Process, Insight, and Empirical Method
An
Argument for the Compatibility of the Philosophies of Alfred North
Whitehead and Bernard J. F. Lonergan and Its Implications for
Foundational Theology.
A
Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Divinity School, The
University of Chicago, for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
December 1983
Thomas Hosinski, C.S.C.
Chapter I:
Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s Interpretations of Empirical Scientific
Method and Philosophic Method [continued]
Lonergan’s Interpretation of Scientific and Philosophic Method
The Method of
Empirical Science and Philosophy
Since I will be considering all the
topics of this section in more detail in Chapter III of my study, my
discussion here will be much briefer than in the last section. But I
must present at least in summary fashion how Lonergan conceives the
relations between empirical scientific method and philosophy in order to
begin formulating my thesis and to prepare for the task of Chapter II.
It is easiest to understand the
broad lines of Lonergan’s conception of the relation between empirical
scientific method and philosophy if we recall his reasons for
undertaking such an extensive analysis of empirical scientific method.
[See Thesis, pp. 53-56.]
His inquiry is into the nature of
human understanding itself. He has studied empirical scientific method
because it provides clear and precise examples of the different kinds of
activities that constitute the successive levels of the cognitional
process, because the transition to modern physics presents a good deal
of evidence about the nature of knowing, and because the faith of the
scientist is pinned not on any particular scientific conclusion but on
the validity of scientific method itself. Lonergan’s purpose, then, is
to move through and beneath empirical scientific method in order to come
to an understanding of understanding, to a knowing of human knowing. Lonergan
is convinced that only by beginning with such an understanding and
knowing of human understanding and knowing can philosophy (and
ultimately, theology) proceed on a constructive path in the modern
period.
I will attempt to summarize
Lonergan’s interpretation of the relation between empirical scientific
method and philosophy in the following way. First, I will consider the
relation of scientific method to the development of cognitional theory,
epistemology, and philosophic method. Secondly, I will consider the
development of transcendental metaphysics and the relation between
metaphysics and science and scientific method. Finally, I will indicate
why Lonergan’s discussion of the world view implied by his
interpretation of empirical scientific method presents a puzzle to me,
and I will try to determine its relation to his understanding of
metaphysics.
Cognitional Theory, Epistemology, and the Method of Philosophy
We recall that at several
significant points in his study of empirical scientific method Lonergan
notes that there are two sorts of data and, consequently, two modes of
cognitional process: the data of sense and the data of consciousness,
the direct mode of cognitional process investigating the former, the
introspective mode the latter.
[See ibid., pp. 75, 85.]
We also recall Lonergan’s statement that if empirical method, at least
in its essential features, could be applied to the data of
consciousness, the result would be “a generalized empirical method. [Insight, p. 74; and Thesis, p. 75.] Finally, we recall that the reason
Lonergan embarks on his extensive analysis of empirical scientific
method was not to exhibit his familiarity with modern science nor to
prove himself a philosopher of science, but rather a desire to reach,
identify and explain the elements of “the dyanmic structure immanent and
recurrently operative in human cognitional activity. [Insight, p.
xxii; see Thesis, p. 55.]
These positions provide the point of
departure for the development of philosophy in Lonergan’s thought in the
way that I will now try to explain.
First of all, in his analysis of the
various elements and operations and the dynamic pattern in which they
occur and recur, Lonergan did not discover something unique to the
empirical sciences. As we have seen implicitly throughout the study,
Lonergan states this
repeatedly both in direct statements and in his use of examples. He
treats this matter at some length in Insight in Chapters VI and
VII on common sense, consideration of which I omitted as not directly
relevant to my analysis of his ‘interpretation of empirical scientific
method.
these operations and their dynamic pattern are to be found in any
example of human cognitional knowing. In principle, one might begin
philosophical reflection by considering any act of human knowing. The
reason most of the examples in the first five chapters of Insight
are drawn from mathematics and the empirical sciences (especially
physics) is because of the clarity, precision, and success they have to
offer. In any case, the identification of these operations provides the
starting point for the application of a generalized empirical method to
the data of consciousness. Or, as Lonergan puts it,
the three levels of the direct mode
of cognitional process [i.e., empirical scientific method] provide the
data for the introspective mode; and as the direct mode, so also the
introspective unfolds on the three levels, an initial level of data, a
second level of understanding and formulation, and a third level of
reflection and judgment. [Insight, p.
274.]
