Lewis Ford stands at
the head of the line of many distinguished philosophical theologians who
find creative inspiration in the work of Alfred North Whitehead. This is
a high compliment, because that list includes such thinkers as Charles
Hartshorne, Lionel Thornton, Daniel Day Williams, Norman Pittenger,
William Ernest Hocking, Henry Nelson Wieman, Schubert Ogden, John B. Cobb,
Jr., Marjorie Suchocki, David Ray Griffin, Robert S. Brumbaugh, George
Allan, Jorge Nobo, and many others. Each of these has made creative use
of Whitehead, some such as Hartshorne by adopting most of the system and
making a few decisive changes, others such as Thornton and Wieman by
importing significant Whiteheadian themes into theologies with independent
agendas. Ford has worked consistently within the Whiteheadian
conceptuality to stretch it to meet the dialectical needs of the religious
situation. In doing this he has modified and developed Whitehead’s
thought more thoroughly and originally than the others, for which
contribution he should be recognized as the most creative.1
Lewis Ford is best
known for his very technical studies of Whiteheadian theology as well as
of other topics in process philosophy; he is also known for his
compositional analysis of Whitehead’s texts, using techniques of biblical
studies to comprehend the layers of composition in Whitehead’s work.2
A later section of this paper will address his technical argument
that God is best to be conceived as the future, a claim with which I have
long had a disagreement. But this argument needs to be put in the context
of a general discussion of Ford’s role as a theologian. The focus on
Whitehead, his work with Process Studies, and the intimidating
technical nature of most of his writings that are accessible only to
scholarly Whiteheadians, have obscured the fact that he is one of the most
penetrating Christian theologians of our time. Indeed, he is one of the
most penetrating theologians of our time, Christian or not, and I aim to
show this is so even while I urge him toward what I take to be a better
view.
I. Ford as Christian Theologian: The Context
Ford’s direct and
non-technical contribution to Christian theology is principally in The
Lure of God: A Biblical Background for Process Theism (LG), a book
that generally has been neglected in the discussion of Ford’s theology.
More unfortunate, it has been neglected in the larger discussion of
contemporary Christian theology. On the assumption that not all readers
of this philosophical journal are clued into the current state of
Christian theology, permit me to sketch certain of the conditions of that
larger discussion to which Ford’s work is relevant.
The most general
condition, and still most problematic, is the challenge of the modern
worldview to the worldview of European late antiquity in whose symbols and
conceptualities Christian scriptures and creeds, communal polities,
liturgies, spiritual practices, theologies, and other self-conceptions
have been expressed. The specific contents of that challenge have shifted
through the five centuries of modernity. But they all have required the
scriptural, liturgical, and other traditional symbols of Christianity to
be rethought in terms that can move the hearts of modern people whose
plausibility conditions for commitment are, or at least seem to be,
different from those of the ancients. (Other religious traditions whose
core texts and motifs of worship, thought, and practical life were formed
in the ancient world have analogous problems.)
The Protestant
Reformation doubled the problem within Christianity, however. For, by
insisting on the importance of the Bible and casting doubt upon the
imagination of post-biblical periods, the Reformers made the biblical
language with its ancient symbols the very stuff of Christian theology,
the primary language of theology itself. Biblical language did not have
such exclusive importance during either the Patristic period or the Middle
Ages. Philosophic language, which might have mediated the shift to modern
worldviews as it had the shift from Galilean to Hellenistic culture, again
from that to late antiquity, and yet again from that to the intercultural
richness of the Jewish-Christian-Muslim High Middle Ages, was cast under
suspicion by Protestant reformers; perhaps philosophic reflection was too
elitist for the project of making God accessible to anyone who can read or
hear clearly the Bible. The Roman Catholic Counter-reformation responded
with scholasticism and appeals to authority rather than imaginative new
mediating theology, until it moved close to Protestant biblicism regarding
theological language with Vatican II. The Orthodox churches of Eastern
Europe were slow to relate thoroughly to the plausibility conditions of
modernity.
So the conundrum
remains today for Christians: how can the fundamental expressions of the
faith make sense to a world whose plausibility conditions are different
from those in which those expressions originated? “Making sense” is not a
merely intellectual theological enterprise. In order for those
fundamental expressions, those basic symbols, to be effective in
transforming souls and creating a vital Body of Christ within which
Christians are members, they must resonate with the deepest imaginative
structures of individuals’ and communities’ lives. The authenticity of
those symbols can be circumvented by bifurcating life into religious
versus other domains, or by appealing to authority for religious identity
so as to keep the force of the symbols at bay; but that is precisely to
circumvent the authenticity of the Christian gospel and its embodiment in
concrete life. Therefore the symbols must be mediated to the imaginations
of modern people if they are to do what Christianity has claimed they do,
and theology is thus a practical discipline.
