Process, Insight, and Empirical Method
An
Argument for the Compatibility of the Philosophies of Alfred North
Whitehead and Bernard J. F. Lonergan and Its Implications for
Foundational Theology.
A
Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Divinity School, The
University of Chicago, for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
December 1983
Thomas Hosinski, C.S.C.
Chapter I:
Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s Interpretations of Empirical Scientific
Method and Philosophic Method
This chapter has two principal
tasks. First, I want to set forth the understandings or interpretations
of empirical scientific method present in the philosophies of Whitehead
and Lonergan and to compare them. My thesis is that they are virtually
identical. When I first observed this virtual identity between their
interpretations of empirical scientific method, it acted as a clue
suggesting that Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s philosophies might be
compatible in ways that had not yet been recognized. The first step in
pursuing this clue would be to trace the influence of their
interpretations of empirical scientific method on their understanding of
philosophic method. Thus the second task of this chapter is to discuss
how Whitehead and Lonergan understand the relation between empirical
scientific method and the method of philosophy. This discussion ought
to reveal if there are in fact grounds for suggesting that their
philosophies are in any respects compatible.
It might be expected that the first
task of this study would be to define precisely what is meant by the
term “empirical scientific method.” For two reasons, however, I must
begin by giving a very general meaning to that term. First, to specify
Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s understandings of “empirical scientific
method” is exactly one of the tasks of the chapter, and these specific
understandings obviously can emerge only in the course of the study.
Secondly, as I shall discuss in Chapter II, there is no agreement among
contemporary philosophers of science as to what exactly constitutes
empirical scientific method. Indeed, the diversity in contemporary
philosophy of science arises largely in response to this very question.
See, e.g., Dudley
Shapere, “Introduction,” to Dudley Shapere, ed., Philosophical
Problems of Natural Science (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 1-29;
or, more recently, Frederick Suppe, ed., The Structure of Scientific
Theories, 2nd ed. (Urbana/Chicago: University of Illinois Press,
1977), especially Suppe, “The Search for Philosophic Understanding of
Scientific Theories,” pp. 3-241, and Suppe, “Afterword,” pp. 617-730.
Given such pluralism of specific interpretations, I must begin this
study with a very general meaning for the term “empirical scientific
method.” By “empirical scientific method,” then, I mean the method of
reasoning used in the empirical sciences, the way in which scientists
pursue understanding and knowledge in the natural and physical sciences.
It is perhaps evident from this preliminary definition that my concern
is not with the specific methods actually used in the sciences but with
the structure and dynamic of the general method which guides the
application and use of the specific methods within each specialized
science. It will become clear that this is also the concern of
Whitehead and Lonergan.
Whitehead’s
Interpretation of Scientific and Philosophic Method
Although Whitehead’s early writings
The generally accepted
division of Whitehead’s writings into “earlier and “later” takes the
publication of Alfred North Whitehead’s Science and the Modern World
(New York: Macmillan, 1926) as the first of his “later” works. Included
in his “early” writings would be the books An Inquiry Concerning the
Principles of Natural Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1919; The Concept of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1920); and The Principle of Relativity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), as well as the earlier
An Introduction to Mathematics (London: Williams and Norgate; New
York: Henry Holt and Co., 1911); (with Bertrand Russell) Principia
Mathematica, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1910-1913; The Axioms of Descriptive Geometry (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1907; The Axioms of Projective Geometry
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1906); and A Treatise on
Universal Algebra (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1898).
Also included in Whitehead’s “early” writings are a significant number
of articles and papers, many of which are collected in The Aims of
Education and Other Essays (New York: Macmillan, 1929) and The
Interpretation of Science: Selected Essays, ed. A. H. Johnson
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961).
are almost exclusive concerned with the philosophy of science, no
extensive analysis of empirical scientific method occurs in them.
Whitehead was interested primarily in clarifying and revising the
central concepts used in science, concepts which one could alternatively
regard as forming the underlying basis of scientific thought or as
expressing the fruition of the scientific analysis of nature. In the
course of his analyses, the actual method of scientific thought is most
often presumed by Whitehead rather than becoming the focus of his
discussions. There are several appeals to the actual method of
empirical scientific thought in Whitehead’s critiques of traditional
scientific concepts,
See, e.g., Whitehead’s
statement in “Time, Space, and Material,” The Interpretation of
Science: Selected Essays, ed. A. H. Johnson (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1961, p. 57: “Murder is a prerequisite for the absorption of biology
into physics as expressed in these traditional concepts.
“This account of
nature and of physical science has, in my opinion, every vice of a hasty
systematization based on a false simplicity; it does not fit the facts.”
(Hereafter cited as IS.)
that is, arguments that some particular conclusion embodied in a
scientific concept does not satisfy the demands of scientific method
since it does not conform to the facts of experience. But in his early
work there is no extended discussion of that method itself.
