From
The Controversy of
Zion,
Chapter 38. Text as it appears
here has been reformatted. The
entire book is available in .pdf format
here.
“Thus Mr. Churchill’s ten years in the political wilderness,
1929-1939, were also ones during which he was in disfavour with the
Zionists and Dr. Weizmann’s narrative never mentions him until the eve
of the Second War, when he is suddenly ‘discovered’ (as the
playwrights used to say) in it as a most ardent champion of Zionism.
This is the more curious because, as late as
October 20, 1938,
Mr. Churchill was still talking like the author of the White Paper of
1922: ‘We should . . . give to the Arabs a solemn assurance. . . that
the annual quota of Jewish immigration should not exceed a certain
figure for a period of at least ten years.’ Very soon after that he
re-emerges in Dr. Weizmann’s account as a man implicitly and
privately agreed to support a Zionist immigration of millions.”—Douglas
Reed
The Little Country Far Away
Douglas Reed
In forgotten Palestine during the 1930-1940 decade, while
“The Chief” and “Der Fuehrer” reigned in Washington and Berlin,
matters went from bad to worse and at the end a British government was
about to abandon the hopeless task foisted on it by Mr. Balfour (who
died in 1930 after a deathbed leavetaking from Dr. Weizmann) when, on
the eve of another war, a Mr. Winston Churchill recommitted his
country to it. Thus the British people, believing that their business
was solely with Hitler, once more went into war under sealed orders,
among which was the purpose, unsuspected by them, that had brought
them to the brink of defeat in 1918.
Successive British governments, in this affair, found
themselves in the plight of the circus clown who cannot rid himself of
the fly-paper; each time they thought they had shaken it off, Dr.
Weizmann affixed it in a new place. In
Palestine the
British administrators and soldiers, on whom “the Mandate” had been
thrust, could not do their duty. The Arabs obdurately rebelled; the
Zionists in
London importuned the government there to use force
against the Arabs; if the men on the spot tried to act impartially
between the parties orders from home restrained them.
British history overseas is probably vindicated by results
in every case but this. It produced free overseas nations in empty
lands, and in conquered ones populated by others the oft-proclaimed
(and ever-derided) intention to upraise the conquered and then depart
is being carried out; India is only one proof of that. In the case of
Palestine
all the rules previously followed by
Britain
overseas were broken and all experience set at naught, under the
“pressure” exercized in London, or from other capitals if London ever
baulked.
Thus the British officials and troops sent to
Palestine were the
unluckiest in British history (characteristically, the only man among
them who was publicly honoured after their departure was a traitor).
They knew how to administer a genuine “protectorate”; the word has an
honest meaning as well as the false one mockingly given to it by
Hitler in Czechoslovakia. Occupation with the consent, or at the
invitation of native inhabitants can be an admirable thing. I have
travelled in one such genuine “protectorate,” Basutoland. The British
went there at Basuto request and the consequence was that the Basuto
survived as a free nation, where they would otherwise have been
enslaved by stronger neighbours. Their lot and prospect today are
better than they could have become in any other way and they realize
this, so that a few dozen white administrators govern 660,000 Basuto
in mutual esteem.
The British in
Palestine, for the
first time in their nation’s history, were required to repress the
people they had come to “protect” and to protect others who were in
fact invaders from Russia. The corruption of “the civil power” in
England, from Mr. Balfour’s time on, achieved this result. The
supreme maxim of Western constitutionalism is that “the civil power”
must always be superior to the military one, so that militarist
regimes may not arise. But if the civil power yields to the dictates
of a secret third party with military aims, it becomes in fact
inferior to a military power, though not to its native generals.
In this way the supreme maxim is stood on its head, because a nation’
s armed forces can then be put at the service of interests alien to,
and destructive of, its own. This happened in Palestine.
The repression of native Arabs as “rebels” did not help
Zionism in
Palestine.