Within
Protestantism, there is a trajectory running from Hegel and Schleiermacher
at the beginning of the 19th century to the present day to recover
appropriate senses of philosophy for Christian theological purposes. This
was perhaps best focused at the beginning of the 20th century in the work
of Ernst Troeltsch, and criticized most severely in the work of Karl Barth
and his Neo-orthodox followers. Barth revived biblical language for a
generation through his use of it to criticize the Christian culture
susceptible to Nazification, and a second generation of his insights
developed the Yale School according to which Christianity is to be
understood as a cultural-linguistic system organized rigorously through
biblical language.3 Yet biblical language has been hard to
sustain among critical educated people in the modern world.4
Much of the current debate in “religion and science” has taken the
desperate form of trying to maintain a “classical” conception of God as
agent, by which is meant a God who can be described with prima facie
references of biblical language, in relation to modern science,
showing how God can act in and on the world without abridging
scientifically known laws.5 Much of the desperation comes from
the fact that contemporary scientifically-shaped imagination is not
receptive to prima facie non-metaphoric biblical language, even if
explicit contradictions can be avoided. The religious problem is with the
imaginative connection of late antiquity with late modernity, a
problem concerning the power of the symbols to give religion life. Most
theologians oriented primarily to biblical language are by no means
fundamentalists or literalists; they appreciate biblical metaphors as
such. Yet they want to assume conceptions of God as a personal agent who
reigns over the world and thus treats the world as a moral field—all
difficult to imagine when the world is conceived as universally subject to
meaningless standard measure.
The genius of Paul
Tillich was to call attention directly to the problems of contemporary
imagination. He developed the “method of correlation” explicitly to
translate back and forth between the religious depth of the traditional
texts and symbols and the religious depth of contemporary life. Yet his
contemporary symbology, for instance speaking of God as the Ground of
Being, was very far from biblical language and it has been accused of
being less a translation than a replacement. Tillich’s treatment of such
a central doctrine as the Trinity, for instance, is relegated to a little
essay on symbolism stuck between Parts IV and V of his Systematic
Theology (ST3 283-294).
II. Ford’s Theological Strategy
The key to
understanding Lewis Ford as a Christian theologian is the recognition that
his graduate specializations were biblical studies and the thought of Paul
Tillich with a late interest in Whitehead. His graduate school
environment was the heated debate between the Barthians and Tillichians
over the plausibility conditions for Christian theology, or the lack of
need for them. His turn to Whitehead was in one sense an attempt to find
a middle ground for the use of biblical language with a God who could be
construed as finite and personal over against the world, interacting with
the world in emotionally freighted evaluative ways. In another sense, it
was a turn from the whole Christian insular theological tradition to take
up the philosophical tradition of modernity about God. The Western
European philosophical tradition, from Descartes, Hobbes, Locke,
Berkeley, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, Steward, Reid, and Kant down to Hegel
and Schleiermacher was deeply formed by the impact of scientific ideas.
There was no problem there of “science and religion” because the
philosophers were all thinking abreast of science. Whitehead followed in
this line. His Science and the Modern World is an excruciatingly
beautiful engagement of that tradition of science-oriented philosophic
thinking about God. That the tradition of Christian church
theology had not engaged these philosophical geniuses was a tragically
missed opportunity. With the rise of the bourgeois sense of moral
responsibility for one’s beliefs in an age of science, church theology
thus was in a hard place. But process philosophy offered an alternative.
It has been a scientifically sophisticated and philosophically
responsible, technical project to interpret a biblically friendly
conception of God to the world of late modernity.
Ford has a complex
view of the relation between theology and philosophy in the Western
tradition.
In times past, from
the Middle Ages down to Hegel and Kierkegaard, most philosophizing was
written from within the Christian tradition, however much it sought to
emancipate itself from the church. This, in turn, dictated much of the
theologian’s apologetic method. He ferreted out these implicit Christian
elements in the reigning philosophies and related them to the more
historically conditioned symbols of the church’s faith. More and more,
however, philosophy’s attempt to become radically secular, divorcing
itself from all ties with Christian theism, has become successful, leaving
fewer avenues of approach open to the theologian. As a result the
theologian is forced to become his own philosopher. This need not
interfere with the rigor he brings to the task, provided his speculative
thinking subjects itself to the recognized philosophical canons. His
theory must be both consistent and coherent in itself, and adequate and
applicable to human experience. But it has meant that Christian
philosophizing has become less and less the task of the professional
philosopher and has been relegated more and more to the theologian. (LG
ix-x)
Ford, I believe,
primarily conceives himself as a Christian theologian doing the
philosophizing appropriate to that task.
