Process, Insight, and Empirical Method
An
Argument for the Compatibility of the Philosophies of Alfred North
Whitehead and Bernard J. F. Lonergan and Its Implications for
Foundational Theology.
A
Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Divinity School, The
University of Chicago, for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
December 1983
Thomas Hosinski, C.S.C.
Chapter III:
The Influence of Empirical Method in Whitehead’s and Lonergan’s Analyses
of Human Subjectivity [Continued]
Whitehead’s Analysis of Human Subjectivity [Continued]
Consciousness,
Rationality, and Knowing [Continued]
Propositions and
Propositional Feelings: Simple Comparative Feelings
Whitehead argues that propositions
have a much wider role in the universe than logicians and philoso-phers
have accorded them. They are generally re-garded as the intellectual
material for judgments. In Whitehead’s interpretation they are to be
understood as lures for feeling, the trailblazers for the world’s
advance into novelty.
[See PR, 11.9.i
(M, pp. 281, 284; C, pp. 184-185, 187); II1.4.ii (M, pp. 395-396;-C, p.
259).] Here again
Whitehead takes his clue from human subjective experience. He examines
instances of how propositions function in human experience and then, on
the basis of what he discovers, he gener-alizes the function to all
occasions of experience.
When we examine our own behavior and
that of our fellow human beings, it is an obvious fact that intellectual
judgment only occasionally and fitfully determines our conduct. Our
action, our practice, is much more commonly determined by goals and
ideals which we often have great difficulty bringing to conscious
attention and evaluation. Each one of us is to some extent or another
the servant of purposes unconsciously arrived at. Yet we feel, vaguely
or overwhelmingly at times, responsible for what we have done, for the
purposes we have pursued and served with our lives. Even in cases in
which we have entertained propositions quite consciously and
attentively, we often find that we have committed ourselves to the
germinal purpose contained in the proposition without exercising what
the philosophers call intellectual judgment. On occasion we may even
commit ourselves to purposes going against the dictates of our judgment.
As we have already seen, what lies beneath our decisions to act is the
pursuit of value, and most often we engage in that pursuit without
having made intellectual judgments. We act on the basis of an emotional
appetition for value. This is illustrated both in the baser actions of
human beings, pursuing purposes of which we are later ashamed, and in
the heights of altruistic religious commitment to transcendent values.
. . . consider a Christian
meditating on the sayings in the Gospels. He is not judging “true or
false”; he is eliciting their value as elements in feeling. In fact, he
may ground his judgment of truth upon his realization of value. But such
a procedure is impossible, if the primary function of propositions is to
be elements in judgments.
[PR, 11.9.1 (M, p. 281; C, p. 185).
The same is illustrated in our aesthetic experience. Whitehead uses the
famous soliloquy of Hamlet as an example, and points out that no one in
the audience is judging “true or false”; they are reacting to the
proposition, “To be or not to be . . . ,” as a lure for feeling. [Ibid.]
That proposition is for the audience, at least at the actual moment of
hearing it, purely theoretical, yet it leads them to feel the tragedy in
Hamlet’s imaginary life and perhaps to a deeper sympathy for the
possible tragedies of every human life. The feeling of value is what
underlies our enter-tainment of propositions and our pursuit of purposes
expressed in them. Judgment, if it occurs at all, arises later, as a
critic of our actions and the values we have pursued and shall pursue in
the future.
As we shall see below,
in the following two subsec-tions, Whitehead’s point is not to downplay
the importance of judgment at all, but rather to illustrate its role so
that the importance of its practical and transcendent functions may be
seen more clearly.
Metaphysically, then, a proposition is a lure for feeling. Propositions
in themselves occur throughout nature, although they may not be felt as
such. We have already considered the simplest case of propositions
which are not felt or entertained as propositions by the actual entities
exhibiting them. These are what Whitehead calls “physical purposes.” As
we saw above
[See Thesis, p. 282.], physical purposes are the final
determination of “subjective aim” in the lowest grade of actual
entities, and they are determined by the integration of a concrescent
entity’s conceptual feelings with its physical feelings so as to achieve
a subjective unity of feeling. Thus all subjective aims, considered in
themselves, are propositions. Low-grade occasions of experience,
however, do not feel their subjective aims as propositions. They
terminate their concrescence with the integration of conceptual and
physical feelings, and do not prehend their integration as a datum for
further feeling. In high-grade occasions, however, those which are
characterized by “flashes of novelty in appetition” in their mental
poles, “the appetition takes the form of a ‘propositional prehension.’”