At the start of the 1930-1940 decade the rise of Hitler
strengthened its position in the lobbies of
London and
Washington, but this improvement was counterbalanced by the further
deterioration which occurred in Palestine itself as the decade wore
on. During this later period Dr. Weizmann, who from 1904 to 1919 had
concentrated his efforts on the British government extended his
activities to two new places; his orbit covered “Jerusalem, London and
New York” and he dealt with British prime ministers like a man
whittling sticks.
His next victim was, once more, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, who
after desertion by his Socialist colleagues became prime minister of a
coalition government of all other parties. Young Jimmy Macdonald from
Lossiemouth, Scotland’s poor boy made good, was by this time Mr.
Ramsay Macdonald of the graying, floating hair. He made his son, Mr.
Malcolm Macdonald, Under-Secretary for the Colonies, and therewith
both Macdonalds left the happy dreamland of Socialist platform oratory
for the cold, hard world of “irresistible pressure.” Mr. Macdonald
again set out to stop the endless fighting and rioting in Palestine,
which by this time had claimed many British lives, and soon announced
that his government would suspend Zionist immigration, regulate
Zionist land purchases, and punish incitements to disorder “in
whatever quarter they may originate .”
Mr. Macdonald at once became the object of violent attack
and began to wear the bewildered mien for which he became famous (and
which I observed when I met him in 1935). He received the visit of
Dr. Weizmann and three Zionist associates and was accused of “dealing
rather frivolously” with “the moral implications of promises
given to Jews” (Dr. Weizmann). Leading politicians in his own country,
America and
South Africa began a furious campaign against him. Intimidated a
second time, he appointed a special Cabinet Committee to reconsider
the oft-considered “Palestine policy.” A Socialist minister, Mr.
Arthur Henderson, was chairman and Mr. Malcolm Macdonald was
secretary; Dr. Weizmann and six leading Zionists formed “the
committee”; the Arabs, as usual, were not represented.
Dr. Weizmann violently attacked the undertaking to punish
incitements to disorder from whatever quarter; disorder,
violence and massacre, he said, originated only with the native
Arabs. Mr. Macdonald again surrendered in a letter to Dr. Weizmann,
under the terms of which Zionist immigration to
Palestine in 1934
and 1935 exceeded all previous figures. Having dealt with Mr.
Macdonald Dr. Weizmann undertook the grand tour. As the Second War
approached he was everywhere, in South Africa, Turkey, France, Italy,
Belgium and other lands. In France he met “every premier between the
two wars” and of these he found M. Leon Blum, a co-religionist, to be
especially sympathetic. M. Aristide Briand, the Foreign Minister, was
also well-disposed “although a little vague as to what was going on”
(Dr. Weizmann often refers in such terms to the Western politicians
who did his bidding). He saw Mussolini three times. He spoke to
distinguished audiences about the iniquities of Hitler and told them
it was “the responsibility of the civilized world” on this account to
expel the Palestinean Arabs (he did not put it so plainly).
Nevertheless, by the later 1930’s Zionism in
Palestine was
disintegrating again. But for the Second War it would have faded into
oblivion, an Arabian Jameson Raid undertaken in irresponsibility and
ignominiously ended.
In 1936 Arab rioting became even more violent. By then
successive British governments for fourteen years, at Zionist behest,
had refused to allow the Arabs to hold elections. With time Dr.
Weizmann’s argument that this refusal was of the essence of
“democracy” lost appeal and the British government found itself in an
increasingly difficult dilemma. Mr. Stanley
Baldwin (after
succeeding Mr. Macdonald) resorted to the old “pending-basket”
procedure; he sent one more commission of investigation (the fifth?)
to Palestine, and at this point the thing became plain farce.
Mr. Macdonald had been cowed by Dr. Weizmann and his
bodyguard into cancelling a “Palestine
policy” announced after full consultation with his responsible
advisers. Now that Mr. Baldwin sent a commission to Palestine to
discover an alternative policy it was received by Dr. Weizmann! With
agility he hopped from London to Jerusalem and back, telling the
British government in London what to do, their Commissioners in
Palestine what to report, and the British government in London, again,
what it should do with the report when it arrived. (Betweenwhiles he
visited New York
to arrange for more “pressure” from that quarter).