We should note how
rare this is. Contemporary theologians such as Jürgen Moltmann or Robert
Jensen are preoccupied with Christian symbols, especially biblical
language. Yet they have very little philosophy to make those symbols
plausible to the late modern imagination. Others such as Wolfhart
Pannenberg and David Tracy speak powerfully of the importance of
philosophy, yet avail themselves only of borrowed goods. Ford is surely
right that theology needs to work out its philosophy for itself and from
within. Tillich, the most philosophical and original of the 20th century
theological giants, focused on existentialist philosophic concerns rather
than the philosophy of nature which is needed to address the scientific
imagination of late modernity. Ford notes accurately that philosophy of
nature ought to be central to the theological task in our time. Yet the
20th century German schools of theology, influenced by Kant’s argument
that nature is to be studied by empirical scientists only and that
philosophy is limited to transcendental reflection on the conditions for
science (philosophy of science), are inhibited to engage philosophy of
nature and are limited to existential or hermeneutical philosophies.6
So Whitehead’s process philosophy is an obvious source for creative
Christian theology. At the very least it gives the lie to the Kantian
claim that we simply cannot do philosophy of nature and naturalistic
metaphysics any more, by doing it. Whereas Kantian fideism rigorously
separated the ancient religious and modern scientific imaginations, making
religion irrelevant to the extent the scientific imagination forms the
soul, process philosophy makes possible their integration.
The problem with
process theology, according to Ford, is that it is a mere metaphysics. He
says that much of what has been written as “process theology” is really
simply philosophy written within the context of a Christian perspective.
It is a sustained reflection upon the generic features of experience,
taking seriously those dimensions of experience most fully apparent within
the religious life” (LG ix). “As a result, however, the distinctively
theological task has been comparatively neglected. This study [The Lure
of God] seeks to redress the balance” (LG x). Hence, Ford the
church theologian.
If the challenge of
the modern worldview to that of the ancient is the general condition of
the contemporary theological discussion, Ford has a specific
interpretation of where that discussion lies now. Neo-orthodoxy has
collapsed, he says, and “theologians are recognizing the need for an
increasingly wider conceptuality which frees theology from the ghetto of
sacred history and places it within the whole sweep of human and natural
history” (LG ix). “The ghetto of sacred history” is strong language for
what has been a dominant theological motif of our time.7 But
in light of the late-modern imagination, that is exactly the right phrase.
III. Ford’s Theological Contribution
According to Ford,
the Bible gives particular, historical specificity to the general
metaphysical picture provided by process philosophy. The general process
conception is that God acts on the world through persuasion, not on just
the human world but the whole world. Ford writes:
God’s general,
everlasting purpose is everywhere one and the same: the elicitation of the
maximum richness of existence in every situation. Yet because creaturely
response varies, the achievement of this good is highly uneven and follows
many different routes. In biological evolution many other lines were
tried—amphibians, reptiles, marsupials—before mammals emerged, and of the
mammals only certain primates were responsive to the call to become
human. Among men the response to God varied considerably, and even when
that response was intense, God’s address must be radically different
depending upon their particular circumstances. The Word addressed to
Abraham was not the same as the Word addressed to Ikhnaton or Gautama or
Lao-Tzu. (LG 25)
This is a powerful
logos doctrine that embraces the non-human world and the whole of
humankind, including other religions; it does not require other religions
to be anonymous versions of Christianity because what would elicit maximum
richness of existence differs, depending on the situation. This doctrine
honors differences among religions.
Yet at the same time
it provides the rationale for the specificity of the religions of the
biblical tradition, which otherwise might seem so arbitrary. Precisely
because Abraham was different from Ikhnaton, the God of Abraham, Isaac,
and Jacob, revealed in the lures defining that people, is different from
the God of the Egyptians. We should not expect it any other way, says
Ford, and should thus look to the specifics of our history and
current situation to interpret and bring to consciousness the content of
divine persuasion for us.
A related general
process conception is that the freedom of every agent lies in its
self-creativity given the actual potentials at hand and the real
possibilities. Hence the well-known process defense of the goodness of
God through the claim that people and other creatures have the freedom to
reject or distort the divine lure, choosing the worse rather than the
better. Ford relates this specifically to the history of Israel in the
Hebrew Bible. As the prophets so often argued, the people often chose the
worse and this amounted to a rejection of God, not just a bad choice. At
this point, Ford contrasts the process philosophical conception of God
with that of “classical theism.” Because the latter believes that God
controls everything, it has to say that people get what they deserve,
which runs contrary to obvious fact. The tortuous writhings of the
prophets to make it seem as if God runs a tight ship cannot be sustained.
As Ford says:
According to the
historian of Kings, Manasseh was one of the worst kings to sit on the
throne of Judah, and Josiah one of the very best. Yet Manasseh had a long
and peaceful reign of some fifty-five years, and Josiah is cut down in
battle before he was yet forty, despite Huldah’s word from the Lord that
he would die in peace (2 Kings 22,20; cf. 23,29). Jeremiah and Habakkuk
questioned the justice of God, as did many of those exiled in Babylon.