[PR II.9.i (M, p. 280; C, p. 184).]
The concrescing entity feels the presence of a possibility. This is what
Whitehead means by a “propositional feeling.” Such propositional
feelings do not necessarily involve consciousness, though as we shall
see below, consciousness always involves propositional feelings.
At this point it would be of
assistance to know to what in the more common parlance concerning the
objects of our experience Whitehead is referring. Whitehead is
characteristically reluctant to draw definite lines among the “objects”
we experience in nature and identify some one group as illustrating the
various phases of concrescence. He says explicitly that the
cosmological scheme “requires us to hold that all actual entities
include physical purposes,” and that “the constancy of physical purposes
explains the persistence of the order of nature, and in particular of
‘enduring objects.’”
[PR, III.S.vii (M, p. 421; C, p. 276).] An “enduring object” is “a genetic
character inherited through a historical route of occasions.”
[PR, II.3.xi (M, p. 166; C, p. 109).] It is a “society” of actual
occasions enjoying “personal order,” and as such it is a special case of
a “nexus” with “social order.” A “nexus” is a set or grouping of
occasions which are together by some form of prehension by or
objectification in each other.
[See PR, I.2.i (M, p. 30; C, p. 20) and ii, Category of
Explanation xiv (M, p. 35; C, p. 24).]
A nexus is said to have “social
order” or to be a “society” when there is a common form of definiteness
illustrated in each of its actual entities, when that common form arises
in each actual entity of the nexus “by reason of the conditions imposed
upon it by its prehensions of some other members of the nexus, and
[when] these prehensions impose that condition of reproduction by reason
of their inclusion of positive feelings of that common form.”
[PR, I.3.ii (M, pp. 50-51; C, p. 34).]
Such a society is said to have “personal order” “when the genetic
relatedness of its members orders those members ‘serially.’”
[Ibid. (M, p. 51; C, p. 34).
That is, there is a historic route of transmission from one actual
occasion to the next, passing on for inheritance a defining
characteristic. Any “slice” or “cut” through this historic route of
occasions encounters a single actual occasion, which has inherited the
defining, characteristic from all the rest of the series in its past and
which bequeaths itself and that characteristic to all the rest of the
occasions in that series lying in its future.
[Ibid. (M, pp. 51-52; C, pp. 34-35.)
A society with such personal order is what Whitehead defines as an
“enduring abject.”
An ordinary physical object of the
type we are familiar with in our daily lives, such as a rock or a chair,
is a complex society made up of many “strands” of enduring objects.
Such a complex society is what Whitehead terms a “corpuscular society,”
because such societies generally form what we normally call a material
body. An enduring object itself, however, may or may not form a
material body. [See ibid. (M,
p. 52; C, p. 35), and II.3.xi (M, p. 166; C, p. 109).]
When we couple these definitions
with Whitehead’s understanding that actual occasions concresce but do
not change, that actual occasions do not move, and that actual occasions
do not experience the passage of time (the passage of time being the
transition between occasions),
On lack of change in
actual entities, see PR, I.3.ii (M, p. 52; C, p. 35), and Index
to C. ed., entry “Change: not attributable to actual entities.” On
actual entities not moving, see PR, II.2.iv (M, pp. 113-119c, pp.
73-77). On actual entities enjoying quanta of time but not its passage,
see PR, I.3.iii (M, pp. 52-53; C, pp. 35-36) and IV.1.i (M, pp.
433-434; c, pp. 283-284).
we can begin to make some rough assignments of the type of natural
events or “objects” of our common speech that Whitehead is talking
about.
Of the “objects” we encounter in the
world of daily experience, the animal body represents the most complex
form of society. Along with the vegetables, all forms of life are what
Whitehead generally calls “living societies.” In the inorganic realm,
the objects we deal with every day are “corpuscular societies.”
Enduring objects can form a material body, Whitehead says. Although he
says nothing explicit about this, I suspect that no material body we can
see with unaided eyesight is as simple as an enduring object. The
examples Whitehead does give for enduring objects are electrons,
protons, and photons.