An inquiry in the introspective mode of cognitional process will
eventuate in a cognitional theory and then the higher viewpoint of an
epistemology. But before attempting to explain this according to
Lonergan’s analysis, perhaps a more general presentation might clarify
what Lonergan is proposing and doing here.
We might say that Lonergan is
proposing a hypothesis and is intending to follow empirical method (in
its essential features) to test that hypothesis. He has observed that
empirical science is a successful kind of knowing, and that it is
precise and clear in its operations. He has further observed that
scientists (and, we might add, the general public) have great faith in
the validity of the scientific way of knowing. Perhaps he notes that
there seem to be correlations between some factors in the method of
empirical science and some factors in the exercise of rationality in
non-scientific thought. He has an insight that perhaps beneath all
forms of cognitional knowing there lies the same basic method and that
this method operates according to norms inherent in the cognitional
process itself. This insight is then expressed in the hypothesis: there
is a normative dynamic structure immanent and recurrently operative in
human cognitional activity. This hypothesis must be tested, and this is
where cognitional theory comes in. But cognitional theory does not
begin on the level of deduction and prediction and the devising of
thought experiments to test this hypothesis. As in the case in much
work of the empirical sciences, before the hypothesis can be tested an
investigator must return to the stage or level of observation and
description in order to determine precisely what it is that is going to
be tested for. Or, to put it another way, the hypothesis demands an
acuteness of observation and description before the hypothesis can be
stated precisely enough to be tested. And so the verification of
Lonergan’s hypothesis involves beginning again at the level of
observation and description, and the first ten chapters of Insight
are the developments that are necessary in order for the verification
made. The eleventh chapter, “Self-Affirmation of the Knower,” is where
the judgment of verification is actually made. But it is to be noted
that this first verification (the final moment of cognitional theory)
results only in the judgment that the operations described do occur,
that they occur in the particular pattern hypothesized by the
investigation, and that this pattern is verified as immanent in the
facts of cognitional process (which means that the pattern itself cannot
be revised).
[See Method, pp. 16-20; Insight, pp. 276-277, 304,
335-336.]
A great deal of evidence has been accumulated, but all that has been
affirmed or verified is that this is what people do when they think they
are knowing. There is yet the further question: how do we know that
this is really knowing? (Or, as Lonergan phrases this question for
intelligence, “why is doing that knowing?” [Method, p.
25.])
This launches the further inquiry that will end by affirming that this
immanent pattern of operations is knowing; and this inquiry is an
epistemology. Thus the development of Lonergan’s philosophy begins as
the attempt to verify an hypothesis using the essential features of
empirical method and applying that method to the data of human
consciousness rather than to the data of sense, and it continues by
pursuing the further questions that arise. Let us now see in slightly
more detail how his cognitional theory and epistemology develop.
As we have seen, cognitional theory
begins by observing and describing the operations involved in the
cognitional process. It would be possible to go through my discussions
in the previous section and show how Lonergan’s analysis follows the
basic pattern of empirical method, but that does not seem necessary to
me. The important point is that cognitional theory discovers the
operations, their relation, their normative pattern of occurrence, their
recurrence, and their immanence in the cognitional process. The
hypothesis has been prepared for testing. The test is whether or not
one can affirm that this description and explanation of the cognitional
process is really so. It is in the formulation of this test that
Lonergan takes the “turn to the subject:” the question for reflection is
“Am I a knower?”
Insight, p. 319. For the
sake of brevity I will here omit discussion of how this question is
answered in the self-affirmation of the knower, but I will take it up in
Chapter III.
It is to be noted that this “turn to the subject” does not appear out of
the thin air;’ the way has been prepared for it all along by a constant
reference of the operations to the operator.
While this is clear in
Insight itself, it is more compendiously expressed in the
summaries of Method, pp. 7-20, and of “Cognitional Structure,”
Collection, pp. 222-227.
The inquiry all along has been into the human subject as knower, and
when the affirmation is made that, yes, I am a knower, the cognitional
hypothesis has been verified and the inquirer now has a basic method
that can be used to continue his or her inquiry into the further
questions that express philosophical problems. Lonergan calls this
method “transcendental method.”
Method, pp. 13-20. There is
a significant development in Lonergan’s vocabulary and thought between
Insight and Method. While I will consider these
developments in Chapter III, I here prescind from such considerations
for the sake of brevity.