This Peel Commission received from some quarter a proposal
that the eternal dilemma might be solved by partitioning
Palestine, and
promptly consulted Dr. Weizmann. Until that moment the pretence had
been kept up, all through the years, that the Zionists did not claim a
Jewish state, only the “national home.” Dr. Weizmann knew that if a
British government could once be brought to support “partition” it
would at last be committed to a separate Jewish state.
His Asiatic mastery of the art of negotiation compels
admiration. By invoking the Old Testament he firmly nailed down the
idea of partition without committing himself to any boundaries.
He said that he might be able to make some concession about the
actual area to be taken for his Zionists, as Jehovah had not indicated
precise frontiers in his revelations to the Levites. This accepted
the offer of territory while leaving the entire question of boundaries
open so that even “partition,” obviously, was to be no solution. The
words with which Dr. Weizmann supported partition are of interest in
the light of later events: “The Arabs are afraid that we shall absorb
the whole of
Palestine. Say
what we will about the preservation of their rights, they are
dominated by fear and will not listen to reason. A Jewish state with
definite boundaries internationally guaranteed would be something
final; the transgressing of these boundaries would be an act of war
which the Jews would not commit, not merely because of its moral
implications, but because it would arouse the whole world against
them.”
The Peel Commission recommended partition and stated that
“the Mandate” was unworkable. Had the British Government acted on
that report and promptly withdrawn from Palestine much might have been
spared mankind, but within two years the Second World War reinvolved
it in the insoluble problem.
As it approached Dr. Weizmann continued to beleaguer the
Western politicians with the argument that “the Jewish National Home
would play a very considerable role in that part of the world as the
one reliable ally of the democracies.” By this he meant that the
Zionist demand for arms for the forcible seizure of
Palestine, which
was about to be made, would be presented in that way, through the
politicians and the press, to the public masses of the West. In 1938
he then proposed to Mr. Ormsby-Gore, British Secretary for the
Colonies, that the Zionists should be allowed to form a force of
something like 40,000 men. This presupposed that the unnecessary war
would come about (an anticipation in which the leading men behind the
scenes apparently were all agreed), and Dr. Weizmann did all he could
to ensure this, using the case of the Jews as his sole argument.
After the murder of von Rath and the anti-Jewish disorders in Germany
he told Mr. Anthony Eden:
“If a government is allowed to destroy a whole community
which has committed no crime
. . . it means the beginning of anarchy and the
destruction of the basis of civilization. The powers which stand
looking on without taking any measures to prevent the crime will one
day be visited by severe punishment.”
Hitler’s persecution of men was ignored in these
private, fateful, interviews in political antechambers; the plight of
one “community” alone was advanced as the argument for war.
The Zionists, as events have shown, were intent on destroying “a
whole community which had committed no crime” (the Arabs of
Palestine,
who knew nothing of Hitler) and the arms they demanded were used for
that purpose. Significantly, Dr. Weizmann put his argument in terms
of the Christian creed; under that teaching the destruction of
a community innocent of crime is itself a crime which will
bring “severe punishment.” Under the Levitical Law, however, which
Dr. Weizmann invoked as the basis of his demand for Palestine, it is
the chief “statute and commandment,” to be rewarded by power and
treasure, not punished.
In the last twelvemonth before the Second War the secret
arbiters of power exerted their maximum effort to gain control of men
and events. Mr. Roosevelt was “committed” but could only be made use
of at a later stage. In
England Mr.
Baldwin, the Worcestershire squire and manufacturer, gave way to the
Birmingham business-man, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, in whom a serious
obstacle to the exercise of “irresistible pressure” behind the scenes
arose.