See PR, I.3.iii
(M, pp. 53-54; c, p. 36), and II.3.ii (M, pp. 139141; C, pp. 91-92).
Whitehead’s most extended attempt to provide a hierarchy of the
societies composing our epoch is PR, II.3.iv-xi (M, pp. 147167;
C, pp. 96-109).
In short, as far down as the realm of sub-atomic particles, we are still
dealing with complex societies.
Returning to the concern which
motivated this excursus on hierarchies of societies, it is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to give a concrete line of separation
between actual occasions capable of the higher phases of experience and
those which are not. What kind of an actual occasion can feel a
proposition? Certainly actual occasions in the life-histories of all
living forms have the capacity to feel propositions. I cannot judge
with any assurance here, but I suspect that perhaps actual occasions in
the life-histories of the more complex inorganic societies, such as the
chemical structures studied in organic chemistry, are capable of feeling
propositions. To speculate for a moment, I am not sure how one can
account for the amazing diversity of such inorganic bodies as rocks if
all occasions in the life-histories of rocks are incapable of feeling
propositions. To the average observer, “When you’ve seen one rock,
you’ve seen them all.” But to those who study rocks in the laboratory,
it soon becomes obvious that no two rocks are the same. There is, in
short, an observable uniqueness to each rock. It is difficult for me to
understand how such amazing diversity can be achieved unless at least
some occasions in the life-history of the complex societies of rocks are
capable of feeling a proposition. Yet once given a certain level of
diversity in the components of rocks, it is clear that rocks exhibit
only “physical purposes.” They are what they are because of what was
there when they were formed.
But how does one understand the rise
of the diversity of a rock’s component parts? How does one understand
the diversity of minerals, elements, crystal structures, molecules, and
so on? If our planet began from a more or less homogeneous state (as
most theories of planetary origin hold), it would seem that in order to
understand the amazing diversity in the inorganic realm, one must hold
open the possibility that at least some of the occasions initiating
enduring objects must have been capable of feeling propositions, and
this on a relatively low level of physical organization.
Be this as it may, Whitehead refuses
to make any firm identifications of the sorts of “objects” whose actual
occasions are capable of feeling propositions. Moreover, even though it
may be impossible to determine exactly how far down in the hierarchy of
societies the feeling of propositions is possible, it seems relatively
clear that the feeling of propositions is not an important instrument of
novelty until we arrive at living societies. To put this differently,
it may be possible for some inorganic occasions to feel a proposition in
very rare instances, but relative to the massive continuity of physical
purposes studied by the physical sciences, such occasions would appear
to be quite rare. Among living societies, however, the feeling of
propositions becomes a much more frequent occurrence in some of the
actual occasions of those societies. Clearly among the higher animals,
and even among the invertebrates, the feeling of propositions must be
one of the major factors underlying the diverse and novel modes of
animal behavior.
I must now consider the nature of a
proposition more closely
My account of this
aspect of Whitehead’s philosophy and its implications shall be
relatively brief. For a thorough study of this entire aspect of
Whitehead’s thought and its implications for religion, see Ste-phen T.
Franklin, “Speaking From the Depths: Alfred North Whitehead’s
Metaphysics of Propositions, Symbolism, Perceptions, Language, and
Religion,” Ph.D. Dissertation, The Divinity School, The University of
Chicago, 1976.
since it is one of the basic elements in Whitehead’s account of the
possibility of knowing. “A proposition is a new kind of entity. It is
a hybrid between pure potentialities and actualities.”
[PR, II.9.i (M, p. 282; C, pp. 185-186).]
Pure potentialities, or eternal objects, in themselves do not have any
determined reference to particular actual entities.
. . . an eternal object refers only
to the purely general any among undetermined actual entities. In
itself an eternal object evades any selection among actualities or
epochs. You cannot know what is red by merely thinking of redness. You
can only find red things by adventuring among physical experiences in
this actual world. This doctrine is the ultimate ground of
empiricism; namely, that eternal objects tell no tales as to their
ingressions.
[PR, III.4.i (M, p. 391; C, p. 256).]
Hence eternal objects and conceptual feelings in themselves have no
particular reference to this actual world. They speak only of abstract
potentiality, telling no tales of what in fact is. On the other hand,
actual entities (considered as “superjects” or “objects”) have reference
only to what has in fact been. They tell tales only of what they have
become, what the actual world is in them. These are the two primary
types of entities.