Why should they be required to pay for the sins of their forefathers,
particularly in the light of the emerging realization that each man should
be answerable for his own sins? (Jer. 31:27-30; Ezek. 18:1-4). . . . It
is a commonplace to observe that Job undercuts the easy assumptions of the
wisdom school or of the Deuteronomic historian. It is not equally
realized that it undercuts the basis for the whole prophetic
interpretation of history. Amos and Hosea could threaten doom upon Israel
in the confidence that this was God’s just punishment for its sin. If in
fact there is no correlation between conduct and consequence, the nerve of
this sort of interpretation of history is severed. (LG 132)
According to process
theology, there is no strict correlation between conduct and consequence:
God proposes, and creatures dispose for better or worse. And then God has
to make the next best offer. Sacred history is a ghetto not only because
it assumes too central a place for human history but also because what
happens reveals as much the character of the human actors as it does of
God: God can only make the best of things.
Without defending
classical theism’s claim that God is both external and controlling (as
process philosophers interpret it, though that might be a bad rap), I want
to register a theological alternative to Ford’s view here. A standard
criticism of process theology is that we simply do not know the lures of
God in every actual occasion. Ford writes eloquently of the religious
geniuses who are able to discern from history and their circumstances the
large social patterns of justice and beauty that elicit increased value (LG
ch. 2). But I would say that this discernment of the divine Word should
not be viewed as a generalization of lures ingressed in actual occasions
as initial aims, the standard process account, but rather exclusively as a
reading of the differential value inherent in possibilities offered by the
future. That there is this aesthetic envisionment of value-laden
possibilities is also integral to process philosophy, and Ford makes much
of it in his theory of God as the power of the future. Human discernment
does not require the standard process claim that God constitutes an
initial aim for us, only that the future is alluring.8 The
significance of this qualification will appear shortly.
IV. Ford on God
The central theme of
Christian theology, of course, is God and how God relates to the world,
human history, Jesus Christ, and salvation. The acknowledged contribution
of process theology is its conception of God. I want here to detail
Ford’s special version of this, associated with his claim that God is the
power of the future.
Apart from the world
God has neither past nor future, but is pure presence. Nontemporal, he
creates himself as the envisagement of the infinitude of all pure
possibilities. Just as the world acquires a future from God, so God
acquires a past from the world. Each individual creature receives its
past from the other creatures of the world, and its future ultimately from
God, and out of these creates a new present. God’s presence is internal
to himself, derived from his nontemporality, but out of that and the past
which he receives from the world he creates a new future, as he transforms
his pure possibilities into real possibilities, that is, realizable
possibilities under the conditions of the world. Thus we do not say that
God is a future reality which does not yet exist. Most properly, he is a
nontemporal actuality who influences us by the future he now creates; by
means of the real possibilities he persuades the world to actualize. (LG
40)
The first thing to
note about Ford’s conception is that it includes attributing a positive
reality to God apart from the world, “pure presence.” This stands in
sharp contrast to many process theologians following Hartshorne for whom
only the abstract elements of God exist apart from the world and hence
could not exist at all. For Ford, apart from the world God nontemporally
creates himself by envisioning “the infinitude of pure possibilities.”
This is a very strong creationist theme, atypical of process philosophers,
and it puts Ford in close conversation with Thomists such as W. Norris
Clarke, S.J.9 Ford’s emphasis on non-temporality was
characteristic of his early work, for instance the (1973) essay “The
Non-Temporality of Whitehead’s God” (194-195) which made much of
Whitehead’s notion of divine envisagement of possibilities as the
primordial created act.10 By the time (1987) of his
“Creativity in a Future Key,” he could hope to assimilate the nontemporal
to the temporal by means of an enriched notion of the future. The point
here is that in his explicitly theological work, The Lure of God,
in 1978, he could insist upon self-creativity in God apart from the world,
a self-creativity according to which God creates the primordial part of
the divine nature. In this, Ford sides with the Scotists against the
Thomists in making the divine will prior to the divine nature, which is
consequent on the creative will. It seems to me confusing to call the
nontemporal “presence,” because presence is a temporal notion connected to
past and future, and what Ford means is that which is not in that
connection. That confusion also sets one up for an anti-presence onto-theo-logo
Heideggerian blast quite unnecessarily.
Another confusion
lurks here, however. Ford is clear that what is created is God as
envisioner. The eternal objects, ungraded and irrelevant to one another,
are aboriginal and uncreated, according to Whitehead. Yet how could they
exist, without vacuous actuality, in an unenvisioned state? They could
not, and so they are said to be nontemporally, i.e., eternally,
envisioned. But isn’t the only nontemporal creativity possible to God the
actual creating of the eternal objects as envisioned, which is the same as
creating God as envisioner? I think so: for eternal objects to exist they
must be envisioned and this means that they are created as envisioned.
