From Whose Togas I Dangle
W. Norris Clarke, S.J.
June 1, 1915-June 10, 2008
The writings of the late Father W. Norris Clarke, an
appreciative and engaging critic of Whitehead and
Hartshorne,
has forced me to rethink my under-standing of St. Thomas. I spoke
with him briefly by phone in the early '90s when I was working my way
through David Braine's The Reality of Time and the Existence of God,
which Clarke had reviewed for
The International Philosophical
Quarterly.
Remembering many years later the cheerfulness and
energy with which he took that call from a stranger, I regret I did not
keep in touch. Fortunately, all of his major papers have been
anthologized. In addition to several that have meant a great deal
to me, I will hunt down and format for posting nonanthologized articles
and reviews. What I have done so far is listed below.
Anthony Flood
May 22, 2010
Clarke’s
Journey: In His Own
Words
I
started off as a convinced Thomist from my first philosophical training
with the French Jesuits at Jersey, under the guidance of the brilliant
young Thomistic metaphysician, Andre Marc, from whom I developed a keen
appreciation of the basic metaphy-sical structure of the real according
to the vision of St. Thomas. Also decisive was my private reading of
Joseph Marechal’s whole history of Western thought, Point de depart
de la metaphysique, culminating in his seminal Vol. V on Aquinas
himself, in which he stressed the innate dynamism of the human intellect
toward the Infinite Fullness of being as the ultimate foundation of all
human inquiry; added to this was my underground reading of the then
temporarily banned Blondel’s Action (1st edition, 1893—better
than all the later more cautious revisions), which powerfully
highlighted the complementary dynamism of the human will toward the same
fullness of being as good. I have always held onto these two fundamen-tal
insights of St. Thomas as the basic for all human inquiry and search for
the good, but I am not a full card-carrying member of the Transcendental
Thom-ism school, for various technical reasons regarding whether and how
they reached fully existential being as the basis of metaphysics by
their method.
The
historically important rediscovery of the pro-foundly existential
character of St. Thomas’s meta-physics, centered on the act of existence
(esse) as the fountainhead of all perfection, both in creatures
and in God, diversified by various modes of limiting essence, was just
getting under way when I was at Jersey (1936-39), under the dramatic
leadership of Etienne Gilson in the 5th edition of Le Thomisme,
but I took full explicit possession of this deeply inte-grating insight
into Aquinas’s thought during my M.A. in philosophy at Fordham, under
the direction of Anton Pegis, disciple and colleague of Gilson at
Toronto. So I became what soon became known as an “existential Thomist.”
The
next significant phase of my philosophical development came during my
Ph.D. studies at Louvain, under the well-known Thomists Van Steen-berghen
and De Raeymaeker. Here I shared in the exciting rediscovery of the
central role of Neopla-tonic participation in the metaphysics of
Thomas, especially as the basic structure behind the relation of
creatures to God, going far beyond what he could get from Aristotle
alone—all this from my reading and discussions with Geiger, Fabro, De
Finance, etc. Now I came to understand St. Thomas’s entire meta-physical
system as an original synthesis of Aristo-telianism and Neoplatonism. I
wrote my thesis pre-cisely on the development of this synthesis in
Thomas (summarized in the first, widely circulated article in my list of
publications) a theme not yet widely known, it seems, in American
Catholic Thom-istic circles.
The
last key element in my philosophical forma-tion I picked up also during
my doctorate at Louvain. All around me were blossoming the new movements
of phenomenology, both the older more austere school of strict
Husserlian phenomenology, which interested me less than the newer more
existential interpersonalist phenomenologies of thinkers like Emmanuel Mounier, Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel, Maurice Nedoncelle, John
Macmurray, etc., and to a lesser extent Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin
Heidegger. I plunged deeply into them for months, before returning to
St. Thomas for my dissertation. I saw the need now for both these
approaches as complemen-tary to give us a more fully rounded
understanding of the real. The interpersonal phenomenologies need the
ontological grounding of dynamic substance or nature as a unified center
for its many relations and its self-identity through time; Thomistic
metaphysics needs to enrich the data it is seeking to explain by the
more detailed concrete descriptions of the actual life of real persons
provided so richly by phenomeno-logy. A creative synthesis was needed.
This I have tried to outline in Person and Being (l993), now in
its fifth printing, and my widely circulated article, “To Be Is to Be
Substance-in-Relation” (1992), which sur-prised many non-Thomists.
In
doing this I identify myself with the growing, late 20th century
movement called “Personalist Thomism.” One leading center of this has
been the Lublin School of Thomism (Poland), of which the best-known
representative is Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II), with his seminal
book, The Acting Person and other similar writings.
From Fordham University site, W. Norris Clarke
page.