Attempts to Clarify
Classical Theism's Problem of Evil
The Idiocy of Johnson's Theodicy: A Letter to
Would If He Could, But He Can't So He Doesn't: A Response to
Benjamin D. Wiker Followed by Dr. Wiker's Reply
Even a Good Neighbor, Let Alone Worthy of Worship: A Letter to
Does God Permit Evil?
Something Good Because God Commands It? Or Does God Command It
Because It Is Good?
A Catholic Dilemma
David Ray Griffin's
Ideal for Theodicy
See also essays listed on
should be part of a total theo-logical position that is intended to
be more consistent, adequate, and illumina-ting of our experience
than any of the al-ternative philosophical and theological positions
of the time. Such a theodicy cannot merely show that the evils of
the world do not necessarily contradict belief in God’s perfect
goodness and power. Nor can such a theodicy resort to encouraging
us to believe that there is a God of perfect goodness and power
in spite of the fact that the appearances suggest that some
other hypothesis is more probable. Rather, such a theodicy must
attempt to portray the world so that the hypothesis that the
world has been created by such a God seems more likely than
other hypo-theses, so that those who accept this belief can come to
perceive the world in these terms. In such a theodicy the
evils of the world should not be an embar-rassment to the total
theological position; they should not be that ‘fact’ to which the
theology somehow manages to be ‘ade-quate’ but which would fit more
comfor-tably within some contrary hypothesis. Rather, the theodicy
should ideally be more illuminating of the nature of evil, and the
reason for its existence, than other portrayals of reality,
including atheistic ones.
“Creation Out of Chaos and the Problem of Evil,”
in Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy, Stephen T.
Davis, ed., Atlanta, John Knox Press, 1981, p. 119.