But this is a big slip down the slope to creation ex nihilo, which
Ford wants to avoid, and for this reason he has attempted to minimize the
nontemporal aspects of factual creation.
Ford says, in the
passage just quoted, that a finite creature receives its past from other
creatures of the world, its future from God, and creates a new present
(itself) out of these. This is a decisive abandonment of another typical
process claim already noted, namely, that a creature’s past includes a
hybridly prehended lure from God; for Whitehead, God’s lure constitutes an
initial aim which is not future but among the data prehended. Ford’s
modification is to locate the lure in the future possibilities. Because
for him God is the creativity shaping the future real possibilities, all
of the creature’s possible being derives from God—a powerful doctrine of
creation. But the future real possibility is always a little
indeterminate or vague—otherwise it would be actual! So the creature
makes the final decisions as to how that vague lure shall be actualized,
and thus has a free responsibility over against God with which it is
possible to sin or at least choose stupidly. “I have set before you life
and death, blessings and curses. Choose life that you and your
descendants may live” (Deut. 30:19).
God, by contrast,
receives the world from the past into the nontemporal present and creates
the future for the world by transforming the pure possibilities into real
ones relevant to decisions of finite actual entities. The readiness of
real proximate future possibilities to be realized is what motivates a
finite actual occasion to become (CFK 188-189). But exactly how that
finite occasion becomes, within the limits of the possibility, is its own
choice. No matter how you cut it, a process God, Whitehead’s,
Hartshorne’s, or Ford’s, is not very much like a finite actual occasion.
In Ford’s case, the future has its actual residence—that which makes it a
non-vacuous reality—in God. The future cannot be actual on its own, for
the future is precisely that which is not yet actual and is too
indeterminate to be so. Nor can it be resident in the becoming of the
present, because the present has its own creative act separate from the
creativity of the future. This means that God cannot be in present time
if God is the actuality of the future and the present and future have
different temporal acts. Of course the future cannot be actual in the
past. So the future is actual in no time at all, rather in eternity or in
the peculiar time of God which combines past data with non-temporality.
God’s peculiar time cannot be the present, for Ford, as most other process
theologians would say, because present time has a different act of
concrescing from the reality that would hold future possibilities.
Ford’s originality
can be understood in part in the temporal implication of his view of God
as the power of the future, namely, that the future and past are as real
in their ways as the present. Although Whitehead himself was not clear on
this, most process theologians say that the past is unreal except as
objectively prehended in some present concrescing actual occasion, and
that the future is unreal except as anticipated in superjection by a
present concrescing actual occasion. For most process theologians, the
flow of time, transition, is from one present moment to the next present
moment, not from future to present to past.11 For them, the
past and future are real as different from the present only within the
mind of God through remembrance and anticipation, and for them God too (at
least for the Hartshorneans) is actual only in the present. For Ford, the
future is not to be reduced to the present in anticipation, not even to
some divine present (in which it would still have to be anticipation).
Rather, the future’s possibilities are real, the locus of the divine
contribution to finite process.
However anomalous
Ford’s position on this is to his fellow process theologians, it is quite
comfortable to me, a creation ex nihilo theologian with a deep
appreciation of eternity. Agreeing with process thinkers that “actuality”
means “actualized in time,” I would not say that the future is actual in
any sense. Nor is God actual in the nontemporal or eternal aspects. But
the future is real. What Ford has shown with his claim that God is the
creativity of the future is that the flow of time involves not only change
in the present but the constantly shifting contours of real possibilities,
and that these are necessarily connected. If the future were only
projected, anticipated, or superjected, as process philosophers sometimes
say, it would not be real and the becomings of present actual occasions
would be miracles each time. Ford should also say that the past does not
cease to exist except insofar as objectified in some present actuality, as
some process thinkers say, but that the flow of time from present to past
involves a similar shift in temporal modalities with the past being as
real in its way as the present.
In contrast to both
Ford and most other process theologians I say that the open-ended flow of
time requires God to create all the temporal modes together, not “at
once,” which is a temporal expression, but eternally together.12
Within the divine creative act, every date of every temporal thing’s
existence is constantly shifting like a future kaleidoscope as the time of
its becoming nears, every date has its decisive moment of becoming, and
every date fits into a past that extends ever more remotely as time
marches on. Whereas in the line of temporal flow there is a singular
order such that at any present date some things are all past and others
are all future, in the divine life lies an eternal dynamism in which all
futures are constantly shifting, all presents are happening, and all pasts
are actually exhibiting their achieved value. Temporal things are
stretched out in time, eternal in their full identity within the singular
divine creative act.