[See PR, II.9.i (M, p. 287; C, pp. 188-189).]
A proposition is a hybrid type of entity. “Such entities are the tales
that perhaps might be told about particular actualities. Such entities
are neither actual entities, nor eternal objects, nor feelings.” [PR, III.4.i
(M, p. 392; C, p. 256).] Rather, they mix the potentiality of
eternal objects with the limiting conditions set by actual entities and
thus serve as the datum for complex feelings.
As a hybrid entity, a proposition
exhibits characteristics of both primary types of entities from which it
is derived. To understand this fully, we must consider both
propositions in themselves and propositional feelings.
The fullest account of
the following is PR, 111.4.i (M, pp. 392395; C, pp. 256-259).
A proposition has logical subjects and predicates. The logical subjects
are a definite set of actual entities originally prehended in the
physical feelings of a concrescent occasion. The predicates are a
definite set of eternal objects originally prehended in the conceptual
feelings of a concrescent occasion. When the concrescent entity
integrates its physical feelings and conceptual feelings the result is a
proposition. This fusion necessarily involves a double abstraction or
elimination concerning the data of the pure physical and conceptual
feelings. The integration abstracts from or eliminates the absolute
generality of reference of eternal objects which are the data of
conceptual feelings. In the integration the eternal object is
restricted in reference to this particular set of actual entities (the
logical subject of the proposition).
Thus abstraction from
potentiality runs toward determination or concreteness, the opposite
direction from which abstraction from actuality runs. See SMW, X,
pp. 245-246.
The integration also abstracts from or eliminates the full concrete
actuality of the actual entities which are the data of physical
feelings. These logical subjects of the proposition
are reduced to the status of food
for a possi-bility. Their real role in actuality is abstracted from;
they are no longer factors in fact, except for the purpose of their
physical indication. Each logical subject becomes a bare “it”
among actualities, with its assigned hypothetical relevance to
the predicate.
. . . the peculiar objectification
of actual entities, really effected in the physical feeling, is
eliminated, except in so far as it is required for the services of the
indication. The objectification remains only to indicate that
definiteness which the logical subjects must have in order to be
hypothetical food for the predicate.
[PR, III.4.i (M, p. 394; C, p. 258).]
The proposition is thus a complex entity, composed of determinate but
reduced actual entities and indeterminate but restricted eternal
objects, related in a definite but indeterminate pattern. “The
proposi-tion is the possibility of that predicate applying in
that assigned way to those logical subjects.
[Ibid. See also III.4.iii (M, pp. 398-399; C, p. 261).]
A proposition is an entity, but it
is not an actual entity. Since by the ontological principle entities
appealed to for explanatory purposes cannot simply float in out of the
blue, every proposition must be somewhere, that is, it must have a locus
in actuality, which means in actual entities. What, then, is the locus
of a proposition?
The “locus” of a proposition
consists of those actual occasions whose actual worlds include the
logical subjects of the proposition. When an actual entity belongs to
the locus of a proposition, then conversely the proposition is an
element in the lure for feeling of that actual entity.
[PR, II.9.i (M, p. 283; C, p. 186).]
The proposition thus “exists” in any
number of actual occasions, but it may not be admitted into feeling by
any of them. A proposition that is admitted into feeling is said to be
“realized” by a member of its locus. This realization however, is not
yet a propositional feeling; it may be a simple physical purpose, which
feels the proposition not as a proposition, but merely as the subjective
aim forming its purpose. I shall discuss this difference at more length
below. In order to understand the difference, however, I must first
consider how a proposition may be related to the actual world of a
member of its locus.
There are only two types of
relationship between a proposition and the actual world of a member of
its locus. “The proposition may be conformal or non-conformal to the
actual world, true or false.”
[Ibid. (M, p.
284; C, p. 186).]
In fact, the proposition must be true or false. There are several
important points to be noticed about this. First, this is one way in
which a proposition differs from an eternal object. Eternal objects can
never be true or false; they just are. This is because “truth and
falsehood are always grounded upon a reason. But . . . a reason is
always a reference to determinate actual entities.”
[PR, III.4.i
(M, p. 392; C, p. 256).]