It is the most basic pattern of the process of human knowing, and is at
work in any and all instances of human knowing. But it is in making
this method conscious and objectifying it (i.e., in the development of
cognitional theory) that philosophy gains its central method. Lonergan
summarizes the inquiry of cognitional theory in the following way. If
one denotes the various operations by reference to the principal
activity on each of the levels of human consciousness, one can summarize
the basic pattern of operations as experiencing, understanding, judging,
and deciding.
Method, p. 14. Note that
Lonergan here speaks of a fourth level of human consciousness that in
Insight does not appear until Chapter XVIII, “The Possibility of
Ethics.”
Objectifying this pattern so as to arrive at transcendental method
consists in:
(1) experiencing one’s experiencing,
understanding, judging, and deciding, (2) understanding the unity and
relations of one’s experienced experiencing, understanding, judging,
deciding, (3) affirming the reality of one’s experienced and understood
experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding and (4) deciding to
operate in accord with the norms immanent in the spontaneous relatedness
of one’s experienced, understood! affirmed experiencing, understanding,
judging, and deciding.
[Method, pp.
14-15.]
As we have seen, after the judgment
affirming the reality of the normative pattern of cognitional process in
the knower, a further question for intelligence arises: “Why is doing
that knowing?” In other words, the judgment terminating cognitional
theory (in affirming the reality of the cognitional process) provides
the first level data, observations, and descriptions for another
inquiry, epistemology. The inquirer, pondering this question, has an
insight which is expressed in the epistemological hypothesis “that
knowledge in the proper sense is knowledge of reality, or more fully,
that knowledge is intrinsically objective, that objectivity is the
intrinsic relation of knowing to being, and that being and reality are
identical.”
“Cognitional
Structure,” Collection, pp. 227-228. Lonergan here calls this
“the epistemological theorem.” Chapters XII and XIII of Insight,
pp. 348-384, are the argumentation in support of this hypothesis. This
issue is not treated at length in Method; see pp. 20-21.
The key to verifying this hypothesis lies in an analysis of the
intentionality of the cognitional process, and in establishing that
knowing in this way is intrinsically objective.
Thus Lonergan embarks on an analysis
of the intentionality of knowing. He notes that the pure desire to know
has an objective, namely, being. This intended objective is
unrestricted and comprehensive; that is, “its ultimate goal is the
universe in its full concreteness.”
“Cognitional
Structure,” Collection, p. 228. The argumentation in support of
my summary can be found in Insight, pp. 348-374.
In this sense, being is identical with reality. Lonergan argues that
being, then, is to be known in judgment. The notion of being thus
constitutes the supreme heuristic notion of cognitional process. It
thus underpins and constitutes all cognitional contents as cognitional,
and is the core of all meaning. In short, the drive, the motive power
of the dynamic structure of human knowing is its intrinsic relation to
being, its intention of being. The final affirmation that this is,
indeed, knowing can take place once one has had the reflective insight
that this cognitional process with its intention of being is inherently
and intrinsically objective.
[Insight, pp. 375-384.]
Lonergan establishes this by
exhibiting the relation of the notion of being, correct judgments, and
objectivity. While I will not discuss the details of this argument
here, I might note that it is Lonergan’s interpretation of objectivity
that allows him to resolve or evade what might appear to be the central
problem of epistemology: How does the knower get beyond himself to a
known?”
. . . we contend that, while the
knower may experience himself or think about himself without judging,
still he cannot know himself until he makes the correct affirmation, I
am. Further, we contend that other judgments are equally possible and
reasonable, so that through experience, inquiry, and reflection there
arises knowledge of other objects both as beings and as being other than
the knower. Hence, we place transcendence, not in going beyond a known
knower, but in heading for being within which there are possible
differences and, among such differences, the difference between object
and subject. Inasmuch as such judgments occur, there are in fact
objectivity and transcendence; and whether or not such judgments are
correct it is a distinct question to be resolved along the lines reached
in the analysis of judgment. [Ibid., p.
377.]
Before following Lonergan’s path to
yet a higher viewpoint, let me pause and reconsider the relation of
empirical scientific method to cognitional theory and epistemology.
First, then, empirical scientific method provide a clue for cognitional
analysis; it provides the clue in the success of its knowing, but even
more so in the fact that the trust of the scientist is in the validity
of empirical scientific method itself, not in the contents of the
sciences. Secondly, empirical scientific method provides the data for
the development of cognitional theory; it provides the data in its
normative pattern of related and recurrent operations. Or, put another
way, empirical scientific method in its general and essential features
is an example of transcendental method at work, calling forth and
guiding the development, use, and application of all special methods
within the special sciences. It is an example of the activity of the
very method (transcendental method) cognitional theory intends to reach.