Against this, Ford
and most process theologians would object that the integrated divine
creation of future, present, and past eternally together for all things in
the moving flow of time ruins the strategy of separating divine and
creaturely acts of self-creation and hence different loci of
responsibility. True, I have to say that God’s creative act is
responsible for everything in one sense. But responsibility in the
relevant moral sense has to do with temporal decisions, decisions within
time.13 God is not within time, and only the finite creatures
are. For the latter, the future is open to some extent, and Ford’s
analysis of partly indeterminate real possibilities applies. God,
however, does not know or determine things in advance because God occupies
no temporal place in advance of anything, on my theory. So, to my mind,
the difference between the singular eternal act of creating which issues
in and contains the whole of time’s flow and the limited temporal nature
of responsibility in finite creatures is sufficient to locate human
responsibility solidly in humans. The sense in which God is responsible
for the whole, including its dark side and evil, is very different from
human responsibility, and resonates with deep religious sensibilities on
its own. The point for morality is to locate human agential
responsibility in people and prevent the scapegoating of God. The point
for the dark side of creation, and for the transformative bliss of
blessing God with gratitude for the life that contains indifference of
scale, suffering, evil, and death within it—an integral part of many
people’s Christian spirituality, including mine—is not registered by Ford
or any other process theologian. There might be a disagreement of basic
intuitions or sensibilities here. But let us not acquiesce in differences
in intuition yet.
The defense of
different metaphysical views is very complicated and both Ford and I have
given many that cannot be reviewed here. But I would like to raise here
the question of the unity of the temporal modes, at least those of the
present and future, in temporal flow. Ford’s hypothesis is that
creativity, not God, is the integrating connector of things future,
present, and past. This is the only way to preserve the separation of the
divine exercise of responsibility and that of humans. Yet creativity has
no character of its own save in its exercise in specific actualizations.
Even if God creates future possibilities to be relevant from the future’s
standpoint to concrescing actual occasions, there is nothing in that to
make the possibilities relevant from the standpoint of the concrescence
which is not real until it happens. It was for this reason that Whitehead
and others placed the divine lures in the past or actual world of
concrescing occasions; for them, future possibilities are not relevant for
concrescence save insofar as anticipation in conscious beings might shape
a superject through them. But lures from the past are not enough
ontologically if contemporary concrescences are required jointly to
specify a common future with a field character, as surely they must; Ford
rightly recognizes that the future has to be real, not mere anticipation,
even divine anticipation. Creativity, featureless as it is, cannot manage
transition through the modes of time, future, present, and past, if the
acts of creativity are modally different, one (divine) for the future,
another for the (finite) present. Far better it is to say that one
eternal divine creative act creates temporal things in their flow with all
the modes working together in the shifts from one present moment to the
next (oversimplifying here the problems of simultaneity, etc.). Only a
creative act that is eternal, embracing the various activities and shifts
of the temporal modes together and not itself in any temporal mode, can
make the temporal modes relevant to one another, specifically, make the
real possibilities relevant from the standpoint of emerging concrescent
occasions.
V. Ford on Christology
Setting aside our
disputes about time and eternity, and the differences about the
philosophical models of God, I want to point out some further theological
aspects of Ford’s theory. In Christology, he holds plainly that the
Christian commitment is to Jesus as the incarnation of the logos for the
human situation, and perhaps not for the whole of the human situation but
for that interpretable within the history of Israel and the expanding
cultures of Christianity (LG 63ff). For Ford, “salvation is the
application of God’s creative purpose to intelligent life” (LG 64). Not
all intelligent life could make much of Jesus. But we need to ask, for
the intelligent life that can, what salvation in Jesus would mean.
Ford directly bases
his answer to that on the resurrection of Jesus. How should we interpret
the New Testament witness to the resurrection? Ford cites Pannenberg’s
claim that both Jesus’ resurrection and the promise of resurrection for
Christians are to be interpreted in light of an apocalyptic general
resurrection. He then cites Gordon Kaufman’s claim that if the
apocalyptic expectation is disregarded, as Ford himself wants to do, then
the resurrection experiences of the early church were hallucinations.