Since eternal objects in themselves abstract from all determinate actual
entities, referring with absolute generality to any actual entities,
there can be no reason upon which to found the truth or falsehood of
eternal objects. Propositions, however, do have reference to determinate
actual entities. Hence they must be true or false. Secondly, though
propositions must be true or false, in themselves they are indeterminate
as regards their truth or falsehood.
[Ibid. (M, pp. 393, 394-395; C, pp. 257, 258).]
That is, propositions contain as components determinate actual entities
(their logical subjects) which are the reasons determining the true or
falsehood of the proposition. But if we consider the proposition
itself, without recourse to the reasons, the proposition “tells no tale
about itself.” [Ibid. (M, p. 393; C, p. 257).]
The proposition alone does not proclaim its truth or falsehood, only its
possibility. In this way, propositions are indeterminate and are like
eternal objects.
A proposition shares with an eternal
object the character of indeterminateness, in that both are definite
potentialities for actuality with undetermined realization in actuality.
But they differ in that an eternal object refers to actuality with
absolute generality, whereas a proposition refers to indicated logical
subjects.
[Ibid. (M, p. 395; C, p. 258).]
The proposition shares with actual entities the char-acter of referring
to determined matter of fact, but differs from them in presenting not
what is, but what might be in the given situation. The proposition is
thus a true hybrid, exhibiting characteristics of both its parent
entities.
There is yet one important point to
be noticed about the truth and falsehood of propositions. False
propositions, when considered by logicians, are merely wrong.
Metaphysically, however, false propositions are the instrument of the
world’s creative advance.
The conception of propositions as
merely material for judgments is fatal to any understanding of their
role in the universe. In that purely logical aspect, non-conformal
propositions are merely wrong, and therefore worse than useless. But in
their primary role, they pave the way along which the world advances
into novelty. Error is the price which we pay for progress.
[PR, II.9.i (M,
p. 284; C, p. 187).]
This profound observation calls for some explanation. A true proposition
is one that conforms to the actual world of a member of its locus.
When a conformal proposition is
admitted into feeling, the reaction to the datum has simply resulted in
the conformation of feeling to fact, with some emotional accession or
diminution, by which the feelings inherent in alien fact are synthesized
in a new individual valuation. The prehension of the proposition has
abruptly emphasized one form of definiteness illustrated in fact.
[Ibid. (M, p.
284; C, pp. 186-187).]
This describes the formation of a physical purpose and, as we have
already seen
[See Thesis,
pp. 283, 286-287.],
such physical purposes are not instruments of novelty in the universe.
A false proposition, in contrast, is one that does not conform to the
actual world of a member of its locus.
When a non-conformal proposition is
ad-mitted into feeling, the reaction to the datum has resulted in the
synthesis of fact with the alternative potentiality of the complex
predi-cate. A novelty has emerged into creation. The novelty may
promote or destroy order; it may be good or bad. But it is new, a new
type of individual, and not merely a new intensity of individual
feeling. That member of the locus has introduced a new form into the
actual world; or, at least, an old form in a new function.
[PR, II.9.i (M,
p. 284; C, p. 187).]
It is primarily through the feeling of false or non-conformal
propositions that novelty actually emerges in the world. The entity
feeling a false proposition and deciding to actualize it, in doing so
synthesizes what has been with what might be and creates something new.
For example, as I write this, the proposition “there exists a
dissertation arguing a fundamental similarity between the philosophies
of Whitehead and Lonergan” is false. Entertaining this proposition,
however, has lured me through long months of work to make it true.
Something similar occurs uncon-sciously throughout the universe, and is
the way in which new truth is born. That is why Whitehead says, “in the
real world it is more important that a proposition be interesting than
it be true. The importance of truth is, that it adds to interest.”
[PR, III.4.ii (M, pp. 395-396; C, p. 259).]
What, then, is the difference
between proposi-tional feelings and the formation of physical pur-poses?
The simple comparative feelings—physical purposes and propositional
feelings—have the same structure but are different feelings with
different subjective forms. Though every subjective aim is a
proposition, physical purposes do not feel their aim as a proposition.