Thirdly, to say that empirical scientific method is an example of
transcendental method at work does not mean that empirical scientific
method is a model for philosophic method. Although transcendental method
is active in the employment of empirical scientific method, it is
neither conscious nor objectified as transcendental, and it does not
become known as the basic method of philosophy until it has been made
conscious and objectified by the whole circuit of cognitional theory.
What cognitional theory discovers and affirms is not that philosophic
method must be modeled after empirical scientific method, but rather
that underlying all methods there is a dynamic and normative pattern of
recurrent and related operations which, when made conscious and
objectified, not only reveals the unity in all human knowing but also
provides philosophy with its basic method. Finally, it can be said that
there is a structural identity between transcendental method and
empirical scientific method in its general and essential features. The
methods themselves are not identical, since empirical scientific method
does not require for its application the making conscious and
objectifying of transcendental method as transcendental. Fundamentally,
however, empirical scientific method and the basic method of philosophy
have the same dynamic structure.
Transcendental Metaphysics and Its Relation to Science and Scientific
Method
The dynamism of human knowing does
not end with its discovery of transcendental method, its own basic
dynamic structure. It impels the knower to ask what is known when one
is engaged in knowing, and this is the question of metaphysics. [See ibid., Chapters XIV-XVII, pp. 385-594; and Method,
pp. 20-23, 24-25.]
While a full discussion of
Lonergan’s develop-ment of metaphysics must await Chapter III of my
study, some brief consideration of several of those developments must be
given here, especially those bearing upon empirical science and
scientific method.
First of all, a metaphysics that
operates in accord with the norm involved at the final moment of
affirming oneself as a knower (the norm being: deciding to operate in
accord with the norm immanent in the now-affirmed cognitional process
[See Thesis, p. 101; and Method, pp. 15, 20.]), allows the development of a
critical realism. Here transcendental method has two distinct but
related functions, a critical and a dialectical function. [For this and what immediately follows, see Method, pp.
20-21 and Insight, pp. 385-389.]
The critical function allows the inquirer to understand that
disagreements between thinkers on the nature of reality can be reduced
to disagreements about knowledge and objectivity. Disagreements on
objectivity can be reduced to disagreements on the activity of knowing,
or cognitional theory. Furthermore, disagreements about cognitional
theory can be settled by making explicit the contradiction between a
mistaken cognitional theory and the actual conduct or performance of the
thinker espousing that mistaken theory. The dialectical function
of transcendental method is the determination of the “basic positions”
affirmed by a critical application of transcendental method, and of the
“basic counter-positions” refuted by criticism. The “basic positions”
(on the real, knowing, and objectivity
[See Insight,
p. 388.])
are the affirmations of cognitional theory and epistemology. The
dialectical application of transcendental method allows the inquirer to
deal with the multitude of philosophical arguments on these questions,
reversing all counter-positions and developing all positions. The
critical and dialectical functions of transcendental method are the
basic working tools of metaphysics.
But what exactly is metaphysics?
Since metaphysics is intended as the answer to the question of being
(“What do I know when I’m knowing?”), and since the notion of being
underlies, penetrates, and transcends all other notions [See Thesis,
p. 101, and Insight, pp. 356-357.], “metaphysics is the department of
human knowledge that underlies, penetrates, transforms, and unifies all
other departments.”
[Insight, p.
390.]
But it exists in three forms or stages: latent (when it is
operative but not conscious of itself); problematic (when the
need for it is felt but accounts of knowing, reality, and objectivity
are enmeshed in a mixture of positions and counter-positions); and
explicit (when the latent metaphysics always at work succeeds in
conceiving itself
[Ibid., p. 391.]). Explicit metaphysics, then, will
integrate the heuristic structures of human understanding and yield an
understanding of the basic structure of all there is to be known, the
universe of “proportionate being.”
In its full sweep, being is whatever
is to be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation. But
being that is proportionate to human knowing not only is to be
understood and affirmed but also is to be experienced. So proportionate
being may be defined as whatever is to be known by human experience,
intelligent grasp, and reasonable affirmation. [Ibid.]
Explicit metaphysics can then be defined as “the conception,
affirmation, and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of
proportionate being.”
[Ibid.]