Mr. Chamberlain’s name is linked with the final, fatal act
of encouragement to Hitler: the abandonment and enforced surrender of
Czechoslovakia at Munich. For a few weeks the public masses thought
he had saved the peace by this deed and at that moment I, in Budapest
and Prague, first understood what Thomas Jefferson meant when he said,
“I really look with commiseration over the great body of my fellow
citizens who, reading newspapers, live and die in the belief that they
have known something of what has been passing in the world of their
times.”
Nevertheless, Mr. Chamberlain may have calculated that he
was compelled to do what he did by the state of British weakness and
unpreparedness which his predecessor, Mr. Baldwin, had allowed to come
about. I believe he was wrong if he so calculated; even at that late
moment firmness would have saved the day, because the German generals
were ready to overthrow Hitler; but he may have been honestly
convinced that he could not act otherwise. Where he unforgivably
erred was in depicting the deed of
Munich
as something morally right and in bolstering up this contention
with allusions to “a small country a long way away with which we have
nothing to do,” or similar words.
However, he was at least consistent in this last attitude.
He wanted to disentangle
England from its
imbroglio in another small country far away where it had found only
tribulation bequeathed to it by Mr. Balfour. What he did incurred the
bitter enmity of those who were powerful behind the political scenes,
and in my opinion the true source of his overthrow may have been the
same as that of Mr. Asquith in 1916.
1938, when the word “partition” rang out, was the bloodiest
year in Palestine
up to that time; 1500 Arabs were killed. The Peel Commission had
recommended partition but could not suggest how it might be effected.
Yet another body of investigators was sent out, this time in search
of a means of bisecting the infant without killing it. This Woodhead
Commission reported in October 1938 that it could not devise a
practical plan; in November the von Rath murder and the anti-Jewish
disorders which followed it in Germany were used by the Zionists to
intensify their incitements against the Arabs in Palestine.
Mr. Chamberlain then did an extraordinary thing, by the
standards prevailing. He called a
Palestine
conference in London at which the Arabs (for the first time
since the Peace Conference of 1919) were represented. From this
conference emerged the White Paper of March 1939 in which the British
government undertook “the establishment within ten years of an
independent
Palestine state”
and
“the termination of the Mandate.” In this state the native Arabs
and immigrant Zionists were to share the government in such a
way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community
were safeguarded. Jewish immigration was to be limited to 75,000
annually for five years and the irrevocable land-purchases were
to be restricted.
This plan, if carried out, meant peace in
Palestine at last,
but no separate Jewish state. At that moment the figure of Mr.
Winston Churchill advanced to the forefront of British affairs. He
had for ten years been in political eclipse and the future student may
be interested to know what contemporaries have already forgotten: that
during this period he was a highly unpopular man, not because of any
specific acts or quality, but because he was consistently given that
“bad press” which is the strongest weapon in the hands of those who
control political advancement. This organized hostility was made
particularly plain during the abdication crisis of 1937, when his
pleas for time received much more bitter attack than they
inherently deserved and he was howled down in the House of Commons.
His biographers depict him as suffering from depression during
these years and thinking himself “finished” politically. His feeling
in that respect may be reflected in his published words (privately
written) to Mr. Bernard Baruch early in 1939: “War is coming very
soon. We will be in it and you will be in it. You will be
running the show over there, but I will be on the
sidelines over here.”
Very soon after he wrote this Mr. Churchill’s political
fortunes took a sudden turn for the better and (as in the case
of Mr. Lloyd George in 1916) his attitude towards Zionism appears to
have had much to do with this, to judge from what has been
published. His record in this matter suggests that Mr. Churchill, the
product of Blenheim and
Brooklyn, is
something of “a riddle inside a mystery wrapped in an enigma,” to use
the words employed by him about the Communist state in 1939. In 1906,
as has been shown, he was among the earliest of the politicians who
supported Zionism on the hustings, so that a Zionist speaker said any
Jew who voted against him was a traitor. However, in office
during the First War he took little part in that affair and Dr.