We have seen that one of the major characteristics of a proposition is
its indeterminate-ness. To have a propositional feeling is to feel that
indeterminateness. Physical purposes, in contrast, in their appetition
push that indeterminateness to the background. Further, a proposition
reduces the datum of physical feelings to the status of bare logical
subjects, food for possibility. Physical pur-poses, in contrast, do not
so reduce the datum of the physical feelings. The actual entity forming
a physical purpose continues to feel the datum of its physical feelings
as factors in fact. Hence, though the physical purpose is in actuality
a proposition, the concrescing entity feeling its physical purpose does
not feel it as a proposition. The proposition has been “realized,” but
it has not been “realized” that it is a proposition; the contrast
involved in the union of its component parts has not been felt by the
concrescing subject.
[See PR, III.5.vii (M, pp. 421-423; C, pp. 276-277).]
In a propositional feeling the con-crescing subject feels that contrast.
Propositional feelings do not
necessarily involve consciousness.
[PR, III.4.ii,iii,v (M, pp. 396, 399, 402; C, pp. 259, 261, 263);
III.5.vii (M, pp. 427-428; C, p. 280).]
As we shall see below, consciousness
arises in a later integration involving propositional feelings as one of
the components. The subjective form of proposi-tional feelings,
however, always involves “decision,” that is, adversion or aversion.
[PR, III.4.iii
(M, p. 399; C, p. 261).]
The subjective forms of
propositional feel-ings are dominated by valuation, rather than by
consciousness. In a pure propositional feeling the logical subjects
have preserved their indicated particularity, but have lost their own
real modes of objectification. The sub-jective form lies in the
twilight zone between pure physical feeling and the clear conscious-ness
which apprehends the contrast between physical feeling and imagined
possibility. A propositional feeling is a lure to creative emergence in
the transcendent future. When it is functioning as a lure, the
propositional feeling about the logical subjects of the proposition may
in some subsequent phase promote decision involving intensification of
some physical feeling of those subjects in the nexus. Thus, according
to the various cate-goreal conditions, propositions intensify,
atte-nuate, inhibit, or transmute, without necessarily entering into
clear consciousness, or encountering judgment.
[PR, III.4.v (M, p. 402; C, p. 263).]
The decision in the subsequent phase (the final determination of
subjective aim) may also be to ignore the proposition even though it is
felt. Thus whether or not the proposition is effective as a lure, the
concrescent subject entertaining it will make some decision relative to
it.
Propositional feelings mark a stage
intermediate between the largely unoriginative stage of physical
purposes and the highly originative stage of conscious purposes.
The propositions are lures for
feelings, and give to feelings a definiteness of enjoyment and purpose
which is absent in the blank evaluation of physical feeling into
physical purpose. In this blank evaluation we have merely the
determination of the comparative creative efficacies of the component
feelings of actual entities. In a propositional feeling there is the
“hold-up” . . . of the valuation of the predicative pattern in its
relevance to the definite logical subjects which are otherwise felt as
definite elements in experience. There is the arrest of the emotional
pattern round this sheer fact as a possibility, with the corresponding
gain in distinctness of its relevance to the future. The particular
possibility for the transcendent creativity—in the sense of its advance
from subject to subject—this particular possibility has been picked out,
held up, and clothed in emotion.
[PR, III.5.viii
(M, pp. 427-428; C, p. 280)]
Propositional feelings are thus very
important in the life-histories of “enduring objects.” They are the
feelings that dominate within any “physical object” that displays
growth. Whitehead states this as follows:
. . . there is a zest for the
enhancement of some dominant element of feeling, received from the data,
enhanced by decision admitting non-conformation of conceptual feeling to
other elements in the data, and culminating in a satisfaction
transmitting enhancement of the dominating element by reason of novel
contrasts and inhibitions. Such a life-history involves growth
dominated by a single final end. This is the main character of a
physical object in process of growth. Such physical objects are mainly
“organic,” so far as concerns our present knowledge of the world.
[PR, II.9.i (M,
pp. 285-286; C, p. 188)]
As an occasion admits into its
concrescence the selected elements of the propositional lure, as felt
contraries, it generates purpose of the sort that we can observe in
physical growth of corpuscular societies. Propositional feelings thus
qualify efficient causation. They are also the necessary but not
sufficient condition of the possibility of conscious-ness. “A felt
‘contrary’ is consciousness in germ.”
[Ibid. (M, p. 286; C, p.188)] I now turn to a consideration of
how consciousness arises.
Forward to
Intellectual Feelings and Consciousness: Complex Comparative
Feelings
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