Kaufman concludes that the hallucinations were fortunate, for they led the
early Christians to found the church, the body of Christ. Ford
distinguishes, however, among hallucinations, which are merely
subjective, veridical perceptions, which did not happen in the case
of the resurrection appearances, and visions. Visions have a
subjective shape like hallucinations, but objective reference to
non-perceptible realities (LG 71- 74).14 What is the
non-perceptible reality referred to in the case of the experiences of the
resurrected Jesus? Ford suggests that it is the spirit of Jesus that
animates the church. This is to say, the logos incarnate in Jesus is
apprehended in the love of the disciples so that it animates the
community. The resurrected Jesus is literally the church as the Body of
Christ, for Ford, a very high Christology and ecclesiology indeed.15
According to the
tradition reported by Paul and the Gospel writers, Peter encountered Jesus
as Lord and Christ on the third day after his death. In what form Christ
appeared to Peter we do not know; nor is it important, for we regard it as
an hallucinatory accompaniment to the actual encounter. Peter experienced
the Spirit of Christ, a nonperceptible reality proposing aims for guiding
the actions of Peter directly analogous to the nonperceptible reality of
the human mind as guiding the actions of the body. Peter encountered a
Spirit he knew to be one with the extraordinary life of the Master he had
followed, a Spirit to whom he could now fully dedicate himself in the
confidence that the aims and directives it mediated served God’s purposes,
just as Jesus had served those purposes during his lifetime. Moreover,
this Spirit was living, dynamic, responsive to growing circumstance. As
others encountered this same reality, they too became the
instrumentalities of its will, as they became knit together into that
common life we know as the body of Christ. Peter and the others
experienced this dynamic presence in their midst as shaping their common
activities; they remembered Jesus’ life and death and could interpret this
phenomenon in only one way, proclaimed by Peter at Pentecost. This Jesus,
whom you crucified, God has raised up and made both Lord and Christ (Acts
2:23-24, 36). (LG 78)
The spirit of Jesus
animating the church is not some vapid liberal “team spirit” for Ford.
“This transformed human community forms a living organism, a biological
phenomenon which we conceive to be the next stage in the emergent
evolution of the world, and the incarnation of the divine Word” (LG 74).
Thus the general divine purpose of eliciting value in intensity of
experience is made specific for the present situation of humankind. The
kind of human community the church is supposed to be, and ideally is as
animated by the mind of Christ, is a new level of biological evolution for
intelligent beings, claims Ford. It could not have happened without the
readiness of the disciples through the history of Israel, nor without the
life of Jesus; and it is contingent upon the continuing inspiration of the
church community.
But how does this
redeeming community work? Jesus’ encouragement of his disciples to get
along with one another in love during his life was spectacularly
unsuccessful. Ford’s answer is that reconciliation comes through the
cross, which makes resurrection possible. “Evil lies in the mutual
obstruction of things; their conflict and disharmony engender suffering
and loss” (LG 93). God’s infinite conceptuality allows any conflict to be
taken up into a higher pattern of harmony. Whitehead said that the
appreciation of this fact is what gives rise to Peace. But most of us do
not have that Peace and cannot be reconciled by an intellectual
hypothesis. Ford points out that this Peace is exactly what Jesus lost on
the cross when he cried that God had forsaken him. “Jesus did not die a
‘good’ death, with the serene nobility of a Socrates, but in the painful
awareness that the intimate presence of God had been withdrawn in the
ultimate hour, and that he had been abandoned as one rejected” (LG 93).
Yet Jesus continued to love God, and to commit his spirit to God. This
pain and love make sense to us, so that we can participate in the living
resurrected Body of Christ as reconciled.
All this leads Ford
to a version of Christian trinitarianism: “the divine creative act
nontemporally generating the primordial nature, from which proceeds the
consequent nature as implicated in the Whiteheadian ‘categorial
conditions’ established by the primordial envisagement” (LG 110). The
Father (the nontemporal creative act) generates the Son (the primordial
nature) from which the Spirit (the consequent nature) proceeds. Unlike
the Patristic formulation, God does not exist in total independence of the
world, for Ford; indeed, the consequent nature requires the prehension of
the world and the divine address to the world. So, Ford’s doctrine of the
spirit essentially relates to the world. But unlike what process
philosophers call the neo-classical conception of God, Ford’s position
does not conceive the world to be wholly dependent on God but partially
transcendent so that finite things are responsible far their own exercise
of creativity, and God is thus essentially relational regarding the world
as well as in the internal persons.
Many questions
remain concerning whether this trinitarianism can be worked out. On the
metaphysical level, I have argued that it is not possible for God to
prehend the world, and vice versa.16 On the
Christological level, Ford’s is what Wesley J. Wildman would call a
“modest Christology” which better than the Patristic creedal ideas
captures what was authentic in biblical views of Jesus and what is
plausible and transformative today.17 Much work remains to be
done to study Ford’s views as Christian theology and to put them in
perspective with those of, say, Schubert Ogden, John B. Cobb, Jr., and
Marjorie Suchocki. I hope I have shown enough of his view here, however,
to make that work attractive and to indicate my enormous respect.
References
CFK Lewis S. Ford,
“Creativity in a Future Key,” New Essays in Metaphysics, edited by
Robert C. Neville. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987.
LG Lewis S. Ford,
The Lure of God: A Biblical Background for Process Theism.
Philadelphia, PA, Westminster, 1978.