What Lonergan means by
an “integral heuristic structure” is this. As we have seen in
Lonergan’s analysis of the elements of insight, further discussed in his
analysis of mathematics and empirical science,
prior to the understanding that
issues in answers, there are the questions that anticipate answers; and
as has been seen, such anticipation may be employed systematically in
the determination of answers that as yet are unknown; for while the
content of a future cognitional act is unknown, the general
characteristics of the act itself not only can be known but also can
supply a premise that leads to the act. A heuristic notion, then, is
the notion of an unknown content and it is determined by anticipating
the type of act through which the unknown would become known. A
heuristic structure is an ordered set of heuristic notions. Finally, an
integral heuristic structure is the ordered set of all heuristic
notions. [Ibid., p. 392.]
Metaphysics does not invent or
create heuristic notions and structures. They are the products of human
intelligence at work in life and in the specialized sciences and
disciplines (including cognitional theory and epistemology.) What
metaphysics does is take these heuristic notions and structures made
available to it by the other disciplines and integrate them so as to
formulate the heuristic structure of proportionate being itself. Thus
the relation between metaphysics and the empirical sciences is to be
discovered in the task and the method of metaphysics. That relation can
be summarized by considering six points.
(1) Metaphysics is in a certain sense dependent on the special sciences
(as well as on all other examples of human intelligence and
reasonableness). As just mentioned, metaphysics does not invent its own
data; it receives its data from the sciences, other disciplines, and
from reflections on life as lived (common sense).
Metaphysics does not undertake
either to discover or to teach science; it does not undertake either to
develop or to impart common sense; it does not pretend to know the
universe of proportionate being independently of science and common
sense; but it can and does take over the results of such distinct
efforts, it works them into coherence by revising their
counter-positions, and it knits them into a unity by discerning in them
the concrete prolongations of the integral heuristic structure which it
itself is. [Ibid.,
p. 393.]
(2) As this quotation also
indicates, the appropriation by metaphysics of these heuristic notions
and structures is not uncritical. Because of the various biases and
confused notions on reality, objectivity, and knowing to which the human
subject so easily falls victim, the metaphysical appropriation of the
sciences’ heuristic notions and structures involves critical evaluation
in order to reverse any counter-positions in which they may be expressed
and to express them instead in the basic positions worked out by
cognitional theory and epistemology.
[See ibid., pp.
388, 398-399.]
This critical appropriation adds coherence to the “results” of the
special sciences.
(3) Metaphysics unifies the sciences
(or offers the real possibility of such unification) “by discerning in
them the concrete prolongations of the integral heuristic structure
which it itself is.” That is, metaphysics discerns in the special
sciences the concrete applications of all heuristic notions, and in
doing so it establishes the fundamental unity of the sciences.
See Method, p.
24, where Lonergan applies this also to the integration of all knowing.
(4) and (5) Intimately related to
the point I have just mentioned, the critical appropriation and
unification of the sciences also has two other important effects for the
sciences. It grounds the sciences by anchoring their special methods in
the dynamic structure of human knowing; and it gives the sciences the
general view of the whole the sciences are trying to understand.
If the metaphysician must leave to
the physicist the understanding of physics and to the chemist the
understanding of chemistry, he has the task of working out for the
physicist and chemist, for the biologist and the psychologist, the
dynamic structure that initiates and controls their respective inquiries
and, no less, the general characteristics of the goal towards which they
head.
[Insight, p. 498; see also pp. 507-509.]
This view of metaphysics as giving scientists “the general
characteristics of the goal towards which they head” does not infringe
upon the proper autonomy of the sciences, for the metaphysical elements
in Lonergan’s interpretation are only the structure; they possess no
content of their own.
. . . they express the structure in
which one knows what proportionate being is; they outline the mould in
which an understanding of proportionate being necessarily will flow;
they arise from understanding and they regard proportionate being, not
as understood, but only as to be understood.
. . . If one wants to know just what
forms are, the proper procedure is to give up metaphysics and turn to
the sciences; for forms become known inasmuch as the sciences
approximate towards their ideal of complete explanation; and there is no
method, apart from scientific method, by which one can reach such
explanation. [Ibid., pp. 497-498.]
(6) Since metaphysics is not dealing
only with the sciences, but with all other disciplines and “common
sense” as well, there results from metaphysics an integration of the
sciences with all other human cognitional activity, and this might be
called an integration of all knowing. Thus the final service of
metaphysics to the sciences is to bring them into relationship not only
with each other but also with all other forms of cognitional knowing.
Finally, it should be noted that
Lonergan claims an essential stability for this metaphysics.
[See ibid., pp. 393-394.]