By engaging in a detailed analysis
of Whitehead’s many books and papers on the fundamental concepts of
modern science it might prove possible to arrive at his presupposed
understanding of empirical scientific method. Frankly, however, this
would be a tedious task of little interest for my purposes. It is not
necessary for my thesis to become involved in a detailed study of the
content of Whitehead’s philosophy of science
Detailed studies of
Whitehead’s philosophy of science are available. See Robert M. Palter,
Whitehead’s Philosophy of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1960); the brief analysis given in A. H. Johnson, “Introduction”
to IS, pp. xi-xli; and Wolfe Mays, Whitehead’s Philosophy of
Science and Metaphysics (The Hague: Martinus Nijoff, 1977).
since the focus of my concern is how the method of empirical science
influences and is used in his philosophy. Fortunately Whitehead has,
albeit briefly, set forth his understanding of empirical scientific
method in his later works where his discussions shift to cosmological
and metaphysical concerns. Still, it is important at this juncture to
show that a fundamental relationship exists between Whitehead’s earlier
work in the philosophy of science and his later work in cosmology and
metaphysics.
A fairly common approach to
Whitehead’s work is to view it as falling into two distinct and for the
most part unrelated sets of concerns: the early work concerned with
mathematics, logic, the foundations of algebra and geometry, and the
philosophy of science; and the later work concerned with metaphysics,
cosmology, and humanistic discussions. Those who read in one of these
groupings of writings generally ignore the other. Palter argues
Palter, Whitehead’s
Philosophy of Science, pp. 1-4. Mays, Whitehead’s Philosophy of
Science and Metaphysics, pp. 9-11 also so argues and patterns his
argument after Palter.
that there is an inherent relationship between Whitehead’s “scientific”
and “metaphysical” work. I think that Palter’s argument can be
substantiated and supplemented by pointing out the consistent concern
with the basic concepts and assumptions of science Whitehead maintains
throughout all his work.
0ne major example of
this consistently maintained concern is the often unread Part IV of
Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology
(New York: Macmillan, 1929), “The Theory of Extension.”
His concern is to ground science by making these concepts as clear and
faithful to the facts of experience and the assumptions as reasonable as
he possibly can.
The key to understanding Whitehead’s
consistent concern with the basic concepts of science lies in
recognizing that in Whitehead’s view these basic concepts of time,
space, objects, location, motion, points, and so on, are the fundamental
working tools which guide and influence the scientific analysis of
nature. Concepts are in effect hypotheses, general hypotheses that make
possible the framing of all less general hypotheses in science.
See Alfred North
Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: Macmillan, 1933; Free
Press pb. ed., 1967), Chapter IX, Sections iii, v-vii, pp. 144, 154-158
(hereafter cited as AI, with Chapter and Section numbers,
followed by pp. numbers of Free Press pb. ed.). See also Alfred North
Whitehead, Religion in the Making (New York: Macmillan, 1926;
Meridian pb. ed. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1960), Chapter IV,
section 1, p. 127 (hereafter cited as RM, with Chapter and
Section numbers, followed by pp. numbers of pb. ed:). Also, from
Whitehead’s earlier work, see the following statements from “The
Organization of Thought,” (1916), IS, pp. 21, 34: “At the stage
where we now are, the formulation of the concepts can be seen to be as
important as the formulation of the empirical laws connecting the events
in the universe as thus conceived by us . . .” “One great use of the
study of logical method is not in the region of elaborate deduction, but
to guide us in the study of the formation of the main concepts of
science.”
Whitehead is concerned to clarify these concepts and bring them into
accord with the actual facts of experience. But underlying these
concepts, indeed underlying the whole pursuit of science, are the basic
assumptions of scientists: that the method of induction is possible and
fruitful; that causality is a real element of nature; and, ultimately,
that there is an “order of nature” to be discovered. This last
assumption is the scientific “faith” that nature is inherently
intelligible. These assumptions are the most basic, foundational
hypotheses of science, and they are interrelated. Scientific activity
makes no sense, cannot be understood, and is absurd unless one assumes
the existence of some order in nature to be discovered, the existence of
causality which enables the construction of explanatory descriptions of
the natural order, and the faith that the method of induction will
enable the scientist to trace causal connections. A significant portion
of Whitehead’s later work is devoted to the grounding, justification and
support of these fundamental assumptions of science.
The topics of
causality, induction, and the order of nature all receive extended
discussion in each of Whitehead’s “later” works.
Without these foundational assumptions or most general hypotheses of
science there is no reason for observing nature and hoping to frame any
specific hypothesis that will be explanatory of it. To anticipate my
later discussion, observation is the first moment in the method of
empirical science, and the formation of hypotheses is its central
creative moment. It is Whitehead’s continuous interest in legitimating
or grounding this central creative moment of scientific method that
constitutes at least one unbroken thread running through all of his
work. Full discussion of these issues must be reserved for a later
section, but at the outset it is important to note that Whitehead’s
later discussions of empirical method, causality, induction, and the
order of nature are the manifestations of his continuing concern to
ground science in as coherent and reasonable a way as possible.
Forward to The Method of Empirical Science
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