NTWG Lewis S. Ford,
“The Non-temporality of Whitehead’s God,” International Philosophical
Quarterly 13 (1973).
ST3 Paul Tillich,
Systematic Theology, Volume 3. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 1963.
Notes
1
I am privileged to have begun learning from Ford back in graduate school
when we held detailed and technical discussions of Whitehead and Tillich,
and he attempted with only moderate success to cure me of my errors. Our
latest exchange in print continues his attempt to help me with his essay,
“Creation and Concrescence,” and my “Reply,” in Critical Studies in the
Thought of Robert C. Neville, edited by J. Harley Chapman and
Nancy Frankenberry (Albany: State University of New York Press,
forthcoming 1999). In the meantime, there have been sets of published
debate and many conversations. For instance, see The Southern Journal
of Philosophy 7 (1969-1970) with his “On Genetic Successiveness” and
my “Whitehead on the One and the Many”; and his response, “Neville’s
Interpretation of Creativity,” his Explorations in Whitehead’s
Philosophy, edited with George L. Kline (New York: Fordham University
Press, 1983). My Creativity and God (New York. The Seabury Press,
1980; new edition: State University of New York Press, 1995) discussed his
philosophical theology extensively to which he responded (with Charles
Hartshorne and John B. Cobb, Jr.) in “Thee Responses to Neville’s
Creativity and God” in Process Studies 10 (1980),
33-34, and to which I came back in “Concerning Creativity and God:
A Response” in Process Studies 11(1981), 1-10. Moreover, those
fortunate enough to be Ford’s correspondents know the treasure of his
long, detailed letters chock full of arguments and citations and totally
devoid of ego.
2His
best-known work in the last genre is The Emergence of Whitehead’s
Metaphysics. 1925-1929 (Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 1984).
3See,
for instance, George A. Lindbeck’s The Nature of Doctrine
(Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1984)
4See
Hans Frei’s lament of this in The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative
(New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1974).
5See,
for instance, the extraordinarily well structured set of debates in
Religion and Science: History, Method, Dialogue, edited by W. Mark
Richardson and Wesley J. Wildman (New York: Routledge, 1996).
6
See Herman Deuser’s
brilliant analysis of the differences between continental theology, with
its exclusion of philosophy of nature, and American theology influenced by
process and pragmatic thought, in “Neville’s Theology of Creation,
Covenant, and Trinity,” American Journal of Theology and Philosophy
18 (1997), 215-237.
7See,
for instance, Oscar Cullmann’s Christ and Time, translated by Floyd
V. Filson (Revised edition: Philadelphia, PA: Westminster, 1964).
8
I have argued this
complicated alternative to process theology in my thee-volume Axiology
of Thinking, consisting of Reconstruction of Thinking (Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press, 1981), Recovery of the Measure
(Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 1989), and
Normative Cultures (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,
1995).
9
See, for instance,
his discussion of this point in “Creativity in a Future Key,” New
Essays in Metaphysics, edited by Robert C. Neville (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1987), 179-197, especially 194-195.
10Whitehead’s
point begins chapter 3 of part 1 of Process and Reality “The
primordial created fact is the unconditioned conceptual valuation of the
entire multiplicity of eternal objects. This is the ‘primordial nature’ of
God.” Process and Reality, Corrected Edition, edited by David Ray
Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: Free Press, 1978), 31. Ford
discusses God as the creativity of the future in many places beyond those
discussed here. See for instance “The Divine Activity of the Future,”
Process Studies 11 (1981), 169-179
11
The subtlest
discussion of this is Jorge Luis Nobo’s in Whitehead’s Metaphysics of
Extension and Solidarity (Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 1986). Ford believes that Nobo’s account is right about a view of
time’s passage that Whitehead subsequently gave up (an argument within
Ford’s compositional analysis). I think that Whitehead was mistaken to
give that view up, coming as close as process philosophy can to
acknowledging real transition within the flow of time, and that Nobo’s
theory is the best attempt to save Whitehead.
12
I have argued this at length in Eternity and Times Flow (Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press, 1993); see also my “Time,
Temporality, and Ontology,” The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne,
Library of Living Philosophers, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn (La Salle,
IL, Open Court, 1991).
13
See my The Cosmology of Freedom (New Haven, CN: Yale University
Press, 1974; new edition: Albany, NY, State University of New York Press,
1995).
14
My own The Truth
of Broken Symbols (Albany, NY, State University of New York Press,
1996) defends this point.
15
See Ford’s subtle
discussion of New Testament terms for the physical and spiritual bodies of
resurrected persons, including Jesus, at The Lure of God, 74 ff.
16
See my Creativity
and God (new edition: Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,
1995).
17
See his Fidelity
with Plausibility: Modest Christologies in the Twentieth Century
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998).
Posted April 15,
2007
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