mass culture, the divine right of the majority, the worship of the
“common man,” etc. And hence, the New Conservatives oppose, not only the
totalitarian systems abroad, but also the New-Fair Deals at home, as
part and parcel of the modern wave of social democracy. (Liberal
democrats may wonder at this classification of totalitarianism under
forms of Social Democracy. But the New Conser-vatives hold that modern
totalitarian movements depend peculiarly on collective support.)
Much more just is Huntington’s charge that the New Conservatives are
vague about what they positively wish to defend. The reason for this
vagueness is clear, however; it stems from the utter lack of agreement
among the New Conservatives, and among the contemporary Right generally,
on the nature of the world they would like to see brought into being.
And, of course, Huntington is absolutely correct on one point: the New
Conservatives are not really conservative at all. They are not really
defending any more, if they ever did; they are fighting against
trends which have already and increasingly prevailed. They are
therefore ardent radicals, in the root sense. But they and their
critics have not realized this, or have not conceded it, partly because
of the lack of agreement within their ranks. Since the New Conservatives
can unite only in opposition to the enemy, and never on the positive
advancement of a consistent creed, their public stance tends always to
seem purely “negative” and situational. But the positive ideational
creeds are there: some New Conservatives are laissez faire
individualists, some Tory feudalists, some ardent decentralists, some
monarchists, etc. Strategically, these differences tend to be buried,
in order to create a Popular Front of opposition. But the
“conservative” label is a most misleading term to apply to this
congeries of opposition. The true conservatives in America today are
the defenders of the current status quo. The fact that so many
former liberals have shifted to the “conservative” mantle is highly
significant, for it seems to mean that liberals have begun to lose faith
in the liberal ideology, and must therefore turn to tropistic
conservatism as a final defense of what is. But if historical
precedents are prophetic, this means that liberalism is doomed and that
either communism or one of the ideational creeds of the Right opposition
bids fair to become the “wave of the future.”
1
Samuel P. Huntington, “Conservatism As An Ideology,” this Review,
Vol. 51 (June, 1957), pp. 454-473.
Samuel P. Huntington’s Letter of Reply to Murray N. Rothbard
To the Editor:
Dr. Rothbard makes a number of remarks in his comment (September issue,
pp. 784-7) from which I must vigorously dissent.
He argues that groups espousing the conserva-tive ideology have been
uniformly unsuccessful in achieving their objectives, and he attributes
this failure to the poverty of conservatism as an ideology. In the first
place, ideology only influences, it does not determine the outcome of
conflict between social groups. Other factors—economic, social,
military—are of equal or greater importance. Nor, unfortu-nately, is it
true, as he argues, that the more rational a political theory, the more
likely it is to succeed. If this appealing variation of the philosophy
of progress were valid, Greece and Rome might still be the centers of
world civilization. Secondly, Dr. Rothbard’s history is wrong in
places. To be sure, on the Continent the medieval estates generally
went down before the national monarchs and in our Civil War the South
went down before the North. But what of the other conservative efforts?
Was Hooker’s defense against the Puritan dissent a failure? The Church
of England is still the established church, and in 1689, after a century
of strife between political and religious extremists, England returned
to the path which Hooker had counseled. It was Hooker, and neither
Hobbes nor Winstanley, whom Locke invoked and whose viewpoint prevailed
in the end. Nor was the conservative reaction to the French Revolution
a failure. For better or for worse, the ideological, social, and
military forces of the Revolution could not crack the existing structure
of society in England, Germany, and eastern Europe. The Congress of
Vienna shaped the pattern of events on the Continent for a century to
come. If Appomattox was a conservative defeat, by the same token
Waterloo was a conservative victory.
Dr. Rothbard argues that conservatism is inher-ently irrational; it is
“a blindly tropistic hostility to change” and “on Huntington’s own
account, conservatism is not a rational defense” of existing
institutions. Here he defeats himself a few sentences further on, when
he quotes my description of conservatism as “the rational defense of
being against mind, of order against chaos . . . .” He assumes, but
does not demonstrate, that “to oppose reason with reason” it is
necessary to adopt “a contrasting radicalism,” in short, that only
radicalism is rational. He does not define what he means by “reason”
and “rational,” but any reasonable definition would either invalidate
his assumption or force him into a circular argument. Evidently, there
can be rational and irrational attacks on existing institutions and
rational and irrational defenses of them. Were Hooker and Burke
irrational? Has America produced any more rational political thinkers
than John Adams and John C. Calhoun? It would take quite an effort to
reduce the cold logic of A Disquisition on Government to an
appeal to “blind instinct.” Adherence to the status quo may
indeed at times be “blind,” as Dr. Rothbard suggests, but, at other
times, it may stem from the rational decision that in the light of
certain ideational values the maintenance of existing institutions is
the most desirable of the feasible social alternatives, and
consequently, that conservatism is the most rational ideology to
espouse. His argument that conser-vatism is necessarily irrational
because it stresses the irrationality in man equates a theory of
irrationalism with irrational theory.
He implies that a conservative who defends one set of existing
institutions must defend all existing institutions: one who conserves
American institutions must also conserve those in “Soviet Russia, South
Africa, and Yemen.” But this ignores the basic thesis of the article
that conservatism is situational: it is the product of a specific
pattern of social forces in a given situation. Though conservatism as a
theory is the theoretical rationale of all existing institutions, a
conservative as an individual only wishes to defend a specific set of
institutions. He only espouses conservatism temporarily, in that
situation, until the challenge to the institutions is victorious or
dissipated. Nor is it a reflection on conservatism that it cannot be
used to defend fascism. Fascism, as it existed in Germany and, to a
lesser extent, in Italy, was a permanent attack upon stable
institutions—radicalism of the most destructive and nihilistic sort.
Finally, Dr. Rothbard argues that liberalism is doomed if liberals today
abandon their liberal ideology and espouse conservatism. I have touched
above on the weaknesses in the historical analogy by which he attempts
to support this conclusion, but another fallacy also exists in this
argument. The problem of the United States today in relation to the
rest of the world is that we are so absorbed in our own ideals that we
find it impossible to believe that other nations cannot be absorbed in
them also. However, the noncommitted portion of the world seems to be
about as afraid of a crusading American liberalism as of a crusading
Russian communism. The way to develop support among the neutrals then
is to prove to them that unlike the Soviet Union we have no desire to
make them over in our own image. Our problem, as Hartz says, is to
transcend our own experience. It is to recognize that the liberal
institutions which are appropriate for us have little relevance in Asia,
the Mideast, the satellite countries, or even, in many respects, in
western Europe; and that our proper aim, as liberals, is to insure that
they are maintained here. As Dr. Rothbard recognizes and deplores,
American liberals are tending toward conservatism. Such a develop-ment,
however, is not a sign of doom but of maturity. John Dewey and Henry
Wallace were appropriate for the 1930s; Reinhold Niebuhr and George
Kennan are required in the 1950s.
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