Weizmann only mentions him once at that period, and then not as a
“friend.” Then, as Colonial Secretary in 1922, he gave offence to
Zion
by his White Paper, which Dr. Weizmann calls “a serious whittling down
of the Balfour Declaration.” It proposed for Palestine “a
Legislative Council with a majority of elected members,”
and this would have meant, not only holding those elections which Dr.
Weizmann to the end forbade, but allowing the native Arabs of
Palestine
to govern their own country!
Thus Mr. Churchill’s ten years in the political wilderness,
1929-1939, were also ones during which he was in disfavour with the
Zionists and Dr. Weizmann’s narrative never mentions him until the eve
of the Second War, when he is suddenly “discovered” (as the
playwrights used to say) in it as a most ardent champion of Zionism.
This is the more curious because, as late as
October 20, 1938, Mr. Churchill was still talking like the author of the
White Paper of 1922: “We should . . . give to the Arabs a solemn
assurance. . . that the annual quota of Jewish immigration should not
exceed a certain figure for a period of at least ten years.” Very
soon after that he re-emerges in Dr. Weizmann’s account as a man
implicitly and privately agreed to support a Zionist
immigration of millions.
Quite suddenly Dr. Weizmann says that in 1939 he “met Mr.
Winston Churchill” (ignored in his story for seventeen years) “and he
told me he would take part in the debate, speaking of course
against the Proposed White Paper.” The reader is left to guess
why Mr. Churchill should have undertaken “of course” to speak against
a document which, in its emphasis on the need to do justice to the
Arabs, was in accord with his own White Paper of 1922 and with his
speeches for seventeen years after it.
Then, on the day of this debate, Dr. Weizmann was invited
to lunch with Mr. Churchill “who read his speech out to us” and asked
if Dr. Weizmann had any changes to suggest. The reader will recall
that editors of The Times and Manchester Guardian wrote
editorial articles about Zionism after consultation with the chieftain
of one interested party; now Mr. Churchill approached a debate on a
major issue of state policy in the same manner. He was renowned for
the quality of his speeches, and became so in
America on account
of the strange fact (as it was considered there) that he wrote them
himself. However, in the circumstances above described by Dr.
Weizmann, the point of actual penmanship appears of minor importance.
At that moment Mr. Churchill’s “championship” (Dr. Weizmann)
was vain; the great debate ended in victory for Mr. Chamberlain and
his White Paper by a majority of 268 to 179. It was substantial, but
many politicians already smelt the wind and their sail-trimming
instinct is reflected in the unusually large number of abstentions:
110. This gave the first warning to Mr. Chamberlain of the method, of
dereliction within his own party, by which he was to be overthrown.
The debate showed another interesting thing, namely, that the
Opposition party by this time held Zionism to be a supreme tenet of
its policy, and, indeed, the ultimate test by which a man could prove
whether he was a “Socialist” or not! The rising Socialist party had
long forgotten the wrongs of the working man, the plight of the
oppressed and the sad lot of “the underdog”; it was caught up in
international intrigue and wanted to be on the side of the top-dog.
Thus Mr. Herbert Morrison, a Socialist leader, pointed accusingly at
Mr. Malcolm Macdonald (whose department was closely identified with
the White Paper) and mourned the heresy of a man who “was once a
Socialist.” Socialism, too, by this time meant driving Arabs out of
Palestine, and the trade union notables, with their presentation gold
watches, did not care how poor or oppressed those distant people were.
The Second War
broke out very soon after the issuance of the White Paper and the
debate. At once all thought of “establishing an independent Palestine” and “terminating the Mandate” was suspended, for the duration of the
war (and at its end a very different picture was to be unveiled). At
its start Mr. Roosevelt in
America was “publicly and privately committed” to support Zionism (Mr. Harry
Hopkins). In
England Mr. Chamberlain was an impediment, but he was on his way out. Mr.
Churchill was on his way in. The people wanted him, because he was
“the man who had been right” about Hitler and the war; they knew
nothing of his talks with Dr. Weizmann and the effects these might
produce.
Douglas Reed page