This is not to say that there cannot be modifications and improvements
made in the expression of it, but in order to do so one would have to
employ exactly the transcendental method Lonergan has described and
explained. To the extent that one’s cognitional theory and epistemology
are correct, to that extent one will be able to specify the basic
metaphysical elements that are not based on any particular content or
forms, but rather on the fundamental and unchanging dynamic structure of
human knowing. Since that essential structure cannot change, neither can
the essential structure of metaphysics.
Emergent
Probability, Metaphysics, and Science
Having seen in the two preceding
subsections the direction Lonergan’s analysis of empirical scientific
method takes him in the development of cognitional theory, epistemology,
and metaphysics, I will conclude with what is for me still a puzzle: the
relation of the “world view” of emergent probability to the empirical
sciences and to metaphysics. The full discussion of this puzzle
properly belongs to Chapter III of my study, and so all I wish to do
here is indicate why it is a puzzle for me and outline very briefly a
possible way of resolving the puzzle.
Lonergan develops his account of
“emergent probability” in Chapter IV of Insight, “The
Complementarity of Classical and Statistical Investigations.”
Ibid., pp. 115-128; see
pp. 128-139 for Lonergan’s contrast of this world view with those
associated with the names of Aristotle, Galileo, Darwin, and the world
view called Indeterminism.
Lonergan has previously argued that
classical and statistical investigations are complementary in their
structure of knowing.
[See Thesis,
pp. 79-80.]
Now he argues that since there must be some correspondence between
knowing and known, his affirmation of both classical and statistical
laws necessarily implies a world view that must be made explicit. My
puzzle is that I am not sure which department of human knowledge
produces or expresses this world view. It bears the ear-marks of a
cosmology, yet it is not produced by generalizing any of the particular
ideas of the sciences, but rather by an analysis of the structure of
empirical method. Hence this world view is not produced by the sciences
themselves, nor is it based on any content of the sciences, and Lonergan
asserts that it is independent of any changes that might occur in the
content of the sciences.
[Insight, pp. 116-117.]
Yet Lonergan asserts that this view of world order is an explanatory
account of the intelligibility immanent in world process, and that it is
thus “within the limits of empirical method.”
[Ibid., p. 128.]
If this cosmology is not produced by
the sciences and is not dependent on the content of the sciences, then
is it produced by cognitional theory? Apparently not; at least
cognitional theory alone is not enough to produce such a world view.
The affirming judgment terminating cognitional theory has not yet
affirmed that the cognitional process is objective knowing of the real,
only that it is what one does when one thinks one is knowing. Likewise,
epistemology and cognitional theory alone cannot produce this world
view. First, while epistemology affirms that the cognitional process is
objective knowing of the real, it does not concern itself with what is
known, only with the knowing. Secondly, the critical and dialectical
functions of transcendental method are necessary in order to establish
such a world view, develop its basic positions, contrast it with
competing world views, reverse the basic counter-positions of those
world views, and affirm that, indeed, emergent probability is the world
view implied by the dynamic structure of human knowing. But the
critical and dialectical functions of transcendental method are not
employed until one has begun the inquiry of metaphysics. Thus it seems
that it is metaphysics that produces this world view. This
interpretation seems substantiated when Lonergan again discusses
emergent probability in the chapter on “Elements of Metaphysics.”
[Ibid., p. 462.]
I will briefly indicate here why
this is a point of some interest to me. The world view of emergent
probability is an explanatory account of the intelligibility of world
process that falls within the limits of empirical method. It thus might
prove helpful to scientists in some way. Yet this is not its main
purpose. Rather, in my provisional understanding, the principal purpose
of this world view is to offer an explanation of why and how the
sciences can explain. This might seem to be a matter of small account,
but it is actually rather important for my study since, as I noted
above, it is also Whitehead’s understanding that the purpose of
metaphysical explanation is not to explain concreteness, but to explain
the possibility of abstraction (which is in his philosophy the way in
which explanations are produced).
[See Thesis, pp. 50-51.]
Hence if the production of the world
view of emergent probability is correctly placed within the department
of metaphysics, and if I have interpreted Lonergan’s meaning correctly,
this provides a point of contact and similarity between Lonergan’s and
Whitehead’s conception of the role of metaphysics. From this initial
clue it might prove possible to argue to a certain degree of
compatibility between two metaphysical positions that initially appear
to be quite incompatible.
Forward to
A Comparison of Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s Interpretations of
Scientific and Philosophic Method
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